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• Renewables are now powering year-round habitation in TAR, dual-use infrastructure and the expansion of settlements into more permanent border towns.

• Surplus power and expanding power corridors create scope for electricity exports to the geographical neighbourhood.

• Renewable energy hubs in TAR appear to be scaling up fast. Still, environmental safeguards and protections for local culture/livelihoods are likely being treated as secondary priorities as build-out accelerates.

• Renewable energy “Development” jobs often require specialised skills, so workforce inflows from other provinces can dilute local benefit-sharing and, over time, add demographic/cultural pressures.

1. INTRODUCTION

While the previous edition of the Geospatial Bulletin examined solar energy harvesting in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in depth, this edition turns to the other pillars of electricity generation on the plateau: geothermal, wind, and hydropower. The focus is not simply on where these projects exist, but on what they are designed to achieve: the scale of deployment, the stated purpose of these sites, the technological shifts enabling high-altitude operations, and the way infrastructure is being arranged and connected across TAR.

This assessment sits within a broader national context in which China’s renewable build-out has crossed a historic threshold. Total installed renewable capacity has reached 1,889 GW, accounting for 56% of the nation’s power capacity: wind and solar alone amount to 1,482 GW, overtaking thermal power at 1,451 GW. China also met its 2024 target of 1,200 GW of wind and solar six years ahead of the 2030 deadline announced by President Xi in 2020. By current estimates, China accounts for 44% of global renewable capacity and hosts approximately 64–74% of the world’s utility-scale renewable projects under construction. Against that scale, the TAR’s contribution is surprisingly modest: it holds less than 0.5% of China’s renewable capacity, about 7.176 GW out of 1,889 GW, roughly comparable to Austria’s solar photovoltaic capacity. Yet this small base masks a turning point: the region is now entering an acceleration phase, with substantial additions anticipated during 2026–2030.

Within TAR itself, the energy mix reveals an active contest between hydropower and solar. Rapid advances in solar panels and energy storage are helping solar expand quickly and compete more directly with hydropower, particularly in areas where grid upgrades and storage reduce concerns about intermittency. According to available data, the renewable energy breakdown is roughly as follows: hydropower ~53.7%, solar photovoltaic ~36.3%, and solar thermal ~1.4%. Other sources remain comparatively minuscule, wind nearly 3% and geothermal around 0.5%, but their strategic value is growing as developers push into higher altitudes and more remote locations. This competition could be decisively reshaped by the proposed 60 GW mega hydropower dam, which, if realised, would expand generation on a scale that could tilt the balance back towards hydropower for decades, particularly given its perceived reliability in meeting rising demand.

Official projections point to a potential steep change in TAR’s renewable trajectory. From a base of roughly 7.2 GW in 2024, capacity could rise to 9 GW in 2025 and 22.5 GW by 2030, lifting annual generation from around 17.5 TWh to approximately 70 TWh. The longer-term ambition is even larger: 100 GW by 2050 and 150 GW by 2060, with output increasing to approximately 350 TWh and 475 TWh, respectively. The strategy described in planning documents is an integrated portfolio in which the proposed Medog mega dam (60 GW) functions as the cornerstone, supported by expanding solar and wind capacity across the plateau. If Medog proceeds at scale, some projections suggest that TAR’s renewable energy capacity could reach about 210 GW by 2035, with annual generation nearing 750 TWh. Such an outcome would elevate TAR into a central clean-energy hub, reshape regional economic structures, strengthen China’s position on energy security, and accelerate the broader national transition through a combination of large-scale hydropower and solar build-out, expanded grid infrastructure linking interior settlements, and electrification of industrial and transport sectors.

These ambitions are reinforced by major transmission planning. A key element is the West-to-East power transmission programme, intended to move electricity from resource-rich western regions to energy-hungry eastern manufacturing centres. Targets under this approach envisage delivery of around 500 billion kWh annually to eastern hubs by 2050, a dramatic increase from the roughly 15.4 billion kWh transmitted since 2015. TAR’s future generation capacity becomes meaningful only at the national level if it can be distributed effectively; transmission corridors are therefore not a supporting detail but a central feature of the strategy: they link disparate renewable hubs, reduce curtailment risk, and turn remote generation into a system-wide asset. As renewable energy generation in TAR already exceeds local requirements, surplus electricity is increasingly transported to other parts of China. This infrastructure expansion also creates potential opportunities for electricity export to landlocked neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan. Well-established transmission networks and abundant energy resources could enable China to offer competitively priced electricity to these countries, with significant strategic implications for India’s regional energy diplomacy and economic influence.

These ambitions are reinforced by major transmission planning. A key element is the West-to-East power transmission programme, intended to move electricity from resource-rich western regions to energy-hungry eastern manufacturing centres. Targets under this approach envisage delivery of around 500 billion kWh annually to eastern hubs by 2050, a dramatic increase from the roughly 15.4 billion kWh transmitted since 2015. TAR’s future generation capacity becomes meaningful only at the national level if it can be distributed effectively; transmission corridors are therefore not a supporting detail but a central feature of the strategy: they link disparate renewable hubs, reduce curtailment risk, and turn remote generation into a system-wide asset.

Against this backdrop, the sections that follow offer a spatial analysis of TAR’s renewable infrastructure beyond solar, and examine geothermal, wind, and hydropower, where capacity is being concentrated, how projects are being networked through transmission, and how these developments may influence the plateau’s internal settlement patterns, industrial priorities, and the broader geopolitical environment around the Himalayas.

2. GEOTHERMAL ENERGY

The Himalayan Geothermal Belt (HGB) stretches over 3,000 km from Pakistan to Myanmar and Thailand. Formed by the Indian–Eurasian plate collision, it concentrates high-temperature fields along the Yarlung Tsangpo fault zone, where crustal deformation and elevated heat flow sustain extensive hydrothermal systems.

In terms of footprint, the region is home to two operational geothermal plants - Yangbajing and Yangyi. While Yangbajing is the most widely known geothermal site in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the exact locations of several other geothermal fields and operational stations are not publicly disclosed. At the same time, the region also features tourism facilities centred on hot springs, indicating that geothermal resources are used not only for energy and research purposes but also for recreation and visitor-oriented activities. Yet, the plateau stands out as a mesmerising geyser basin, home to approximately 672 active geothermal zones. Among these, 34 zones exhibit remarkable potential, surpassing 150 °C.

It’s fascinating to note that not all these geothermal features are suitable for exploitation. The variety within these zones is striking, ranging from steam vents and destructive hydrothermal explosions to bubbling hot springs, with many sources exceeding 80 °C.

Table 1 illustrates the differences between various types of geothermal resources in TAR.

In summary, fumaroles represent dry steam venting, boiling springs represent steady hot-water flow, and hydrothermal explosions represent catastrophic steam release. They form a continuum reflecting increasing instability and pressure within geothermal systems.

The Yangbajing region near Lhasa in TAR is one of the world’s most extensively studied geothermal fields. A fault-bounded basin beneath the majestic Nyainqentanglha mountain range characterises this system.

The geothermal reservoir comprises two distinct units: a shallow reservoir located at depths of approximately 180 to 280 meters and a much deeper reservoir that reaches depths of around 5 kilometres. The heat that fuels this system is derived from a cooling magmatic body within the fractured granitic rocks of the Himalayas.

Geochemical and isotopic studies have provided compelling evidence that meteoric water precipitation that infiltrates the ground percolates through the extensive network of faults in this region. As these waters descend, they are subjected to increasing temperatures and pressures, which cause them to heat further with depth. Eventually, this heated water rises to the surface, contributing to the region’s notable geothermal features, including hot springs and fumaroles.

The unique geological and hydrological dynamics in Yangbajing highlight the complexity of the geothermal systems in this area and have significant implications for scaling geothermal as a sustainable energy source in this high-altitude environment.

2.1 Is this a new plant developed in response to China’s recent renewable energy push in the TAR?

The answer is “no”. Commercial activity began in 1977 with the establishment of China’s first high-temperature geothermal plant at Yangbajing, which had an initial capacity of 1 MW. Between 1981 and 1991, eight additional units, each with a capacity of 3 MW, were added. Later, in 2009-2010, two screw-expansion generators with a capacity of 2 MW were introduced, bringing the total capacity to approximately 26 MW.

Several medium- and low-temperature systems, including Dengwu, Huitang, Langjiu, and Naqu, were ultimately decommissioned due to a combination of factors. These systems faced significant challenges, including poor economic performance that made them unsustainable, persistent scaling issues that hindered their operational efficiency, and modest thermal efficiency that failed to meet industry standards. Consequently, their inability to deliver optimal performance led to their decommissioning.

Regarding utilisation, while reservoir characteristics technically limit power generation, direct applications are diverse. These include greenhouse and space heating, balneology (the study of therapeutic baths), medical uses, and industrial washing. During the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), policies encouraged the exploration of Hot Dry Rock (HDR) resources in southern Tibet, indicating a shift toward deep-heat extraction. Concepts for Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS), which utilise fracture-controlled reservoirs, have also been proposed for areas like Yangbajing and Gulu.

In recent years, extensive research has been dedicated to sustainably harnessing geothermal potential. A significant initiative aimed at this goal is the effort to interconnect isolated electricity grids, which will facilitate the connection of remote power generation sources and ensure energy distribution to locations with limited access to electricity, even reaching some of the most distant areas.

Notable projects include the Qinghai–Tibet Networking Project, launched in 2011, which successfully integrated Tibet’s 500 kV electricity network with the national grid. This ambitious initiative was bolstered by the establishment of 16 strategically positioned substations, enhancing the efficiency and reliability of electricity transmission across the region.

Another groundbreaking attempt is the Qamdo–Shenzhen Ultra High Voltage (UHV) transmission initiative, slated for completion in 2025. This project aims to transmit approximately 10 gigawatts of renewable energy, derived from geothermal, hydro, and solar sources, over an impressive 2,681-kilometre distance to the Greater Bay Area. This initiative is projected to reduce carbon emissions, offsetting around 12 million tonnes of coal annually, contributing significantly to environmental sustainability, and supporting China’s 2060 Carbon net-neutrality mission.

2.2 Is geothermal energy extraction a safe practice?

The process’s safety profile is complex and warrants careful consideration, particularly the management of geothermal fluids. Incomplete reinjection of these fluids, which are frequently enriched with minerals such as boron and fluoride, has led to localised soil contamination and increased sedimentation risks in vulnerable Tibetan alpine ecosystems. This situation highlights the necessity for robust environmental safeguards. Key priority measures to mitigate these risks include implementing comprehensive reinjection protocols, enhancing waste-stream management strategies, and exploring selective hybridisation with solar energy technologies. Such integration can optimise the performance of geothermal plants while minimising their environmental footprint.

Furthermore, with diligent reservoir management and strict adherence to environmental compliance standards, Tibet’s geothermal resources have the potential to advance a low-carbon energy portfolio significantly. They can complement existing hydropower and solar systems, meet local heating demands, and bolster grid stability. However, any efforts to scale up geothermal extraction must be cautiously approached, as they may pose serious environmental challenges and profoundly affect local communities. A new geothermal facility has been successfully established in Nagqu at an altitude of 4500 m. By overcoming two significant challenges, this facility has successfully tapped Nagqu’s geothermal resources, ensuring stable system operation. As a result, it now provides heating to nearby urban areas in Nagqu for 7 months without interruption.

Notably, the economic viability of geothermal energy remains a critical concern. Despite its potential benefits, it is still regarded as one of the less favoured renewable energy resources for utility-scale extraction, primarily due to upfront costs for exploration, drilling, infrastructure, and ongoing management expenses. These financial challenges can hinder large-scale deployment despite the long-term advantages.

3. WIND ENERGY

China has reported remarkable growth in wind energy capacity within the TAR over recent years, reflecting a significant commitment to renewable energy development in this challenging environment. In 2023, TAR added a substantial 700 megawatts (MW) of wind power capacity by completing 11 projects. This momentum continued into 2024, when the region expanded its capabilities by an impressive 860 MW from 15 additional projects. The upward trajectory of wind energy development accelerated further in 2025, with the area seeing a notable increase of 2,600 MW attributed to just two large-scale initiatives.

Label 1 marks part of the Omatingga Wind Power Project, while Label 2 points to another wind project in the Nagqu area. Both sites are located at altitudes above 4,500 metres, highlighting the development of wind power in extreme plateau conditions. Label 4 indicates a military zone, and Label 5 appears to mark a heliport inside or close to that zone. Given the proximity, it is plausible that the army facilities could draw electricity from the Omatingga wind site (Label 1), either directly or through the local grid. At the same time, Nagqu city is more likely to rely on power from Site 2, along with additional supply from a solar farm south of the town, suggesting a combined wind–solar energy base supporting civilian demand. Among these projects, the Omatingga Wind Power Project near Nagqu City stands out as a landmark installation. Commissioned in early 2024, this facility boasts a capacity of 100 MW. It operates at altitudes ranging from 4,500 to 4,800 meters, earning the title of the world's largest high-altitude wind farm at the time. The project incorporates nearly 25 wind farms, each with a capacity of 4 MW, spread across an area exceeding 140,000 square meters. It is projected to generate slightly over 200 million kilowatt-hours of clean electricity annually to sustain around 200,000 residents, thereby presenting a significant boon to local energy resources and contributing to environmental sustainability.

In October 2024, according to the media claims, another key facility commenced operations in Baxoi County in eastern TAR. This installation features 20 advanced wind turbines with a total capacity of 100 MW, each standing at an impressive 5,305 meters. This positions it as the world’s highest wind farm. The design and engineering of these turbines have successfully addressed various classical challenges, such as blade stall, ensuring optimal performance even under extreme conditions. These turbines are building resilience against low temperatures, intense ultraviolet radiation, and frequent thunderstorms, thanks in part to nationwide efforts initiated in 2019 that established standards for high-altitude wind turbines, intended for installation at 2,000 meters and above. These standards focus on achieving stable operations and ultra-high efficiency, like in other previous projects.

In addition to standalone renewable energy initiatives, several integration projects are currently under development to enhance the efficiency and reliability of energy production in the region. A noteworthy example is the Sakya Wind and Solar Integration Project, spearheaded by CNNP (Chinese National Nuclear Power) Rich Energy Co Ltd. This ambitious project is now in its final debugging stage and is set to commence operations within this month. Once operational, it is projected to generate 300 MW of renewable energy, with wind power contributing 200 MW through the installation of 40 state-of-the-art turbines, each with a capacity of 5 MW. This significant output is expected to yield over 600 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) of clean energy annually, helping meet the region’s energy needs. Current reports indicate that the installed capacity of solar and wind power in the area has exceeded 9,000 MW, with solar energy accounting for the predominant share. However, the wind energy sector is rapidly gaining ground, reflecting a growing commitment to diversifying energy sources.

3.1 Technological advancements

High-altitude wind farms in TAR have expanded faster because China has developed technology made for plateau conditions. Site selection employs advanced wind resource mapping and computational fluid dynamics modelling to study wind behaviour in complex mountain terrain, select the best sites, and estimate the electricity each location can produce before construction begins. This reduces trial-and-error and helps design wind farms more efficiently.

Chinese turbine makers have also improved equipment to work in thin air, extreme cold, and sudden weather changes. Turbines are fitted with better stability and control systems so they can run smoothly even when winds shift quickly. Key parts are strengthened to handle hail, lightning, and heavy wear from wind, dust, snow, and ice. Cold-weather features such as heating, moisture control, and upgraded insulation help prevent failures, while improved lightning protection reduces damage during storms. Developers also use stronger blades and more durable surface coatings so the turbines last longer in harsh conditions.

Just as important, China has improved the “support system” around these wind farms. Remote sites are monitored using sensors and remote diagnostics, enabling faults to be detected early and repairs to be planned quickly. Before a wind farm starts operating, every turbine is carefully tested, and the entire electrical system is checked and appropriately connected to the nearby grid infrastructure. Better transmission links and grid management have made it easier to transmit electricity from remote parts of TAR, which is essential for turning strong plateau winds into usable power.

3.2 Do these wind farms only bring power?

The establishment of wind farms in remote regions can expand electricity generation capacity and, when integrated with broader grid systems, improve electricity supply. Beyond power, these projects also support job creation and the development of technical capabilities for renewable-energy operations. Each wind turbine can require around 8 to 10 qualified technicians and workers for a range of operational activities, including monitoring, maintenance, repairs, and related logistics. However, while renewable energy infrastructure expansion and associated urban development may create new employment opportunities in TAR, many of these positions tend to require skilled labour in specialised fields such as electrical engineering, turbine maintenance, and grid management. As a result, a portion of these roles may be filled by workers brought in from other Chinese provinces rather than local Tibetan populations, particularly where access to relevant technical training and certification is limited. Although such employment trends are often presented as economic development for the region, the distribution of benefits may not be uniform across communities and, in some contexts, can contribute to demographic and cultural pressures. At the same time, project proponents and official narratives frequently claim that job inflows contribute to socioeconomic development and that exposure to large-scale renewable projects can support the growth of a workforce more familiar with advanced technologies and modern energy practices—though the extent of local participation may vary across locales and policy designs.

Enabling these wind farms in challenging terrain has required significant investment in supporting infrastructure and exceptionally robust transport networks. Good-quality roads have enabled the transport of extremely long wind turbine blades, close to 90 metres in length, and large components such as hubs and tower sections, often moved from manufacturing sites over 1,000 kilometres away. This improvement in connectivity has practical implications for construction timelines and for the ongoing operation and maintenance of wind facilities, including the movement of heavy equipment, spare parts, and technical personnel. It also highlights the broader role of enabling infrastructure in determining where high-altitude wind projects can be built and maintained at scale, and how quickly they can be expanded in remote areas.

Overall, the wind energy initiatives in TAR reflect China’s broader strategy to expand renewable generation into high-altitude and remote areas. In policy terms, these projects can help diversify the regional energy mix and support emissions-reduction objectives, particularly when paired with transmission capacity and complementary sources such as hydropower. They also coincide with infrastructure build-out and the diffusion of technical systems into areas that have historically faced logistical constraints. At the same time, the socioeconomic effects are not uniform. They may vary across localities, depending on workforce availability, access to training, procurement decisions, and the extent to which local communities are integrated into construction and operations. As such, the wind build-out can be read as both an energy-transition initiative and a development intervention, with outcomes shaped by implementation choices as much as by installed capacity.

4. HYDRO ENERGY

TAR’s hydropower journey began in 1959 with Ngachen Station (7.5 MW), but growth remained modest until the 2000 ‘Great Western Development’ initiative. The pioneering plant, with an initial installed capacity of merely 7,500 kilowatts and powered by six generators, marked a significant historical milestone, powering TAR’s capital with electric lights for the very first time.

This initiative catalysed an unprecedented pace of hydro project development in TAR. Particularly in the past decade, the region has witnessed remarkable advancements. The deployment of cutting-edge technology to build high-performance, efficient dams is gradually overcoming previous limitations. One of the most ambitious projects on the horizon is the planned construction of the world’s largest hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River. With a staggering capacity of 60,000 megawatts, this project will dwarf China’s current largest dam. The significance of this venture extends beyond sheer scale; it is set in a region characterised by environmental fragility and a high susceptibility to natural disasters such as landslides and earthquakes. Despite these challenges, proponents of the mega dam project assert that it will not adversely affect downstream regions in India in terms of water flow or environmental degradation, an assertion that remains sceptical. Additionally, the ambitious plans include the development of five cascading dams on the Motu River, capitalising on an elevation drop of over 2,000 metres across a short span of less than 50 kilometres. This ingenious design is projected to generate an astounding 300 billion kilowatt-hours (300 TWh) of electricity annually.

Table 2 lists key hydroelectric projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

This study examines a few hydropower projects shown in figures (4-7) across three major river systems in the TAR. These rivers originate in high-altitude, glaciated mountain ranges at elevations above 5,000 metres and flow through deep valleys and gorges. Their hydrology is primarily shaped by glacial melt and monsoon rainfall, resulting in strong seasonal flows and significant energy potential.

The Yarlung Tsangpo and Lhasa rivers lie entirely within the TAR, while the Jinsha River forms much of the eastern boundary between Tibet and Sichuan before joining the Yangtze system. Together, these river systems support an extensive hydropower cascade, ranging from small run-of-the-river stations to the planned Medog hydropower facility, which is set to be the world’s largest.

Although the Yarlung Tsangpo has been examined in detail in earlier studies, this section focuses on the main hydropower projects along its course and tributaries as the river descends from high altitudes into narrow canyons. Key tributaries include the Lhasa, Nyang (Niyang), Nianchu, and Laka Zangbu rivers. One of the most prominent projects is the Zangmu Dam, a run-of-the-river facility with a capacity of 510 MW and an annual generation of about 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours. Most projects on this system follow a similar run-of-the-river model, with only limited storage. Other operating projects include the Dagu Hydropower Plant in Sangri County, commissioned in 2023 upstream of Zangmu, and the Jiacha Hydropower Project in Jiacha County, commissioned in late 2021 downstream of Zangmu. Major projects under construction include Jiexu and the highly anticipated Medog (Motuo) project, alongside several smaller planned installations. Close to 10 projects, ranging in scale, are operational, under construction, and planned in Yarlung Tsangpo.

The Jinsha River system originates in the Tanggula Mountains on the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau at elevations above 5,000 metres. Its headwaters form the Tongtian River, which flows southeast before becoming the Jinsha River near the Tibet–Sichuan border. For more than 400 kilometres, the Jinsha serves as a natural boundary between Tibet and Sichuan, cutting through deep gorges in eastern Tibet and western Sichuan. Key projects along this stretch include the Suwalong Hydropower Project, operational since 2022, and the Batang Dam, operational since around 2020. Large projects such as Yebatan, Lawa, and Changbo are under construction, alongside numerous smaller water conservancy schemes.

The third major system discussed is the Lhasa River, which originates on the southern slopes of the Nyenchen Tanglha Mountains near Lake Namtso at elevations between roughly 5,000 and 5,300 metres. Formed by the convergence of three smaller rivers, the Lhasa River flows through deep valleys in its upper reaches before turning southwest and passing through Lhasa city. It runs for about 450 kilometres before joining the Yarlung Tsangpo. Important hydropower projects on this river include the Pangduo Dam, with a capacity of 160 MW, commissioned in 2017, and the Zhikong Dam, a 100 MW facility operational since 2007. In addition, several smaller water conservancy projects are distributed along the river.

Overall, these three river systems form the backbone of hydropower development in the TAR. Beyond these, numerous dams and smaller conservancy projects are also present across western and central Tibet, reflecting the region’s growing role in China’s high-altitude hydropower strategy.

5. WORLD-RECORD CLAIMS: VERIFICATION AND REALITY

In 2025, China’s Tibet Autonomous Region was widely recognised as a frontier for “world-record” renewable energy. Some of this narrative holds up, particularly with projects like the Caipeng solar-plus-storage installation at 5,228 meters, the Zabuye concentrated solar power (CSP) project at approximately 4,500 meters, and the Qonggyai wind project, reportedly reaching 5,370 meters. These projects are well-documented as exceptionally high-altitude deployments.

However, the broader claims about records begin to falter upon closer inspection. Many impressive figures, such as annual energy generation, the number of households powered, emissions reductions, construction speed, and specific engineering details, are often based on project announcements rather than independent verification. Additionally, at least one wind power record claim lacks clear corroboration from accessible third-party sources. Even when the underlying technological advancements seem genuine, like the very large impulse turbine units developed by Datang Zala, phrases such as “world’s first” can sometimes be more promotional than officially validated.

While the Tibet Autonomous Region is plausibly emerging as a testbed for extreme-altitude renewable energy, only a subset of its claimed “world records” can be confidently asserted without careful qualification.

6. PARTING SHOT

China’s push in the TAR suggests a clear intent to draw on every available renewable source to advance its 2060 carbon-neutrality goal while accelerating regional development. In practice, this translates into rapid electrification to support the modernisation and urban growth of Tibetan towns, enabling a larger and more permanent human footprint in a harsh environment. Reliable, abundant power also underpins industrial expansion and resource extraction, turning electricity into a lever for reshaping TAR’s economy and land use. Crucially, the build-out is not confined to local consumption: surplus generation is channelled eastwards to industrial centres through new high-capacity transmission corridors designed to move power over long distances with minimal loss. Several grid projects are underway along multiple routes, linking distinct renewable hubs into an integrated system intended to capture and export the region’s energy potential. Over the years, a powerline network has been established across the TAR, with a higher density in the central and southern parts. This network increasingly connects major renewable energy sources with population centres, including remote areas. More than 90,000 electricity towers/poles are already present in the region, and the number continues to grow, underscoring the systematic expansion of electrification in the TAR.

These gains, however, come with costs that are too often treated as secondary. While the electricity produced is low carbon, the construction footprint, roads, blasting, tunnelling, reservoirs, foundations, and transmission towers can be environmentally disruptive, and operational impacts may alter hydrology, habitats, and fragile high-altitude ecosystems. Social consequences are equally visible. Local opposition has not consistently slowed flagship projects, and relocation pressures have accompanied major developments.

One such example, we studied earlier, is the displacement linked to the Yangqu dam expansion on the Machu River, including the submergence and possible relocation of the historic Atsok Monastery, which illustrates how cultural heritage and livelihoods can be placed at risk when infrastructure priorities dominate.

While hydroelectricity generation on the Yarlung Tsangpo carries direct downstream implications for India through potential flow regulation and dam-cascade effects, other renewable energy sources—geothermal, wind, and solar—do not directly affect India. However, these projects are strategically crucial for India.

Renewable energy infrastructure enables sustained human presence in previously remote, sparsely populated areas near contested borders. For example, small-scale solar plants are already providing power to remote border regions, as discussed in the previous edition. Additionally, wind farms at Chigu Lake are located approximately 80 km from the international boundary and 150 km from Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, India. The expansion of transmission networks and electrification is transforming small and medium-sized border towns into more permanent urban settlements. A reliable electricity supply supports year-round habitation, the expansion of military facilities, dual-use infrastructure, tourism and other economic activities in regions that have historically been difficult to settle and administer. This gradual urbanisation and infrastructure densification near sensitive border areas, enabled by abundant renewable energy, represents a form of strategic presence that extends beyond the immediate technical function of power generation. Taken together, renewable energy in TAR is better understood not as a simple “green transition”, but as a strategic programme combining engineering ambition, grid integration, industrial policy, and state capacity – one that will continue to expand and, by its scale and geography, carry implications beyond China’s borders.

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TL; DR

• With solar farms utilising high irradiation and elevation, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is emerging as a significant hub for renewable energy. These advances are likely to help China achieve its 2060 carbon neutrality target.

• The purposeful dual-use strategy, highlighted by the proximity of several solar projects near military installations, helps match the growth of clean energy with national security needs.

• The use of technologies, such as bifacial panels, artificial intelligence monitoring, grid-integrated storage, thermal energy storage reservoirs, and portable batteries, is helping to efficiently and sustainably harness solar energy.

1. Introduction

The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), situated on the vast Qinghai-Tibet Plateau—often called the “Roof of the World”—stands out for its extreme elevation and striking geography. Averaging over 4,500 metres above sea level, Tibet features everything from towering mountains and deep river gorges in the southeast to expansive high-altitude plains in the northwest. This dramatic terrain is accompanied by unique climatic and hydrological systems, shaping the region’s renewable energy potential in distinct ways. China is systematically harnessing the region's renewable energy potential for both civilian and military purposes, with the overarching objective of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.

The climate in TAR is heavily influenced by its altitude and location. While the northwest region remains cold and arid, receiving less than 100 mm of rainfall annually, the southeast benefits from monsoonal rains. Notably, higher elevations are warming faster than lower ones—an elevation-dependent warming (EDW) phenomenon that accelerates glacial melt and alters water cycles (Xiaodong Liu, 2017). These environmental dynamics directly impact the types and reliability of renewable energy sources in the region.

One of Tibet’s greatest renewable assets is solar energy. The region receives solar radiation ranging between 5,852 and 8,400 MJ/m² per year, placing western Tibet in the top-tier (Class I) solar resource category and the southeast in Class II. Interestingly, Tibet ranks among the sunniest regions globally, with more than 3,000 hours of annual sunshine across many western areas and an average of 8,160 MJ/m² annually in Lhasa alone. This has enabled the development of large-scale photovoltaic (PV) infrastructure, such as the 1.1 GW Yangbajing solar farm, building on long-standing traditions of passive solar design in Tibetan architecture. Still, challenges remain, particularly the seasonal drop in solar efficiency during winter and the damage caused by high levels of UV radiation. These factors highlight a paradox: immense renewable potential coexists with ecological sensitivity and infrastructure limitations.

When it comes to hydropower, Tibet’s hydropower potential is equally significant. The region is the origin of several of Asia’s major rivers, including the Brahmaputra, Indus, and Mekong. The Yarlung Zangbo alone has a 2,000-metre vertical drop in its lower reaches, making it a prime candidate for mega hydro dam projects. China has proposed generating up to 300 billion kWh annually here, triple the output of the Three Gorges Dam (Nithiyanandam, 2025). Nearly half of TAR’s water resources are now being regulated, reflecting two decades of hydropower investment. However, the reliability of this energy source is under pressure from EDW-driven glacier retreat and permafrost thaw, both of which disrupt consistent river flow and threaten long-term water security.

While solar and hydro dominate the renewable landscape, wind and geothermal energy also play a role, albeit a limited one. Wind energy, though logistically challenging to harness in this rugged terrain, has an estimated potential of 1.02 billion kW at 100 metres—about 26% of China’s total capacity. Geothermal energy, centred in the Yangbajing Basin, contributes on a smaller scale. The Yangbajing plant produces 25 MW—enough for 50,000 households—but wider adoption is hindered by high exploration costs and localised reserves. Meanwhile, traditional biomass—mainly yak dung and crop residues—continues to be used in rural areas. While essential for local livelihoods, it also exacerbates deforestation and indoor air pollution.

China’s sustained investments in TAR’s renewable energy sector reflect its commitment to achieving its net neutrality goal and its intention to drive economic development in one of its most remote regions. This energy push has added strategic depth to the region’s importance, especially given its proximity to India.

Considering these developments, a spatially detailed mapping of renewable resources—solar, wind, and hydro—is essential. Such mapping is crucial for understanding Tibet’s energy landscape and examining dual-use infrastructure, where energy assets may serve both civilian and military purposes. Strategic planning and policy must be informed by robust spatial analysis and satellite imagery to strike a balance between development and ecological, as well as geopolitical, considerations.

Therefore, our research aims to identify and map several key renewable energy centres around TAR, providing geostrategic assessments, spatial interpretations, and visual data insights. In this initial part, the primary energy source of TAR, namely solar energy farms and plants, and their spatial distribution and potential relationship with infrastructure are examined from a geospatial perspective.

2. Estimating the solar energy potential of TAR using remote sensing

One key factor to consider when selecting a suitable location for solar energy is the amount of sunlight the area receives throughout the year. Traditionally, this is measured using specialised instruments, such as pyranometers and pyrheliometers, which track both direct and scattered sunlight. Since measuring solar potential using ground-based instruments can be time-consuming and challenging to conduct in remote areas, satellite-based observations provide a practical alternative. They enable us to estimate solar energy potential from space, across various locations and periods, without the need to be on the ground.

However, it is essential to note that remote sensing measurements are generally less accurate due to their larger spatial coverage (lower spatial resolution) compared to ground-based instruments, which provide precise solar irradiance data at specific points. While ground-based tools cover only small areas, satellite-based observations can capture solar potential across much larger regions. Although remote sensing has certain biases and limitations, it is highly suitable for identifying suitable zones for large-scale solar farms, rather than for small-scale applications like rooftop solar. Additionally, remote estimation is significantly more cost-effective than traditional ground-based methods, making it a more attractive option for regional planning and development.

The remote sensing estimate shows that the overall solar irradiance over TAR was relatively high during April, May, and June. For 2024, the average irradiance recorded in Tibet exceeded 6.0 kWh/m²/day in April and May, with slightly lower values in June. After August, the irradiance steeply declines to about 3 kWh/m²/day during December and January. While Figure 1 represents the average estimate for the entire TAR, the actual forecasts for specific locations vary based on each zone's climatic conditions and topographical characteristics.

In this research, we conduct solar irradiance calculations based on remote sensing using the hourly climate reanalysis data provided by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). The final product consists of terrain-corrected and aspect-corrected estimations. This means that in mountainous areas, such as the TAR, the actual solar radiation received on the ground is influenced not only by atmospheric conditions but also by the terrain's slope. Steeper slopes receive less radiation depending on the sun's angle. Additionally, the aspect, which refers to the direction the slope faces, affects the amount of radiation received; south-facing slopes in the Northern Hemisphere generally receive more sunlight. These corrections were applied to obtain a more accurate estimation of the solar potential in the region.

Figure 2 indicates that western, northwestern, and southwestern Tibet receive a lot of sunlight, while the central and northeastern areas receive a moderate amount. The southeastern part, closer to India’s Arunachal Pradesh, gets the least. These differences are likely due to the region's diverse range of climates. Most parts of Tibet receive sufficient sunlight to support large-scale solar farms, off-grid setups, and solar-battery systems. Tibet is among the sunniest places on Earth, comparable to the Atacama and Sahara deserts. Its high altitude, low pollution, and mostly clear skies make it an excellent place for harvesting solar energy.

Figure 3 shows how solar irradiance levels vary across Tibet during winter. The central and southern regions continue to receive high irradiance, while the northern and northwestern parts see a noticeable drop. The southeastern area, near India’s Arunachal Pradesh, still gets the lowest levels. Interestingly, the central and southern parts stay relatively consistent in their irradiance throughout the year. These regions are well-suited for capturing solar energy thanks to their altitude, terrain, and climate. That is why most mid-sized solar projects are located here, although a few large ones have been established in northeastern and northwestern areas with high irradiance and suitable land.

Further details about solar energy projects in TAR, from known sources and new ones identified in this study, will be discussed in the next section. As we examine the distribution of different types of solar plants, it is essential to highlight the role of geospatial technology in this context. These tools help map existing solar sites and identify the most suitable new locations by combining various layers of information, including irradiance levels, land use, nearby infrastructure, settlements, military zones, and power grid access. Finding the right spot in the TAR, where land is ample, is not just about high irradiance. It also means choosing a location near roads, power lines, and future developments to make solar energy systems more efficient and practical.

3. Different scales of solar projects

To understand the different scales of solar projects currently operating and proposed in TAR, we have translated the available datasets from Global Energy Monitor into two maps. One map displays small solar projects with a capacity of less than 20 MW, while the other shows solar projects with a capacity of 20 MW or more.

The list features a total of 27 solar projects, each boasting capacities that range from a modest 1 MW to an impressive 15.9 MW, all of which have been operational since 2010. Most of these plants utilise established Photovoltaic (PV) technology, although some projects are classified as assumed PV, indicating a reliance on similar solar principles.

Diving deeper into the capacity distribution, most projects (15) fall within the range of 5.9 MW to 10.3 MW, showcasing a significant concentration of mid-sized installations. In addition, six projects operate within the smaller capacity range of 1.5 MW to 5.9 MW, while another six projects exceed the 10.3 MW threshold, highlighting a diverse portfolio of solar energy initiatives.

Interestingly, around 88% of the projects developed between 2010 and 2017 exceeded 10 MW, indicating a trend toward larger-scale solar solutions during this period. Geographically speaking, most of these projects are in the southern and central regions of the TAR, where solar insolation remains consistently high throughout the year, optimising energy production and indicating a deliberate choice to harness the area's favourable climatic conditions for solar energy generation.

A total of 109 solar projects with a capacity of 20 MW or above have been identified in TAR. While most of them are photovoltaic, and very few are solar thermal technologies. The total installed capacity is 9365 MW, of which 74 are operational and 20 are under proposal. The highest number of projects is observed in Baingoin County in Nagqu Prefecture has the highest number of such projects. Baingoin County's prominence in renewable energy projects can be attributed to its favourable geographical conditions and the broader regional emphasis on expanding clean energy infrastructure. The county's initiatives significantly contribute to Tibet's overall renewable energy capacity.

Over the past 12 years, TAR has made significant advancements in its renewable energy development, particularly for projects with capacities of 20 MW or greater. On average, the region has installed approximately 460 MW of renewable energy capacity annually, although this figure has shown considerable variability. The lowest recorded annual installation was 20 MW, while the highest soared to an impressive 2,675 MW, illustrating the fluctuations in development activity. Notably, years in which installations exceeded 485 MW were classified as high-activity years, marking crucial periods of growth and investment in renewable energy infrastructure. In 2023, Tibet made a substantial leap forward, adding 700 MW through the initiation of 11 projects, which underscored its ongoing commitment to scaling up renewable energy capacity. The momentum continued into 2024, with an additional 860 MW installed across 15 projects, demonstrating a sustained commitment to clean energy initiatives. However, 2025 marked a pivotal year in Tibet’s renewable energy trajectory, as the region witnessed an extraordinary escalation, contributing 2,600 MW from only two large-scale projects. This dramatic increase not only reflects TAR's commitment to expanding its clean energy resources but also underscores the region's potential to become a significant player in the renewable energy landscape.

In terms of spatial distribution within the region of TAR, a significant concentration of moderately sized plants can be found predominantly in the central and southern areas. Conversely, the mega projects, which often involve substantial investment and infrastructure, are more dispersed across the eastern and western regions. A few of these large-scale initiatives can also be observed in the central and southern parts, although they are less prevalent there. This distribution reflects a planned approach to resource allocation and development, as well as the varying economic focuses of different areas within TAR.

When it comes to ownership of the solar plants, most are state-owned enterprises, either at the central or provincial levels. Overall, these developments demonstrate Tibet's strategic emphasis on developing its renewable energy infrastructure, aligning with global trends toward sustainability and reducing reliance on fossil fuels.

4. More solar projects revealed

Our research, based on open-source information and image processing of remotely sensed data, reveals a significant number of solar projects across different regions in TAR, serving diverse purposes. This study aims to explore and analyse some of these key projects, highlighting their various objectives and functions within the area.

Figure 6 displays a comprehensive overview of over 200 solar plants and farms of varying scales identified in the TAR analysis. This collection encompasses a diverse range of small-scale solar installations (excluding solar rooftops), which are primarily designed to provide energy for small industries, residential housing colonies, and military bases. In these settings, solar energy serves dual purposes: it not only generates electricity but also provides heating solutions for various applications.

In contrast, the larger solar farms are engineered for extensive electricity generation, aiming to supply power to local communities and remote areas. These facilities are equipped to harness significant amounts of solar energy, which is then integrated into the electricity grid, facilitating broader distribution to meet the energy demands of a more extensive network. This dual approach highlights the versatility of solar energy in addressing both localised needs and contributing to the overall energy infrastructure.

Among the various clusters analysed, Lhasa stands out with over 100 documented observations, making it a significant area of interest. Often referred to as the "Sunshine City," Lhasa boasts an impressive annual average sunshine duration of about 3,000 hours. This remarkable sunlight exposure translates to some of the highest total solar radiation values in China, reaching around 8,160 megajoules per square meter (MJ/m²) per year.

The Lhasa Lhunzhub solar farm is currently in the pre-construction stage and is one of the significant projects in Lhasa. The Damxung County project is one of the major hybrid solar projects in Tibet. The Jiawa Phase I solar-plus-storage plant, situated at an elevation of 4,500 meters, showcases the region's capacity to develop and operate state-of-the-art solar infrastructure. These systems support Tibet's local energy needs and broader renewable energy initiatives, showcasing a workable strategy for harnessing clean energy in urban environments through the combination of Lhasa's abundant sunlight and advanced solar technology.

4.1 Closer look at key solar projects in TAR

4.1.1 Shigatse

The area around Shigatse Peace Airport has become a significant hub for tapping into solar energy. Back in February 2020, there were no noticeable solar farms near the airport. However, satellite images from subsequent years show rapid development in this area. The first planned solar farm, located southwest of the airport, appeared in 2020. In the following year, another installation emerged, visible in images from January 2024, this time located on the southeast side. The most recent development, captured in January 2025 images, shows a fully operational solar farm adjacent to the southeast area. This one appears to be the largest among the three. The sizes of these three solar farms are approximately 1 square kilometre, 0.6 square kilometres, and 1.145 square kilometres, reflecting steady growth over time.

Shigatse Peace Airport, established initially as a military base in 1973, was expanded for dual military and civilian use in October 2010. It now hosts one of the longest runways in Tibet. With increasing energy needs in the region, particularly near key infrastructure such as the newly established and operational railway station, the power demand continues to rise. Solar energy development in the area shows no signs of slowing down.

Before 2000, Shigatse had not witnessed this much development. Today, it has grown into a prominent city in the Tibet Autonomous Region. In this area, three major solar farms have been identified. The first set of solar farms lies to the west of the city, marked as 1 in Figure 9. This installation was initially established in 2011 and was later expanded. It now covers three adjacent plots of solar farms, measuring approximately 0.16, 0.17, and 0.54 square kilometres.

Imagery from 2018 shows another solar farm located in a valley to the east of the city. This valley installation spans about 0.5 square kilometres. Interestingly, although additional land was cleared in the valley for future expansion, the project appears to have halted before the new areas were fully developed with solar panels. Temporal imagery suggests that the valley installation is often snow-covered in winter; however, newer technologies may be deployed to mitigate the impact of snow accumulation.

The most recent addition is a new solar farm located near Highway G318. Covering around 0.4 square kilometres, its construction began in October 2024 and witnessed significant development by 2025. This site is situated adjacent to a developing industrial area. This farm features a massive, black, elevated structure, possibly a cutting-edge thermal energy storage pit measuring 100 meters by 100 meters, which helps overcome seasonal limitations. Placed on the southeast corner of the site

In terms of technology, these advanced solar farms use a mix of fixed-tilt and tracking solar modules. Some are integrated with energy storage systems (ESS), while others—like the third plant mentioned above—are directly connected to nearby substations. Evaporation ponds or wastewater holding pits are often included in the site layout for maintenance purposes.

4.1.2 Gar County

The solar photovoltaic farm located in Ghar County is a relatively new installation, situated at an elevation of 4,300 metres and located approximately 65 kilometres from Demchok. With a capacity of 30 megawatts, this plant has become operational relatively recently. What makes this site particularly interesting is its proximity to military infrastructure. The solar facility comprises a main plant and several smaller ancillary units, collectively covering an area of approximately 2 square kilometres. The entire setup is positioned right next to the G219 highway.

Situated just three kilometres uphill from the solar site is a military Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), which serves as a sophisticated listening post. This installation is believed to have been established around a decade ago and plays a vital role in intelligence-gathering operations. The CDAA is composed of two distinct sets of 11 antennas, strategically arranged in circular formations. One set is positioned 50 meters from the centre of the array, while the other is located at a distance of 100 meters, enhancing its surveillance capabilities.

The proximity of the CDAA to both the solar farm and nearby hydrocarbon extraction infrastructure strongly indicates that the area is being developed as a crucial energy supply hub. This dual functionality could support not only military operations but also broader infrastructure development in the region, highlighting the strategic importance of the location.

Another noteworthy aspect is the remarkable speed of construction for the solar farm. Land clearing for the solar panels commenced in September 2022, and within just a month, the support structures and arrays were installed. By November of the same year, the solar panels were fully operational. This rapid timeline—from initial land clearance to full functionality—took less than three months. Such efficiency is awe-inspiring given the challenging altitude and remoteness of the site, which typically involves logistical hurdles and longer construction durations. This efficiency may signal a well-coordinated effort to rapidly enhance energy capabilities in the region.

Since summer 2025, an ancillary facility has been under construction adjacent to the regular grid and storage facilities of the solar plant. The new facility features two large tanks that could potentially be used for storing salt for thermal energy or as part of a hydrogen production system. While there is no official confirmation, it is likely intended to enhance the plant’s storage capacity or support additional energy functions.

The electricity generated is most likely transmitted to nearby facilities via high-voltage lines, which are seen crossing the area. The region is also home to hydropower production sites and hydrocarbon operations, underscoring its role as a key hub for renewable and mixed energy sources. Although not far from the international boundary, the strategic use of solar energy for military support activities in this region appears highly possible.

4.1.3 Jomda Dzong

The two solar projects in Jomda exemplify the ongoing development of large-scale infrastructure in the sparsely populated and remote regions of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Located in eastern Tibet, where the elevation is relatively lower compared to the western regions, these projects cover a total area of approximately 1.5 square kilometres and 1.2 square kilometres, respectively. Both installations are strategically located along Highway G557. Despite the sparse surrounding population, these solar projects are designed not only to generate electricity for the region but also to facilitate broader developmental initiatives. A key objective of these projects is to supply energy for both ongoing and future infrastructure endeavours, including a significant expressway connecting Chengdu and Chamdo. These power projects, which have been operational for at least five years, play a crucial role in enhancing the region's energy capacity.

4.1.4 Kamba County

The two solar farms in Kamba County are located approximately 35 kilometres north of Sikkim. Covering areas of around 0.55 and 0.35 square kilometres respectively, these farms are situated at elevations of roughly 4,500 and 4,600 metres. The first solar farm was built in the second half of 2020, while the second was constructed a year earlier. Both are now fully functional and help supply power to the surrounding border areas.

Interestingly, the first solar farm is built over a stream that feeds into the Yarlung Tsangpo River. This site hosts one of the largest solar installations in the region, with an estimated capacity of approximately 30 megawatts, and features dedicated storage facilities, likely utilising lithium-ion batteries.

The lower portion of Figure 12 shows several smaller solar farms set along a mountain slope, located next to dual-purpose settlements. These installations serve as key sources of energy for the local area. Notably, both solar farms are connected by the S-208 highway and lie adjacent to National Highway G-219. Their proximity to the Line of Actual Control also gives the area strategic importance, demonstrating how solar energy can support both civilian and military infrastructure in high-altitude regions.

4.1.5 YangbaJain

YangbaJain is a significant location for the PLA, not just for its strategic importance but also as a substantial hub for geothermal energy production and scientific research. Its unique geothermal features make it ideal for satellite data calibration and related experiments. Located in central Tibet, the area hosts two distinct clusters of solar farms. Among these, the solar farms marked as 3 and 4 are some of the oldest solar farm installations in the region. Unlike newer systems equipped with advanced storage, these older farms were connected directly to the grid. In contrast, the site marked as 1, currently under construction, is set to become one of the largest solar panel arrays in the area. It is located on a mountain slope on the banks of the Duilong River, adjacent to Highway G109.

The area marked as 2 identifies a long-standing, highly secure military complex that remains critical to Chinese military operations. In terms of elevation, the first zone sits at approximately 4,417 metres, while the second cluster (sites 3 and 4) is around 4,300 metres. Locations marked 5 and 6 correspond to the Qinghai–Tibet highway and the Qinghai–Tibet railway line, with 6 also indicating the railway station. Overall, the site reflects how renewable energy is being harnessed to support self-reliance and sustain critical infrastructure in the region.

4.1.6 Mahang

Mahang, located north of Lhasa, is home to two solar farms—one covering about 0.5 sq. km and the other spread across a cluster of approximately 0.45 sq. km. The area marked 1 in the image refers to a relatively new solar farm, where land clearing began in September 2023 and construction appeared to be completed by the end of that year. This farm is situated along a tributary connected to the main river and is located in a valley, which could potentially impact water flow and related activities. Notably, in December, the site experienced snow cover that blanketed the solar panels, potentially affecting energy generation. To support uninterrupted supply during such conditions, a battery storage unit was also identified at the site.

About 4 km south of this newer installation lies an older solar farm, established over a decade ago. This older facility consists of two sections connected by a narrow stretch and operates with standard photovoltaic setups. Both solar farms appear to be meeting the energy needs of the local rural community. They are likely part of broader efforts to promote regional development, something that is becoming increasingly evident in the surrounding infrastructure. Interestingly, a small runoff from the river hydro dam is located just above the solar farms, which could also be harnessed where feasible. Altogether, Mahang represents a compelling example of how remote areas can harness solar energy to meet local needs and foster sustainable growth.

4.1.7 Pangong

This site is a clear example of how small-sized solar photovoltaic panels are used to generate energy in remote areas that need a self-sustaining power source. In this case, small solar panel arrays have been installed within a fenced compound to meet local energy needs, likely to support equipment or personnel stationed on the nearby mountain slope. The area is located within a highly strategic and militarised zone. In the image, Number 1 marks the radar site along with a 3D view of the area; Number 2 shows a close-up 2D view of the radar and the solar panels; Number 3 is marked over Pangong Tso lake; and Number 4 highlights surrounding military developments. Similar setups with compact solar panels are found in other remote locations where traditional power lines are difficult to install, or where off-grid energy is essential for strategic operations. These systems are primarily used to provide electricity and heating in such remote areas.

4.1.8 Chusum

Chusum hosts two large solar farms and a smaller solar grid network, as evident from satellite imagery. One of the major solar plants is located in the Chusum valley and has been operational for over five years, covering an area of approximately 0.67 square kilometres.

More notably, a newer solar plant was established on top of a mountain in 2024. Early signs of construction appear in March 2024 satellite imagery, with solar panel installation becoming visible in April. The plant seems to have been completed by August 2024 and likely became operational shortly thereafter. Its location, at a high elevation with year-round sunlight, makes it ideal for efficient energy harvesting and a wide range of applications.

Another point of interest is a small solar panel setup within the Chusum valley itself. Installed in November 2024 and completed by January 2025, this unit is relatively small but notable for its proximity to a camouflaged foil-covered structure. This structure resembles similar installations observed elsewhere and may represent a prototype or emerging form of energy storage technology being tested by China.

In the image, markers 1 and 2 indicate the location of the latest, larger solar farm atop the mountain. Markers 3 and 4 refer to the sites within the valley, covering both the older and newly established plants. Marker 5 is placed next to the small object, which may be a new energy storage technology.

4.1.9 Yadui

The Yadui area is home to two massive high-tech solar power plants under the Huadian Xizang Caipeng Solar Project, which has been developed in two phases. Phase one was completed by the end of 2023 and began production in December 2023 with an expected capacity of 50 megawatts, covering an area of approximately 0.55 square kilometres.

Phase two started operations a year later, in December 2024. It is twice the size and capacity of the first phase, generating 100 megawatts of power. What makes these plants remarkable is not just their scale, but the fact that they are the highest-altitude photovoltaic projects in the world. They demonstrate the ability to generate clean energy effectively even in extremely high-altitude environments. The second phase alone is designed to generate about 155 million kilowatt-hours annually—enough to power roughly 50,000 homes. This contribution significantly supports the region’s solar energy needs and helps reduce carbon dioxide emissions by approximately 101,800 tonnes per year, according to available sources. These plants are equipped with state-of-the-art technology. The second phase features a 7.5% higher conversion efficiency compared to the first. The bifacial solar panels used in this phase increase efficiency by 20% over traditional models and are built to withstand extreme wind and snow conditions.

Overall, this project stands as a powerful example of clean energy innovation at high altitude—an actual “top-of-the-world” demonstration of technological capability and the pressing need for sustainable energy solutions.

5. Spatial relationship between military areas and solar plants

The overlaid map of solar power plants and military hotspots in the Tibet Autonomous Region suggests a notable trend—military areas with limited access to other energy sources appear to rely more heavily on solar power. In such locations, solar energy has become a key supporting source for military operations. What stands out is how these solar power plants are designed not just to generate electricity, but also to store and distribute it efficiently. They help balance seasonal energy needs and offer resilience against climate variations, thanks to advanced storage and energy-sharing technologies. On the map, areas with the highest concentration of military establishments are shown in yellow, moderate concentrations in red, and the sparsest areas in pink. While solar plants are spread across the region, their placement does not necessarily correspond to the density of military sites, suggesting a more strategic or selective deployment rather than a one-to-one distribution.

6. Parting shot

This study examines the rapid expansion of solar energy in Tibet, starting with an assessment of the region's significant solar potential and its seasonal characteristics. The optimal period for harnessing solar power varies spatially. This analysis provides a valuable foundation for understanding how renewable energy is being utilised on a large scale in one of the world's most challenging high-altitude environments.

Through the mapping and interpretation of multiple solar energy datasets, the spatial distribution of solar installations across the Tibetan Plateau has been visualised. A prominent trend emerging from this analysis is the shift toward large-scale solar projects, typically exceeding 20 megawatts, which are predominantly located in the western and northern regions of the country. In contrast, smaller, earlier-generation plants remain clustered in central Tibet, indicating an evolving spatial and temporal pattern likely shaped by factors such as land availability, elevation, and solar abundance.

The spatial analysis conducted has effectively mapped concentrations of solar facilities. While the plant count may be slightly inflated due to automated classification methods that sometimes register fragmented arrays as distinct units, the analysis offers a robust and timely representation of Tibet’s solar landscape. Importantly, the study has also brought several previously undocumented installations to light, contributing fresh insights to our understanding of renewable developments in the region.

A closer look at individual projects reveals a wide-ranging portfolio—from vast solar farms to modest but locally significant units, some of which are fully subsidised. The developments surrounding Shigatse, particularly near airport infrastructure and urban edges, demonstrate clear technological progression. In Gar County, the proximity of solar plants to military facilities suggests an emerging energy-security nexus, with solar power supporting off-grid operations through battery-backed systems.

Elsewhere, installations such as those in Chomda–Doshong follow the contours of mountainous terrain, while Kamba County exemplifies the move towards mega-scale expansion. The presence of solar arrays near Pangong Tso, potentially linked to radar infrastructure, highlights the strategic utility of renewable energy in sensitive border areas.

Remarkably, even in extremely high-altitude environments such as Chusum and Yadui, solar installations have been sited with precision, taking into account slope, solar exposure, and environmental constraints. These systems perform reliably despite harsh climatic conditions, a testament to years of adaptive engineering and technological refinement.

A defining feature of Tibet’s solar push is the deployment of advanced technologies. Bifacial photovoltaic modules—capable of capturing sunlight from both sides and increasing yield by up to 20%—have become standard in flagship projects like Huadian Caipeng and Jiawa Phase I. Large-scale battery storage systems, such as Jiawa’s 250 MW/200 MWh facility, are enabling a stable, round-the-clock energy supply. Hybrid projects, including Dangxiong’s solar thermal–PV combination, demonstrate the capacity to deliver dispatchable power and manage peak loads efficiently.

Across many sites, high-efficiency cells such as Passivated Emitter and Rear Cell (PERC), half-cut, and emerging perovskite variants are being adopted. AI-powered intelligent monitoring systems are now commonplace, supporting real-time optimisation and predictive maintenance. Structural designs are increasingly tailored to endure high UV exposure, strong winds, and heavy snowfall—once considered exceptions, these design features are fast becoming standard.

Another key trend is the rise of integrated clean energy bases, co-locating solar, hydro, and storage systems, as seen along the Jinsha and Yalong rivers. These hubs enhance regional energy security and support broader decarbonisation goals.

Connection strategies have also evolved. While earlier plants supplied power directly to the grid, newer systems often incorporate storage for greater flexibility across daily and seasonal cycles—and in some cases, mobility. Solar power is increasingly integrated with other renewables, such as wind and hydro, creating decentralised yet interconnected energy ecosystems. This reflects China’s broader strategic intent to maximise the use of renewable resources for national energy resilience.

Many installations are located far from established infrastructure, suggesting possible links to future development zones, critical assets, or military outposts. Construction timelines are notably short, with many projects completed within four months and rapidly integrated into regional or national power systems.

Though officially positioned within China’s 2060 carbon neutrality roadmap, the dual-use character of many installations is evident. Large-scale and tactical systems alike serve civilian demands while also meeting the logistical requirements of the People’s Liberation Army, revealing a deeper strategic calculus.

Ultimately, the expansion of solar energy in Tibet is more than a story of renewable transition—it is a case study in the convergence of energy, environment, and security at high altitudes. The pace, scale, and sophistication of these developments reflect a deliberate and multi-layered policy agenda.

Further investigations into other renewable sources and their synergy with solar power are currently underway. They will be featured in a forthcoming edition, offering more profound insights into the region’s evolving energy architecture.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) and Air Marshal TD Joseph AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd) for giving constant mentorship, other colleagues, external experts and reviewers.

For regular updates on our geospatial research, stay tuned to https://takshashila.org.in/geospatial-research.

The author, Dr Y Nithiyanandam, tweets (X.com) @prof_nithiya

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgment and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

Declaration: This article has been proofread using AI tools.

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• The Medog dam’s undisclosed details and lack of data sharing poses serious risks to downstream water security and ecological stability.

• The Yarlung Tsangpo basin is already experiencing stress, affecting both the quality and availability of water.

• Given the region’s climate vulnerability and disaster risks, China should permanently reconsider and abandon the project.

1. Backstory

In March 2021, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan was approved, setting ambitious goals across multiple sectors, including developing a modern energy system. Among its key initiatives is creating a renewable energy hub in Nyingchi prefecture, integrating hydropower, wind, and solar energy projects. The centrepiece of this strategy is the construction of a colossal 60,000 MW hydropower plant on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Brahmaputra), boasting a generation capacity three times greater than the Three Gorges Dam, currently the world’s largest operational hydropower facility. This project, if successful, could significantly contribute to the region's energy needs and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

In December 2024, China’s state news agency Xinhua confirmed the government’s financial approval for this project, described as an engineering marvel of unprecedented scale in reports. The mega-dam is planned for the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India—a region fraught with strategic sensitivities. This proximity has intensified concerns over potential downstream impacts, including disruptions to water flow, sediment transport, and the risks of artificial floods, which could exacerbate tensions between the two nations.

The Yarlung Tsangpo, originating in the Angsi Glacier of the Tibetan Himalayas at 5,319 metres, is a unique and vital river. It flows through the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), carving one of the world’s deepest canyons at the 'Great U Bend' before descending into India as the Siang River and eventually transforming into the Brahmaputra in India and the Jamuna in Bangladesh. Stretching over 3,350 kilometres and spanning four nations—China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh—the river is vital to the region, nourishing the world’s largest delta, hosting remarkable biodiversity, and supporting millions of livelihoods.

The proposed hydropower plant near the Great Bend underscores China’s ambition to dominate large-scale renewable energy development. However, it also raises serious geopolitical and ecological concerns. The scale of the project, combined with the fragility of the Himalayan ecosystem, makes the potential for environmental disruptions significant. Furthermore, the lack of transparent data-sharing mechanisms with downstream nations has heightened fears over unilateral water resource management. This lack of transparency is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed to ensure the project's success and the region's stability.

While the project exemplifies China's commitment to renewable energy, its broader implications—spanning ecological, economic, and geopolitical dimensions—warrant rigorous scrutiny and regional dialogue. Without greater transparency and cooperative frameworks, this mega-dam could become a potential geopolitical flashpoint in a delicate regional equilibrium.

2. Medog Mega-Dam 2.0

The previous edition of the Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin offered a comprehensive analysis of the mega-dam project, delving into its background and key challenges and drawing parallels to China’s existing colossal “Three Gorges Dam.” It also provided a brief overview of climate change, disaster-related risks, and China’s strategic pursuit of renewable energy, shedding light on its underlying motivations and ambitions.

In contrast, this edition focuses on addressing critical gaps in the existing literature, taking a more detailed approach to understanding the potential impacts of China’s Mega dam project in the context of climate change, natural disasters, and evolving hydrometeorological patterns. It undertakes an in-depth examination of the Yarlung Tsang Po River basin, employing a geospatial lens to decode its dynamics and developments surrounding the basin in recent years. Additionally, this edition seeks to answer some pressing questions about downstream implications, aiming to provide a nuanced understanding of such projects' broader environmental, geopolitical, and socio-economic consequences. This expanded perspective builds upon the groundwork laid in the earlier edition and offers fresh insights into an increasingly critical issue.

3. The extended Brahmaputra River basin

Five critical watersheds influence the central Brahmaputra basin. The Tibet Autonomous Region's (TAR) Yarlung Tsangpo sub-basin is the longest and largest. Other major sub-basins fall into India, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. It should be noted that the amount of water that each sub-basin delivers to the main channels is primarily determined by the amount of precipitation that each watershed region receives. Therefore, the size of each sub-basin does not immediately reflect their actual contribution. In this instance, monsoon rains greatly benefit the eastern part of the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows southward and enters India as the Siang River, as opposed to the western part, which experiences comparatively less precipitation. The Siang stretch at both TAR and Arunachal regions receives good rainfall due to their climatic condition. Sources states that fourteen tiny catchment regions directly dip into the main river; the most prominent of these basins is the one discussed earlier, where the major hydro project is being developed.

The enormous flow rate was created by the decline in elevation after the Greater U Bend when the water flow rate increased in natural gravity. The region could be the most suitable site for river runoff construction in the lower reach of the Yarlung Tsangpo. If the project is reservoir-based, with the area before the U-turn being a potential location. The utilization of natural gravity is likely the primary approach to achieve the project's estimated electricity generation capacity. The shift in land use, particularly the decline in vegetation both before the U-bend and around Medog, indicates a clear intent. However, the absence of any signs of dam toe construction leaves room for continued speculation.

4. The Yarlung Tsangpo Basin

Understanding the dynamics of an entire river basin is crucial for appreciating the intricate interplay of hydrological, ecological, and geopolitical factors that shape a river system. However, in the current discourse, the primary concern revolves around the Yarlung Tsangpo Basin (refer to Figure 3), where the proposed mega-dam project is poised to have far-reaching implications. Given its strategic, environmental, and socio-political significance, this basin warrants a more focused examination. Focusing on the Yarlung Tsangpo basin allows a more detailed assessment of the project's potential impacts, including its broader implications for downstream areas, transboundary water-sharing dynamics, and ecological sustainability.

4.1 Seasonal Flow Patterns in the Yarlung Tsangpo Basin

Understanding the seasonal flow patterns of the Yarlung Tsangpo River is crucial. More than 70% of the total flow happens during the rainy season, from June to September. The river gets its water from different sources all year long. In the dry season, from October to April, most of the river's flow comes from groundwater and water that moves underground. From April to June, melted snow is the primary source of flow. During the rainy season from June to September, the amount of water flowing off grows considerably because of rain, melting snow, melting glaciers, and the natural water flow. This leads to the highest amounts of discharge for the year. As a result, the quantity and quality of water during this time can change significantly, affecting how much water is available and how silt may be moved.

4.2 Water quality

Water quality plays a crucial role in determining the suitability of water for various human uses, including drinking, agriculture, and industry. While the basin primarily receives its water from glacial melt and monsoon rainfall, its quality deteriorates as it traverses diverse geological formations, varying meteorological conditions, and regions affected by human activities in recent times.

Previous assessments indicate that the water quality in the basin is relatively poor, with a recorded Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) concentration of 8.329 mg/L—lower than the global average for major river systems. The degradation is terrible during the wet season when peak river flow occurs. Increased sediment loads, flash floods, and runoff from surrounding terrains contribute to the decline in water quality, making it more complex to manage. Multiple water sources and varied topographies further complicate water quality dynamics.

4.3 Climate of the Basin

The Yarlung Tsangpo basin encompasses multiple distinct sub-climatic classes, as classified by the Köppen Climate Classification (1908–2016), one of the most widely used systems for categorising global climatic zones estimated based on long-term meteorological data, primarily annual and monthly averages of temperature, local vegetation and precipitation.

The Koppen climate classifications categorise the earth's places into five main climate groups and 30 different sub-climatic classes.

The more significant part of the Yarlung Tsangpo basin experiences a cold, dry mountain climate, the eastern section, beyond the Great U Bend, transitions into a warm, humid tropical monsoon climate characterised by significant rainfall. Interestingly, when the river enters India’s Arunachal Pradesh, it experiences two sub-climates: green forest and heavy monsoons.

Tibet has experienced significant climatic shifts, including changes in precipitation patterns, accelerated glacial retreat, and widespread desertification. However, the impact varies across its sub-climatic zones, as does the impact of climate change across regions. Despite these differences, the one common impact is water availability, which influences the quality, quantity, flow rate, and seasonal patterns of water reaching downstream areas in India, with ripple effects extending to Bangladesh.

The tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo, originating from snow-covered high mountains, are primarily fed by snowmelt. Rising temperatures and retreating glaciers threaten to alter the river’s volume and flow patterns. One such example is the study published in 2011, which reveals that “Between 1974 and 2010, the Chemayungdung Glacier experienced a 5.02% reduction in its total area, with its terminus retreating by 768 meters at an average rate of 21 meters per year. During the same period, the terminal lake expanded significantly, increasing in size by 63.7%—from 0.7 square kilometres to 1.14 square kilometres. The lake's volume also grew by approximately 9.8 million cubic meters.” Surprisingly, the headwaters of the Yarlung Tsangpo River face severe desertification due to high altitude, arid climate, and strong winds. Meanwhile, the lower reaches of the basin experience heavy monsoons, which bring different challenges like mudflow and landslides in the region.

Therefore, building a mega dam on the climate-sensitive and uncertain basin likely creates additional complexities, especially for India and Bangladesh. The risks are compounded by their vulnerability to extreme climate events and the impacts of anthropogenic activities along their riverbasins in the Brahmaputra and Jamuna rivers. These interconnected systems face cascading risks, with downstream regions, home to dense populations and critical habitats, being particularly vulnerable.

4.4 Basin’s Vulnerability to Disaster

The basin’s vulnerability to natural disasters significantly magnifies the risks. Over 600 flash flood incidents have been reported in the basin’s history, with more than 15 influencing factors identified in the river system (Fei et al., 2025). The potential for flash floods remains a serious concern due to the basin’s complex geomorphology and climatic variability. Although flash floods are less frequent in the lower reaches of the river, their occurrence cannot be discounted.

The area’s seismic activity is particularly alarming, with the past year alone recording 130 earthquakes of magnitudes four and above in TAR. This sustained seismic activity presents a continuous threat, particularly at the proposed site with high landslide susceptibility. The recent 7.1-magnitude earthquake in Shigatse Tingri caused structural deformations in nearbydams and infrastructure, further emphasising the precariousness of the area. This combination of engineering challenges, the basin’s susceptibility to multiple disasters—including landslides, earthquakes, and flash floods—and the geopolitical implications raises profound questions about the project’s long-term safety, viability, and regional impact.

The hydropower project somewhere around the Great Bend is regarded as "risky, dangerous, and irresponsible" due to several critical considerations. The dramatic elevation drop of over 2,000 metres in the Yarlung Tsangpo Canyon after the U Bend introduces formidable engineering and environmental challenges. Questions persist regarding the project’s design and methodology, mainly regarding whether it will utilise a reservoir-type or run-of-river hydropower. Such a structure could disrupt the river’s natural flow, impede the downstream transport of fertile soil, and provoke concerns about potential water diversion for China’s use—raising fears that it could serve as a geopolitical instrument under the guise of development.

4.5 Importance of Comprehensive Hydrological Data

The precipitation measured through remote sensing indicates that the river stretches around the “U Bend” and receives substantial rainfall even before entering Arunachal Pradesh. According to a World Bank report, the Tibetan Plateau averages 734 millimetres of annual precipitation, while the Yarlung Tsangpo region sees up to 2,000 millimetres. Precipitation increases significantly in the eastern Himalayas, ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 millimetres, and peaks in the Brahmaputra floodplains, with 3,500 to 4,000 millimetres annually. The Jamuna floodplains in Bangladesh receive between 1,500 and 3,000 millimetres.

The contribution of the Yarlung Tsangpo to the Brahmaputra remains contentious due to inconsistent and often outdated data. Reliable assessments require updated ground measurements of tributaries and year-round water flow monitoring to account for seasonal variations. Downstream countries like India face challenges acquiring accurate data due to limited access to upstream hydrological information.

While geospatial tools and remote sensing provide partial insights into precipitation and river runoff, they lack the precision that only detailed on-ground measurements can offer.

China’s reluctance to share consistent hydrological data has compounded these challenges, particularly amid recent geopolitical tensions. The suspension of data-sharing agreements and the failure to renew critical Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) highlight a troubling lack of transparency. As a result, downstream nations must rely on open-source models and datasets, which reveal anomalies in river flow patterns in the Yarlung Tsang Po basin for 2024.

4.6 The Status of Run-off

Data from the Australian National University’s 25-year remote sensing archive shows fluctuated river flow over the years in the basin, indicating potential stress on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra system from both climate change and upstream Anthropogenic activities in 2024 (river flow measurements at various gauges before the U-bend ranged between 3,500 and 4,200 m³/s. Closer to the U-bend, the flow increased to 5,100–5,700 m³/s, and after the U-bend, it peaked at approximately 5,800 m³/s. At specific points along the stream, the flow rate shows an all-time high in 2025, possibly due to the sudden release of water following a recent major earthquake.

China’s aggressive dam-building activities, including the proposed mega-dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo, exacerbate these concerns. These projects can disrupt natural river flows, complicating water availability and sediment transport predictions for downstream nations. The cumulative impact of such projects, combined with unreliable data, threatens the ecological balance of the river basin, the livelihoods of millions, and regional stability. Without greater transparency in sharing scientific data and collaborative hydrological studies, the long-term consequences for the Brahmaputra and its riparian nations remain uncertain.

5. Status of water storage in two distinct water bodies

Water storage levels in the Yarlung Tsangpo have fluctuated significantly in recent times. In our analysis, we examined two storage facilities for which remote sensing estimated open-source datasets are available, comparing their storage capacity over time using time series analysis. Additionally, we assessed their storage levels against historical all-time highs and the levels maintained in 2024.

The la-ang In Sutlej River, which lies within the Indus Basin just ahead of Angsi Glacier where the Yarlung Tsangpo begins, the river storage facility exhibits a discernible trend. However, five years of data show a declining trend and steeped below the long-term average (3DK data). In contrast, in the case of Yamdrok in the Brahmaputra Basin along the Yarlung Tsangpo, water storage fluctuated erratically over the past year, with all-time storage levels also varying. Unlike the Sutlej Basin, Yamdrok’s storage does not follow a clear seasonal pattern and has become increasingly skewed in recent years.

This is a concerning trend. While the Indus Basin witnessed a significant decline in water storage over the past two years, this year has seen an increase in capacity. However, the variations remain unpredictable and have become more erratic, raising concerns about long-term stability and management.

6. Spatial Distribution of Water Bodies in the Brahmaputra Basin

There are many lakes and other water bodies in the Brahmaputra basin. Some of these are in places that could cause flash floods or be affected by climate change or other disasters. Some lakes are already stressed or even ruined because of anthropogenic activities.

Looking at the whole river basin, it's clear why the Yarlung TSangpo is more important than other areas downstream. The Yarlung Tsangpo sub-basin has many water bodies on steep slopes and high elevations. The map shows where these water bodies are, focusing on their elevation and slope.

Areas with the highest risk are those at higher elevations and steeper slopes. There are clusters around Yarlung Tsangpo and other tributaries. This map is important for understanding how these water bodies are fragile and might affect downstream areas. Any changes to these lakes can impact the flow rate, quantity, and quality of water in rivers and streams further down.

7. A Defining Moment for Regional Water Politics – A parting shot

The Medog dam project, shrouded in ambiguity, embodies a crucial inflexion point in the geopolitics of transboundary water management. While its projected scale has drawn sensational comparisons to the Three Gorges Dam, the absence of transparency regarding its design, environmental safeguards, and diplomatic engagement underscores the broader challenges of unilateral hydropower expansion in ecologically sensitive regions.

Though sometimes cited as a counterpoint, India’s dam-building initiatives in Arunachal Pradesh follow a markedly different trajectory—one rooted in transparency, flood mitigation, and cooperative water-sharing mechanisms. This contrast is not merely about engineering choices but the fundamental principles governing responsible riparian behaviour. When shared river systems serve as lifelines for millions, the onus of accountability cannot be disregarded.

The question is whether China will approach the Medog dam with the same degree of responsibility and collaboration that such a project demands. Without clear commitments to mitigating cross-border risks, the project threatens to escalate regional tensions and set a precarious precedent for future large-scale hydropower developments. Until greater transparency emerges, the Medog dam remains a symbol of uncertainty—one that underscores the urgent need for dialogue, cooperation, and a shared commitment to safeguarding the ecological and geopolitical stability of the region.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) and Air Marshal TD Joseph AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd) for giving constant mentorship, external experts and reviewer.

For regular updates on our geospatial research, stay tuned to https://takshashila.org.in/geospatial-research.

The author Dr Y Nithiyanandam tweets (X.com) @prof_nithiya

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgement and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

Declaration: This article has been proofread using AI tools. Some parts of the content were published in The Diplomat & The New Indian Express.

This report finds that a sophisticated PLA firing range near Shigatse is being used for high-altitude target practice and weapon calibration. Secondly, it finds evidence of probable SIGINT systems that can listen to a range of signals, including military and submarine communications, from vast distances.

Backstory

Have you ever wondered what an advanced firing range looks like? While media reports often mention the PLA conducting sophisticated drills "somewhere" in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), this report offers the first detailed glimpse, captured through satellite images, of such a site and its major components. It can show how the landscape has evolved chronologically.

But it’s not just about the firing range. Are you curious about what kind of technology China might use for signal intelligence (SIGINT), navigation, or space situational awareness? In the second part of the report, we reveal two massive SIGINT facilities located near Shigatse along the Yarlung Tsang Po River.

This report focuses on a significant military site—likely a firing range—and two SIGINT facilities situated just 200 km from the Doklam plateau, 150 km from India’s border with Sikkim, and 30 km from the Shigatse dual-use airport. This location underscores China’s intense military preparations, where a variety of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground weapons are tested and complex target simulations are carried out. The proximity of these sites to disputed areas, including Bhutan and India’s Arunachal Pradesh, makes them critical points of interest, mainly as they sit directly along an aerial path over contested territories. The ongoing developments highlight the increasing operational readiness of the PLA forces and the expanding SIGINT infrastructure in this sensitive region.

Part I: The firing range

Firing ranges at high altitudes is essential for maintaining precision in weapon systems and calibrating older equipment, ensuring optimal performance in these unique environments. The thinner air impacts projectile trajectories, making calibration adjustments critical. Regular target practice helps recalibrate systems for use under reduced air resistance, which affects range and accuracy. For instance, the PLA’s high-altitude drills in Tibet tested long-range artillery and rocket systems for precision in low-oxygen, cold conditions. Such drills improve accuracy and integrate new and old systems for combat readiness in plateau regions.

In addition to ground artillery, air-to-ground firing is also crucial in high-altitude environments. The reduced air density can alter the trajectory of air-launched munitions, making it essential for air forces to adapt targeting systems and techniques to ensure accurate strikes. Air-to-ground training at high altitudes allows for better coordination between aircraft and ground forces, enhancing the overall effectiveness of operations. This type of training ensures that aircraft can accurately deliver munitions, even under challenging conditions, which is vital for maintaining control over strategic high-altitude regions.

The firing range is situated at the coordinates 29°22'17"N 88°57'32" E in the flood plain of the Yarlung Tsang Po River between the confluence of two streams. The site is positioned adjacent to Highway G349, which is only 400 metres north of the firing range, and near Highway G562, which is located 12 kilometres to the east. This range is probably used for air-to-ground target practice by fighter jets and drones operating from the Shigatse dual-purpose airport or artillery firing. Its strategic location at an altitude of 3850 meters (approximately 12,631 feet) serves to assess the accuracy of targeting at higher elevations.

Large dunes, dried-up streams, and muddy tracks were the area's defining features prior to 2016. However, from July to August 2016, the landscape underwent a first sign of transformation. The initial development was the construction of a small-scale runway, measuring 200 by 50 metres, made of concrete. Subsequently, an artificial water channel was established along the western perimeter of the site, initially serving as a barrier.

While the initial sign of construction was mushrooming in the second half of 2016, the wide range of markings on the ground evolved rapidly after the Doklam Standoff. It was a 3.13 sq. km firing range during the Doklam stand-off, which expanded to 5 sq. km in 2021. The markings are probably used to calibrate and practice on different weapon systems, possibly for air-to-ground and ground-to-ground operations. The other parts of the range are well connected with the road network, mostly demarcated muddy tracks.

The target pin surfaces are smoothed using loose soil, possibly mined from the adjacent riverbed. Over the five years from 2016 to 2021, the firing range seems to have become a testing ground for various weapons used by the PLA in high-altitude operational environments.

Within the firing range

Let us now dive into the various target simulations and markings observed inside the firing range through the lens of satellite imagery.

1. A concrete strip with fighter jets

Small concrete strips can be observed with fighter jets positioned in various places at different times, with the number of planes changing periodically. These planes, resembling the Su-30 series, appear to be decoys or old, non-functional models likely used for target practice and formation exercises. The strip is probably connected to a road network for moving the planes. Some images show destroyed planes, while others display new sets, indicating ongoing activities in the area. Despite the presence of fighter jets and other nearby assets, the strip is significantly smaller (200*50 metres) than a typical runway required for take-off and landing, reinforcing the idea that the site is primarily used for target practice. An extension piece of the concrete strip will be developed in 2024, containing hardened kinds of simulated targets. 

2. Artificial water channel

A narrow channel, approximately 3 metres wide, flows into the firing range, where it ends abruptly. This channel originates from a place called Sequi, located roughly 35 Km to the east of the site. It carries freshwater diverted from the Yarlung Tsangpo River, providing an essential water supply to various villages and regions along its path.

This channel may offer a purer freshwater source than the water available in downstream areas. Along its route, the water is stored in numerous artificial reservoirs or ponds, which may serve purposes such as irrigation and domestic use for the communities it passes. The water primarily moves via natural gravity, travelling across the landscape and navigating through several barrages, confluences of larger rivers, and smaller streams. Remarkably, at one point, the channel even cuts through a mountain via a tunnel, showcasing significant engineering effort.

What is particularly puzzling is the rationale behind transporting this water over such long distances and through challenging terrain, which involves tunnelling through mountains, crossing dried riverbeds, and constructing bridges. Why the water is sourced from so far upstream, rather than utilising more accessible local water resources right next to the firing range through methods like pumping remains unclear. The reasoning behind this intricate water transport system is still a mystery, leaving questions about its intended purpose and the motivations behind its design unanswered.

3. levelled strip

A levelled strip, measuring 1300 metres in length and 50 metres in width, is in the centre of the firing range. On one side of the strip, there is a section measuring 140 metres in length and 30 metres in width, where dummy aircraft were positioned. In 2018, two aircraft were placed in this area, pointed in a specific direction and good condition. However, satellite images from 2021 reveal that the aircraft has sustained damage. One appears to have been dislocated, with parts scattered along the direction of the hit. Subsequent photos show the aircraft becoming increasingly disoriented and displaced over time, indicating that target practice has been conducted regularly.

Additionally, the strip is dotted with vertical structures arranged into five distinct clusters, each spaced approximately 200 metres apart. Each cluster contains five vertical pillars: two in the front row and three in the second row. The land around the clusters has been levelled and paved with concrete, and vehicles have occasionally been spotted next to the clusters. There are five clusters with 25 vertical pillars on this strip extending east to west. Meanwhile, another five clusters with 25 vertical pillars are evident in the linear structure from north to south. Below the strip are two more clusters, each with ten vertical pillars.

While the vertical pillars have remained intact over the years, the condition of the aircraft and their wreckage has varied, with vehicles appearing intermittently in the area.

4-6. Target pins of varied size

At the firing range, circular target markers of various sizes are observed. The site had a circle with a 100-meter radius and rectangular markings around it in November 2017. Initially, there were also four 50-meter radius circles and some concentric circles in the southeastern corner.

Post-Doklam, significant changes were noted. By 2021, the number of large circles increased to four, each with a 100-meter radius and distinctive (+) marking. Furthermore, 18 circles with a 50-meter radius and several smaller circles with a 15-meter radius, all marked centrally, were also present. In addition, six of the 15-meter radius circles included concentric rings at 5, 10, and 15 metres within them.

This arrangement has been consistently maintained, with annual upkeep. Occasionally, the orientation of the markings is adjusted. Craters within the circles are subsequently filled as part of site redevelopment, indicating that regular target practice is conducted. These targets are not merely superficial but reinforced to endure sustained firepower. The circles with markings probably indicate air-to-ground targeting simulations and ground-to-ground calibration of weapons.

Most of the circular targets are concentrated on the eastern and southern sides of the range, with rivers bordering both ends of the area.

7. Array of structures

A network of roads that resemble arteries connects the various target patches set up in this area. There are over ten distinct patches, some situated near dunes, possibly providing protection. Each patch contains a group of structures spaced evenly apart, typically by 8 to 10 units. The number of structures in each patch varies, ranging from 8 to 10, and they are positioned in different orientations.

Some structures resemble individual houses, while others resemble probable artillery units. Notably, the number and arrangement of these structures are inconsistent across satellite imagery from different periods. These patches are located centrally within a firing range and may be used for various target practice simulations.

8-10. Mix of functional objects and decoys

The image highlights several large individual structures positioned at various points along the roads and road extensions. It also shows target simulations, including vehicle convoys arranged linearly. Notably, a significant structure marked as number 4 in the June 2024 image appears to be a large aircraft hangar, possibly constructed with durable materials and serving as a storage facility or a simulated target like a hangar.

The structures are identified as follows: number 1 refers to individual structures, numbers 2 and 3 represent individual vehicle convoys, while numbers 4 and 5 denote larger structures, potentially simulated targets or storage areas. Numbers 6 and 7 indicate recent changes in the convoys' positions and placement.

Comparing the August 2000 image with the June 2024 image reveals variations in the positions of these structures. Notably, some of these structures are active, not merely decoys. The vehicles and specific structures emit electronic signals, suggesting they are functioning units rather than static or inactive targets. This part of the firing range in the southwest section appears highly active, likely simulating scenarios that change periodically based on operational requirements.

11. Few other features

In addition to the main features previously described, there are a few more minor, unmarked elements worth noting. Three pairs of radars are positioned adjacent, along with two pairs of mobile launchers, all within an area of approximately 1,000 square metres. The radars are spaced less than 10 metres apart, and the launchers are about 10 metres apart, suggesting they might serve as decoys rather than active operational units.

Four concrete pads are visible outside the firing range on the northwest side near a river junction. Despite having markers and roads connecting them, the purpose of these patches is unknown.

Scattered throughout the area are several destroyed structures, with damaged objects and simulated features related to air operations and ground infrastructure. These appear to be used as targets during training exercises.

The monitoring station

The Probable Monitoring Station is located at 4025 metres, right next to the highway and facing the centre of the firing range, which is at 3835 metres. This elevated position gives the station a clear view of the firing range.

View shed Geospatial analysis helps to determine the coverage area using 3D data, with the results displayed in green. The green areas represent the visible areas from the highest point. Considering the station's location, elevation, antennas, road construction, and existing facilities, this is likely a monitoring station for regular firing exercises.

Is this an active firing range?

While studying the developments in the firing area, a big question remains: When were these sites active in the past, and are they still functional today? We used techniques adopted in our previous studies based on remote sensing inference to find some answers. These findings reveal some interesting things, which are explained below.

A space-based approach to monitor ground activity instead of relying on traditional SIGINT methods is used. This allowed us to observe changes throughout the year. In 2017, certain areas of the range were highly active, but from 2018 to 2021, the activity gradually decreased. From 2023, the activity began to increase again, sometimes holding steady until early 2024 before declining slightly. However, overall activity levels remained high. The range is most active from May to August, with August seeing the highest usage, followed by July. Over the years, operations have primarily occurred between May and August, with occasional activity extending into September. August is consistently the busiest month, although shifting patterns may reflect weather changes or other schedule factors.

It is important to note that the above analysis is based on observations of specific sections of the firing range. It relies on limited open-source satellite imagery, which may not fully or accurately reflect the actual extent of exercises conducted. Corroboration with additional intelligence sources is recommended for a more comprehensive and accurate interpretation.

Part II: Probable signal intelligence (SIGINT) facilities

While exploring places around the firing range, we noticed some interesting structures. These might be advanced signal intelligence facilities with broader utilisation and military importance beyond the firing range.

Site A

The site is situated about 6 km west of the firing range and 38 km west of Shigatse Airport, at an elevation of 3,840 metres. Positioned along the banks of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, directly across from Shigatse City, the feature has an approximate radius of 180 metres and a circumference of around 1,134 metres.

The physical characteristics of site A without fingerprinting it are as follows:

Circle and Antenna Placement:

·       First Inner Circle: The innermost circle, located 50 meters from the centre, is populated by 40 evenly spaced antennas around its circumference.

·       Middle Circle: The middle circle, sitting 100 meters from the centre, acts as a boundary for the area between the inner and outermost circles.

·       Last Outer Circle: The outermost circle, situated 170 meters from the centre, contains 40 antennas along its circumference, completing the outermost layer of the structure.

Radial Divisions:

The area between the centre point and the inner circle and between the inner and middle circles is divided into five segments by radial lines extending from the centre. These lines create distinct zones within these circles. Further, the image shows the structure divided into 16 equal segments by radial lines extending from the middle circle to the outer perimeter, creating additional distinct areas.

Central Elevated Structure:

At the centre of the feature is an elevated circular structure with a radius of 8 meters, constructed in 2018. This central feature stands out prominently within the design.

Site Development History:

·       The site was initially a flat riverside area before construction began in June 2017. The first construction phase occurred in the middle of this space, where a small, circular, elevated structure was built.

·       By mid-2018, the land had been cleared and levelled, with the outer circle completed first. Following June 2018, more sections were marked out, and the full-fledged antenna system was rapidly developed.

·       Throughout 2018, additional circular divisions were completed, and the antennas were systematically installed in their respective positions, forming the comprehensive structure seen in the image.

Inference:

The physical features seen were similar to those of SIGINT systems around the world, which suggests that this might be a circularly disposed antenna array (CDAA) system used for high-frequency direction finding (HFDF).

The CDAA system, created during the Cold War, is a tool used to intercept and locate signals. The US military has widely used it to find signal sources worldwide. The Soviets also developed similar systems back then. The CDAA works best between 3 and 30 MHz using two circles that scan signals in all directions to find the best way to intercept transmissions. This system is more compact than large antenna farms, which need much space and must be moved around in different directions.

Many countries have used this system, and recent studies show that China is now using old World War II tools to find and listen to signals from various directions. One study, mentioned in a CSIS document, highlights China helps to build such a facility in Cuba to listen to military activities in the United States.

Since the HFDF system relies on skywave propagation through the ionosphere, it can intercept signals over vast distances, sometimes spanning continents.

In the meantime, another site connected to SIGINT has been identified and is referred to as Site-B.

Site B

A facility with a control centre in the middle and three semi-circular boundaries containing antennae is located between the firing range and the CDAA system. It is approximately 4 km from the firing range and 1.3 km from the CDAA system, at an elevation of 3800 m. The first construction phase began in early 2017, during which the control centre was being developed and the road connecting this site from the highway was laid out. The satellite image of May 2018 shows that construction was halfway completed, but it was expedited and finished by the end of 2018. The control centre is covered with high walls, indicating its importance. Communication dish antennas are also present.

Main Structure:

     -  A rectangular central building, likely housing control equipment, sits at the top of the image, surrounded by a perimeter fence with road access from the upper left.

Antennae Layout:

      -            Multiple antennae extend from the central structure in a radial pattern, forming clusters that create semi-circular patterns around the facility.

Semi-Circular Pattern:

The antennae are organised in semi-circles:

-          Inner Semi-Circle: The first semi-circle closest to the building contains approximately nine evenly spaced antennae.

-          Middle Semi-Circle: The second semi-circle contains approximately 18 antennae, extending further outward.

-          Outer Semi-Circle: The final, outermost semi-circle contains around 33 antennae, making the rods longer and covering a wider area.

Orientation:

  - The central structure is positioned at the top (North), with the antennae spreading in a fan-like formation toward the southern part of the installation (facing south).

Number of Antennae:

   - The three semi-circles collectively contain approximately 60 antennae, with increasing length as they move outward.

Overall Layout:

   - The radial pattern suggests the array is designed for focused data collection, possibly for military, astronomical, radio frequency monitoring, or scientific research purposes.

Inference:

Given the physical features of the antenna array, there are some possibilities that it could be a Very Low Frequency (VLF) system. VLF systems typically require extensive infrastructure to support highly long wavelengths (3–30 kHz), often consisting of tall masts or extensive wire arrays spread over vast areas. The semi-circular arrangement of this array, with clusters of approximately 9, 18, and 33 antennae in progressively larger arcs pointing towards one direction, suggests a design for signal directionality rather than omnidirectional VLF communication. Given the size of the system, this may be designed for 1 MHZ – 1 kHz; however, it may vary.

The radial, organised pattern could be an adaptation to maintain precision in transmitting or receiving low-frequency signals. If this array were intended for VLF applications, the layout could represent a more modern or compact version, where multiple concentric rings of antennae help focus or distribute very low-frequency signals for specific tasks—primarily used for long-distance communication, particularly with submarines or applications requiring signals to penetrate through water or ground. Due to their low frequency, these signals are robust but limited in data capacity.

Notable developments in a nearby village

As we analyse the activities at the firing range and the SIG-INT facilities, it's crucial to consider the surrounding areas. Shigatse, a city with a significant military presence, was previously studied for infrastructure developments at Shigatse airport, Heliport developments, and changes in its urban area. This time, we will focus on Dalongda, the nearest village to the examined sites, located just above the firing range and signal intelligence facility. Significant changes have occurred in this village over time. In 2018, a structure storage facility was constructed, and it has recently transformed into an entire military complex. This indicates ongoing developments and the establishment of supporting facilities in the vicinity.

Parting shot

While firing ranges are a standard component of military operations, their significance intensifies when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducts activities near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. This highly militarised area has fighter jets, UAVs, helipads, and a robust military presence. Still, it is also aligned with critical locations like the Doklam Plateau and India’s 'Chicken Neck' corridor. The proximity of such sensitive regions underscores the importance of these developments. Construction and militarisation activities, particularly since 2018, align with shifting geopolitical priorities. By 2021, much of the infrastructure was completed, with further refinements observed up to 2024, including the reconstruction of targets and the introduction of new shelters and decoys. Although some equipment, such as fighter jets, may not be fully functional, electronic intelligence systems indicate ongoing operational readiness. The precise positioning of radars, shelters, and convoy targets suggests evolving tactical strategies to replicate real-world combat scenarios. The type of weapon being used in the firing range is unclear. Typically, firing ranges have targets at a distance, so it's not clear whether air-to-ground or ground-to-air weapons are being used. However, it's possible that precision weapons are being tested using UAVs and that precise ground-to-ground weapons are being calibrated.

Meanwhile, the SIGINT infrastructures mapped in the report are vital for aviation, space situational awareness, air operations, and, most importantly, military signal intelligence. These systems intercept both high- and low-frequency signals, with the HFDF capturing signals bouncing off the ionosphere and the VLF systems monitoring ground-based propagation extending as far as the Bay of Bengal, tracking potential marine and naval activities. This facility is likely part of a more extensive, global network of similar installations designed to monitor intrusions and gather intelligence on military and civilian operations. Though the exact nature of its operations remains uncertain, the infrastructure appears fully operational and continually expands.

Many might wonder why China would invest in these seemingly outdated signal intelligence systems, which most of the world has moved away from. However, recent developments, such as a 2024 CSIS report detailing China’s construction of a similar facility in Cuba to monitor U.S. military activities, indicate this is part of China’s broader strategy. This network of installations reflects a deliberate investment in traditional signal interception, possibly augmenting modern technologies.

The proximity of this facility to critical areas near the LAC highlights its strategic importance. While geospatial data suggests it could serve as both a firing range and a signal intelligence hub, further intelligence corroboration is necessary for a complete understanding of its function. The fact that China continues to maintain and operate these facilities demonstrates their importance in modern intelligence operations, where the fusion of old and new systems provides comprehensive surveillance capabilities. The proximity to crucial military zones only adds to the significance of this installation in regional and global military dynamics.

These developments underscore the PLA's extensive preparations and highlight the need for effective countermeasures. Understanding the scale and nature of these exercises is crucial for assessing the PLA’s military readiness and crafting appropriate responses. This facility’s presence in such a geopolitically sensitive region reinforces its role as a key player in China’s strategic intelligence operations, making it a significant factor in regional stability and global security.

Cite this article as: Nithiyanandam, Y. “#11 Disclosing the undisclosed: China’s Advanced firing range and probable SIGINT facilities near Shigatse, TAR.” Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin, 7 Oct. 2024, geospatialbulletin.takshashila.org.in/p/11-disclosing-the-undisclosed-chinas.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM [Retd] and Air Marshal TD Joseph [Retd] for giving constant mentorship, external experts and reviewer.

For regular updates on our geospatial research, stay tuned to https://takshashila.org.in/geospatial-research.

The author Dr Y Nithiyanandam tweets (X.com) @prof_nithiya

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgement and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

- Heliports and helipads are strategically placed at key locations and near the LAC, serving as logistics hubs to enable rapid troop and equipment movement.

- Nearly 90% of helipads are situated at elevations between 3300-5300 meters, with 80% between 3600-5300 meters, highlighting their key positions.

- Helistrips are being expanded to accommodate UAVs that can land on strips shorter than 1000 meters, enhancing their utility in case of rotorcraft limitations.

- Despite these high-altitude positions, their operational capabilities remain unclear.

- The slower pace of heliport construction compared to airfields suggests the PLA's priorities under the Western Theater Command.

Backstory

Over the past ten years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has significantly expanded its military infrastructure and presence in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang, part of its Western Theatre Command. Of particular importance is the strengthening of the PLA's Army and Air Force infrastructure in TAR, aimed at high-altitude operational capability. This is a strategic move to match or gain superiority over India in the region.

The PLA's sustained focus on bolstering its military presence and building infrastructure in these areas has significantly increased its operational capabilities. The developments in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) have enhanced civilian activities and augmented military operations. From India’s point of view, it is important to note the advancements in air infrastructure, which have attracted attention from researchers and analysts, especially in the aftermath of the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. These infrastructure enhancements could impact India and other neighbours in a conflict.

Our earlier analysis published in Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin’s fourth edition used advanced high-resolution satellite images to examine TAR's air infrastructure, especially. The study focused on detailing significant military developments at large regional airports. At the same time, other researchers concentrated on fighter aircraft and missile sites. Both heliports and helipads are of equal importance.

Our current investigation thoroughly examines the developments within the helicopter force in the TAR. This includes assessing:

a. Changes in existing heliports

b. The establishment of new heliports and helipads

c. The spatial connections and interrelationships with other infrastructure and developmental activities around each site.

We have chosen eight locations that contain valuable and informative data pertinent to military matters. This analysis aims to understand the multi-dimensional role of helicopter infrastructure in PLA's high-altitude operations.  

We will, however, not delve into the technical aspects of helicopter lift capabilities and deployment, as its scope is focused on Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).

The Role of Helicopters in the Western Theatre Command

PLA’s WTC are equipped with various modern helicopters. Among these are attack helicopters designed for combat purposes and helicopters suited for medium and heavy operations. Notably, the Z-21 heavy attack helicopter stands out as a modified Z-20 utility helicopter. Resembling the American AH-64 Apache, the Z-21 boasts advanced weaponry, enhanced high-altitude capabilities, and reduced infrared signatures, making it a formidable asset in military operations.

Monitoring and examining the establishment and development of heliports and pads at strategic locations is essential. This initiative will likely bolster logistical capabilities, facilitate rapid deployment, and enhance operational efficiency in high-altitude and border regions for any military. The infrastructure supports their strategic objectives by enabling swift troop and equipment movement, which is crucial for maintaining and expanding influence and military readiness in contested and challenging terrains.

In the case of TAR, helicopters under the Western Theatre Command (WTC) play a multifaceted role. They are indispensable for tackling the logistical and transportation challenges posed by the region's high-altitude terrain, where road infrastructure is often insufficient. In addition to providing essential support for combat operations, including close air support, troop insertions, and medical evacuations, PLA’s rotorcraft power offers crucial support in navigating the region’s challenging terrains.

The Chinese helicopters deployed in the WTC include the Z-20, a domestic medium-lift helicopter resembling the UH-60, capable of essential troop transport, sling loads, fast-rope insertions, and hoisting operations. The Z-8, with variants such as Z-8G and Z-8L, provides heavy lift capabilities, with the Z-8L having a wider fuselage for a broader range of military equipment. The Mi-17, with variants that include Mi-171SH, Mi-17E, and Mi-17-V7, serves utility, transport, cargo, and armed roles, notable for its high-altitude performance with the VK-2500 turboshaft engine (a Russian-made engine developed and produced by UEC-Klimov, part of the United Engine Corporation (UEC) under Rostec, a Russian state corporation).

Interestingly, the PLA’s induction of the Z-20 and Z-8L helicopters aims explicitly to enhance performance under challenging conditions. It is commendable that such efforts are being made, even if their practical value remains questionable. The operational information available in the public domain about these machines is limited and, when available, often perceived as unreliable.

Admittedly, the PLA's commitment to develop extensive infrastructure, including the rapid construction of heliports and the upgrade of existing facilities, underscores its dedication to supporting and strengthening its regional capabilities in the TAR.

Now, let’s delve into the spatial distribution of helicopter infrastructure in TAR.

The study identified over 100 helipads in the TAR, as illustrated in Figure 2. These helipads are positioned in four primary areas:

A.      Locations with significant infrastructure.

B.      Strategic points near borders.

C.     Disputed or occupied territories with PLA presence.

D.     Major logistics hubs.

The data presented in Figure 3 indicates that most helipads are concentrated in two primary areas: Lhasa and near Aksai Chin. Lhasa has the highest number of helipads, thanks to its well-established heliport and airbase with dedicated helicopter infrastructure. The Aksai Chin region, located west of TAR, hosts numerous helipads, reflecting its strategic significance and role in supporting the PLA's ground forces in this contested area. Beyond these main clusters, the region also encompasses smaller groupings of helipads situated along water bodies, near key logistics hubs, and in other pivotal locations, thus forming an extensive and interconnected network of aerial support.

The research analysed 109 helipads based on their elevation, and the results unveiled interesting distribution patterns. Surprisingly, only two helipads are positioned at elevations ranging from 780 to 2600 meters. However, 32 helipads are located between 2700 and 3600 meters, 44 helipads between 3700 and 4300 meters, and 25 helipads between 4400 and 4700 meters. Of particular note, six helipads are positioned at elevations between 4800 and 5400 meters. These helipads exhibit a wide range of elevations, from a minimum of 780.50 meters to a maximum of 5374 meters, with an average elevation of approximately 3930 meters.

This research has mapped the locations of heliports/helipads and their crucial role in facilitating ground movements, transporting personnel to remote military locations, and supporting various tactical operations. The strategic selection of helipad locations is particularly evident at higher elevations, where optimal vantage points are vital for effective military operations. Although most helipads are concentrated between 2700 and 4700 meters, it's essential to acknowledge the presence of helipads at both higher and lower elevations. This distribution emphasises the significance of mapping out the operational capabilities of helicopters across diverse terrains, ensuring adequate support in various environments.

The elevation of the helipads and by knowing the inventory of helicopters in the WTC offers valuable insights into the operational conditions and the types of helicopters likely to be deployed in those areas. This understanding is crucial for assessing helicopter models' efficiency and operational requirements, particularly the new attack helicopters and the commonly used Mi-17 series. It indirectly suggests the specific types of helicopters that are most likely to be deployed at different altitudes.

Figure 5 illustrates the locations of helipads and heliports, highlighting their concentration near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). We employed a linear buffer to assess the proximity of helipads and associated infrastructure. The map contains the location of helipads, heliports, and airports (which probably serve as multipurpose facilities that can accommodate helicopters and UAVs in addition to planes). The infrastructure is notably concentrated at these critical points while also being dispersed across areas of interest.

There is a suspicion that these helipads and heliports may be for more than just helicopters. There are concerns that certain types of UAVs used by PLA forces might also operate from these locations. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of all features associated with these aviation facilities, including helipads, heliports, runways, and heli-strips, is necessary to extract information about their development in critical areas.

A previous study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provided valuable insights into TAR's development, highlighting the establishment of several heliports and airports in the region as of 2022. However, this study further maps out the smaller military helicopter landing facilities and helipads within these heliports and airports. Figure 6 showcases the rapid development of TAR since 2022. While the CSIS data primarily focused on significant heliports, our analysis delves deeper by including the newly established smaller helipads. We have pinpointed each helipad in the region, especially those at critical locations and those that have military significance. Our study adds to the existing CSIS findings by identifying more development locations, offering a more comprehensive understanding of the region's air infrastructure. The new features uncovered in our study emphasise the necessity of recognising the significant heliports, airports, and smaller landing facilities crucial for military operations.

Analysis of selected sites that contain crucial helicopter-related infrastructure

Our study selected eight locations with unique scenarios to explore the various factors and potential uses more deeply. Through a detailed analysis of these diverse scenarios, we aim to comprehensively understand these helipads' strategic importance and broader implications for military operations.

Site 1 - GB_HE_47

The facility is situated at nearly 4,000 meters on the riverbanks. It includes a Heli strip measuring 845 meters long, accommodating UAV landings. Over time, the facility has expanded to include over 14 helipads, several operational hangars, and zones designated for testing and practice. Ten helicopters were found during imaging, and some were identified as Mi-17s. This is one of the largest heliports in the region, equipped to handle helicopters, UAVs, and various military vehicles. Observations reveal multiple helicopters on-site, including attack helicopters and those used for logistics. The facility boasts Satellite Communications (SATCOM) capabilities and a control centre identifiable by specific markings. In the top right corner of the image, a fully operational residential area with an indoor stadium is visible, likely providing amenities for the personnel.

Adjacent to this residential zone is a storage facility, likely intended for fuel, and is currently under construction. On the eastern side, a city surrounded by mountains is taking shape, featuring high-rise buildings, recreational areas, and extensive sports facilities, all supported by significant road infrastructure. The foothills are reinforced with materials and structures to prevent landslides. This heliport is a Lhasa access point and hub and supports several military operations. The surrounding area includes multiple tunnels that facilitate highway passage through the mountains. Despite its riverside location, the heliport is strategically positioned to support critical operations in the region.

Site 2 – GB_HE_51

An image dated June 15, 2024, reveals an under-construction heliport with dual-purpose facilities with significant strategic implications. This heliport, strategically located just 60 km from the disputed territory between India and China, features a 400 meters strip expandable up to 700 meters at an elevation of 4300 meters. The facility's potential utility is noteworthy, given its proximity to the conflict zone. The strip is designed for emergency and forward landings and is equipped with approach passes and lighting to facilitate night and extreme weather operations, highlighting the need for preparedness in all conditions. The image also shows radio communication towers and air traffic control towers, which are essential for managing the complex operations expected at this site. Retaining walls have been constructed to protect against flooding from the nearby river.

Additionally, the heliport is well-connected to Highway 3219, enhancing its accessibility and strategic value. Extensive military activities surround the heliport, including new constructions, training exercises, and troop movements. The site's location amidst mountain peaks provides natural cover for these operations, further emphasising its strategic importance in the region.

Site 3 – GB_HE_19

The site, located at an elevation of 3,950 meters, has gained significance due to its functional Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) site. What was merely a piece of land in 2018 has been transformed into a fully operational SAM site complex, complete with administrative buildings, accommodations, recreational facilities, etc. The adjacent land under development is likely being prepared for a heliport, with dimensions ranging from 200 to 250 meters. This new facility is just 100 kilometres from Tawang, near the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh. The site is geographically positioned at a lower elevation and benefits from good road connectivity. Current excavation activity suggests that the soil may be used for land reclamation or potential underground operations, though this remains to be conclusive based on available imagery. Additionally, Site 3, located near the river and close to the city of Lungze, also holds strategic importance.

Site 04 – GB_HE_96

The helipad, located at an elevation of 4276 meters, appears to be an older facility than others we have observed. Although it is not a heliport, this helipad holds significant strategic value in the region. The image above shows that the military building complex is in a remote area; hence, the helipads likely serve as an essential transportation and logistics hub for nearby installations, including the PLA's PAGRI SAM site, which is just 1.5 kilometres away. This site is just 8 kilometres from the Bhutanese border and 16 kilometres from the disputed area between Bhutan and China north of the Dhokla plateau. The area around the helipad is bustling with military activity, as evidenced by numerous trenches, footprints, tyre tracks, temporary military installations, and probable craters created for military operations. Close to Nagadong and 28km east of India’s Sikkim, this helipad is pivotal due to its strategic location.

Site 05 -GB_HE_08

The site depicted in the above image is at an elevation of 3674 meters, nestled in a valley adjacent to Highway G318, which connects Lhasa and Nyingai. This is the second heliport we've examined in Lhasa, positioned right on the banks of the Lhasa River. The heliport features a 550-meter Heli strip and a 400-meter tarmac with fully functional systems. However, no helicopters were observed at the time of imaging. The surrounding area is experiencing substantial development, with high-rise apartments and fully operational community centres to the west of the site. Although expansion efforts have been stagnant for some time, ample land within the heliport complex exists for further development. The infrastructure suggests that the heliport may be used for UAV landing and operations. Despite a retention wall near the river, the heliport and the expansive Lhasa River are nearly at the same level. The absence of landing guidance indicates that the heliport will be operational only under limited circumstances.

Site 06 -GB_HE_34

The heliport shown above is different from others we've seen so far. It is located next to Highway G219, which leads to Pangong Tso Lake and has no nearby towns, indicating its use for military operations. This heliport is built on a mountain slope with reinforced land to enhance its stability and is designed for military operations. It includes 18 probable hardened shelters and is positioned just below a dried river, providing natural protection from direct threats due to its lower elevation relative to the riverbank. This heliport's location and unique topography make it particularly interesting, as it is close to contested areas. The facility consists of two heliports with equally long Heli strips, each about 650 meters long and equipped with approach lights and other facilities suitable for various conditions, including night-time landing. These Heli strips can also support UAV operations in the region. The area around the heliport is bustling with military activities, making this a significant site to monitor during times of tension between India and China.

Site 07 -GB_HE_66

Perched at an elevation of 4,426 meters, this cutting-edge heliport is meticulously crafted to cater to both helicopters and UAVs. Comprising two runways, each spanning from 500 to 600 meters in length, with provisions for expansion up to 1 kilometre, the facility reached a significant milestone with the completion of its second runway by late 2023, greatly amplifying its operational capabilities. Boasting over 16 shelters and hangars, the heliport is a mere 63 kilometres from the Indian border and 23 kilometres from the Bhutanese border, nestled between the stunning Lake Kala and Lake Mabu. Furthermore, its proximity to a radar station, equipped with a pair of radars atop a nearby mountaintop just three kilometres away, adds to its strategic allure. This state-of-the-art facility is also conveniently situated near a modern village approximately two kilometres away, with the added advantage of being closely linked to Highway 219, thereby becoming an integral part of regional developments. The significant presence of military indicators in the area further underscores the importance of heliports. Evolving with time, the heliport may transform into a comprehensive UAV base and a significant heliport equipped with all essential infrastructure, solidifying its critical role in the region.

Site 08 -GB_HE_121

This heliport is deep within Tibet, near Nagqu, far from the Indian borders. The site is under construction and situated at an elevation of 4489 meters, approximately 2.45 kilometres from one of the region's largest train terminals. This terminal is a crucial logistics hub, connecting major cities such as Lhasa and Shigatse with other Chinese cities. The heliport is conveniently located next to Highway G19, providing excellent connectivity. The heliport boasts impressive infrastructure, including a 1-kilometre runway to accommodate UAVs and helicopters and six large hangars for asset storage and maintenance. The site is active and under construction, with visible equipment and ongoing development. Even though it is in the early stages of construction and the fuel tanks and storage systems are still being built, the heliport is expected to become a vital logistic hub. Once operational, it will support further developments and other regional heliports.

3D view of eight sites studied in this report

The two images show the 3D view of 8 sites from over 100 helipads and several regional heliports. The goal is to visualise the topography of these heliports, helipads, and their surroundings. Each image has numbers from 1 to 8 indicating the sites. The centre of each image shows the location of a site. Many of these sites are protected by mountains, near water bodies, and connected to highways. These locations were carefully selected for operational, logistical, and strategic purposes. This visualisation helps us understand the patterns in which these sites are established. By looking at a 10 km radius from the centre, we can see both the local topography and the strategic importance of each site.

Parting shot

The heliports and helipads at critical locations within the TAR are invaluable assets to the region's air infrastructure. These facilities are strategically established to support transporting personnel, supplies, and other necessities for PLA ground forces. Their locations are carefully chosen to leverage natural topographical protection and ensure they remain off the direct line of access from different regions.

Designed for self-sufficiency, these heliports are equipped with essential resources such as food, energy, and water. Additionally, they feature comprehensive facilities for soldiers, including residential buildings, sports facilities, and recreational infrastructures. This thoughtful planning underscores the long-term strategic importance of these heliports.

Despite their crucial role, the pace of construction and expansion for these heliports has slowed in recent years. While initial structures were established swiftly, further development has lagged compared to other regional air bases and infrastructure projects. This slowdown is likely due to the challenges of operating rotary infrastructure at higher altitudes. Meanwhile, the length of certain helistrips has been increased, and turning pads have been added at the ends. This indicates that the strips can now likely accommodate certain categories of UAVs capable of landing within a strip distance of 700-1000 meters.

In conclusion, these heliports' strategic placement and robust design ensure they remain a cornerstone of the region's military logistics and infrastructure, poised to support ongoing and future operations in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

In our research, we found several interesting military features around these helipads. We will discuss these in future editions of our newsletter. Stay tuned by subscribing.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM [Retd] and Air Marshal TD Joseph [Retd] for giving constant mentorship, as well as the two reviewers.

For regular updates on our geospatial research, stay tuned to https://takshashila.org.in/geospatial-research.

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgement and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

TL;DR

• Geospatial maps help understand the connections between transportation networks. The study used advanced geospatial analysis, using data from various sources, including open-source information.

• The study mapped Tibet's comprehensive transportation network, which integrates roads, railways, and air infrastructure. This network has the potential to transform the region economically, socially, and militarily, thereby influencing regional stability and significance.

• Tibet's transport infrastructure has grown massively since 1959, with a 16-fold increase in road networks, the introduction of strategic rail lines, and new air infrastructures bolstering China's logistical capabilities and regional connectivity.

Why is this article a must-read for you?

Suppose you follow Chinese infrastructure development in Tibet. In that case, you've likely heard about their impressive road systems, engineering feats in high-speed rail across challenging terrains, and rapidly expanding air infrastructure. This article uses geospatial tools to compile and analyse the information generated through various sources, offering a comprehensive visual view of Tibet's transportation network. By exploring these maps, you'll gain a deeper understanding of the vast infrastructure, its potential strategic implications for neighbouring countries, and insights into potential regional growth and plans.

The Backstory

China's ongoing efforts to overcome the significant barriers that impede movement between the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Chinese provinces are part of larger strategic goals. These barriers, including surging rivers, rugged mountain terrain, fragile ecosystems, and extreme climatic conditions, have been a part of Tibet's landscape for centuries. The year 1959 marked a significant shift when the transportation of supplies from provinces like Yunnan, Sichuan, and Qinghai heavily relied on humans and livestock. Since then, Tibet's transport infrastructure has seen substantial growth. The total road network in TAR, which was 7,300 km in 1959, expanded to 120,000 km by 2021, a growth of 1543%. This development includes major highways that connect cities, towns, and rural areas within TAR. The integration of Tibet into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2016, a global infrastructure development strategy, has further accelerated this infrastructure growth, profoundly transforming TAR's social and economic landscape.

Despite its sparsely populated mountainous terrain, constructing rail lines in Tibet has been a strategic imperative for China. The inauguration of Tibet’s first rail line, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, in 2006 was a significant milestone. This strategic vision is evident in that by 2020, Tibet will have only about 800 km of railway, a length comparable to that of Shanghai, despite Tibet being approximately 200 times larger in land area. However, this scenario is beginning to change. In 2021, China launched Tibet’s first high-speed rail line, connecting the regional capital Lhasa with Nyingchi. This line significantly enhances the capability to transport civilians swiftly, as well as PLA troops and equipment, across the eastern part of Tibet, thereby bolstering China's logistical capabilities. The implications of these developments are underscored by notable railroads such as Qinghai-Tibet (2000 km) and Sichuan-Tibet Railway, which connects Tibet externally; meanwhile, Lhasa-Shigatse (253 km) and Lhasa-Nyingchi (435 km) are the major rail projects that network internally within Tibet, underscoring the importance of Tibet's transport infrastructure.

As per literature, in recent years, air infrastructure has been significantly enhanced alongside the expansion of road and rail networks. Between 2017 and 2022, five airports were upgraded, and four new airports were established. Additionally, nine heliports became operational, further strengthening the region's air connectivity.

Why it is essential to understand transport infrastructure?

Studying the expansion of roads and other transportation networks in Tibet is essential for India. Firstly, enhanced connectivity in TAR can significantly impact regional trade dynamics, facilitating faster and more efficient movement of goods between China and South Asia. The development of robust transport infrastructure in Tibet enhances China's logistical capabilities, affecting the strategic balance in the region. Improved roads and railways mean quicker mobilisation of military assets, a critical consideration for India given the long-standing border disputes with China. Moreover, the environmental impacts of such infrastructure projects are significant. The fragile ecosystem of the Tibetan plateau, with its unique biodiversity and delicate balance, is susceptible to disturbances from large-scale construction activities. Understanding the environmental repercussions of these developments is vital for India, particularly concerning transboundary river systems originating in Tibet, which are lifelines for millions in South Asia. Lastly, the socio-economic transformation of Tibet, driven by improved infrastructure, can lead to demographic shifts and altered socio-political dynamics in the region, influencing Tibet's stability and potentially affecting neighbouring areas, including India. Therefore, a comprehensive study of the transportation network expansion in Tibet offers valuable insights into the broader implications for trade, security, environmental sustainability, and regional stability, all of which are paramount to India.

Road Infrastructure of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)

It is well-established that road infrastructure is crucial for various aspects, including a region's economic development. Figures 2 and 3 clearly illustrate that road networks have significantly expanded. When comparing maps from the pre-independence era to those of the present day, it is evident that the networks have rapidly extended both in length and breadth. This article will further explore whether this growth has primarily been in significant roads or if there has been a more extensive development of minor networks in the region.

Refer to Figure 2, which illustrates both minor and major roads. Specifically, the various categories of roads are detailed, with trunk and other significant roads depicted by blue lines. These trunk roads connect significant towns and critical areas along the border. Additionally, the figure shows minor roads, including tertiary and secondary roads extending across small villages and remote posts situated in regions closer to the border, remote villages in the valley, and rugged mountains.

While minor roads are crucial for last-mile connectivity, developing major roads is essential for significant progress. Let's delve into this topic through the maps (Figure 4 & 5). The maps illustrate the network of substantial roads established over the past few years. The total length of highways in Tibet spans close to 18,000 km. Among these, the G318, the longest highway in Tibet, connects Shanghai to Tibet. Other significant highways include G109, G219, G214, and the Sino-Nepal Friendship Highway (also part of G318). The connectivity of these highways is detailed in Figure 4.

In addition to the major trunk roads, the trunk link roads play a crucial role in connecting the primary arteries with various regions. These can be considered secondary roads within the area, collectively spanning close to 14,000 kilometres across some of the most challenging terrains in the world. Different forms of minor roads extend further from these secondary roads, reaching villages and remote areas. Refer to Figure 5, which illustrates the significant and primary highway links. The types of roads are asphalt, concrete, gravel, paved, unpaved, and dirt.

Rail Network Infrastructure in Tibet

In late 1999, while other engineers were still figuring out how to make it work, Zhang Luxin, a renowned engineer with extensive experience in railway construction, proposed a new plan. His idea involved following the plateaus that stretch for hundreds of miles. Although the plateau is flat, it is situated at a high altitude and subjected to harsh weather and melting permafrost, making it a challenging route. Zhang argued that it is the best route because it has been used for other purposes. Since the 1970s, this path has been used for an oil pipeline and the route of the Qinghai-Tibet Highway. Many doubted Zhang's plan, believing workers could not survive the high altitudes. More than 644 kilometres of the railway would be built on permafrost, which remains frozen throughout the year. Some considered the technology for building on permafrost too new and risky. However, Zhang persuaded them that it was feasible. Officials approved the route from Golmud to Lhasa, and construction began. This project became one of the most challenging railway lines ever built, high up in the mountains. Today, we see numerous high-speed railways and long tunnels constructed with cutting-edge technology.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes several projects in Tibet that are also aimed at enhancing connectivity between China, Nepal, and Bhutan. Central to this effort is the development of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network. This network includes infrastructure projects such as the railway extension towards the Nepalese border at Gyirong, which aims to connect with the planned Kathmandu-Kerung railway. These rail and road links are expected to facilitate trade and transit between Tibet and Nepal, promoting economic integration and regional cooperation. Additionally, there are discussions about extending road connectivity from Tibet to Bhutan, which would further enhance regional connectivity under the BRI framework. These projects are part of China's broader strategy to strengthen economic ties and enhance logistical links in South Asia through Tibet.

The Tibet railway network, notably the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and its extensions, is both a challenging and impressive feat due to several unique factors. The railway traverses some of the world's highest and most inhospitable terrains, with sections reaching over 5,000 metres, presenting significant engineering and human health challenges, such as altitude sickness and extreme weather conditions, including sub-zero temperatures and strong winds. Much of the railway is built on permafrost, requiring innovative engineering solutions to ensure stability, such as laying tracks on thick layers of rock and concrete to prevent the permafrost from melting and destabilising the tracks. Constructing the railway in a fragile ecosystem requires careful planning to minimise environmental impact. This includes building bridges over animal migration paths and using unique materials to reduce soil erosion. Transporting materials and machinery to such remote and high-altitude locations posed significant logistical challenges, and the workforce had to endure difficult living conditions. Ensuring a continuous supply of necessary materials was complex.

Despite these challenges, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, completed in 2006, is a remarkable engineering achievement. It includes the Tanggula Pass, the world's highest railway pass at 5,072 metres, and the Fenghuoshan Tunnel, the highest railway tunnel in the world. Advanced technologies were employed to address the challenges of building on permafrost and high altitudes, such as cooling pipes and insulation layers to stabilise the ground and pressurised train cabins to ensure passenger comfort at high altitudes. The railway has significantly boosted the economy of Tibet, facilitating the transport of goods and people, improving access to remote areas, promoting tourism, and providing better connectivity for local populations. The extension of the railway network towards Nepal and potentially Bhutan demonstrates China's commitment to regional connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to enhance trade and economic integration between China and its South Asian neighbours.

Air Infrastructure of Tibet Autonomous Region

Air infrastructure is vital in Tibet, overcoming significant geographical and topographical challenges, including high altitudes, mountainous terrain, and harsh weather conditions that make ground transportation difficult. It provides a reliable alternative for moving people and goods efficiently, boosting tourism and facilitating trade. Strategically, air connectivity allows for the rapid deployment of troops and supplies, which is essential for border security. It also enhances accessibility to remote areas, ensuring the delivery of essential services and promoting cultural exchange and integration. Key airports like Lhasa Gonggar and investments from initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are central to these efforts, highlighting air travel’s crucial role in Tibet’s economic and social development.

The air infrastructure in Tibet has significantly improved over the years. Several old airports have been renewed, and new airstrips are being constructed. Additionally, many shorter airstrips and heliports have been strengthened.

In our previous research, we covered some of these developments. However, in this edition, we have found that the infrastructure has grown even more. For instance, the number of airstrips has increased from 9 to 13 in the last two years. Existing literature on the topic identified nine airstrips till 2022. Meanwhile, our current study has identified 13. The number of functional and non-functional helipads identified through open-source intelligence is significantly higher than previous research in the public domain.

As stated in earlier research, most airports and airstrips in the Region serve dual purposes, catering to tourism and civilian movement within the country and acting as military bases for the PLA's Air Force. Although the capacity for military operations at these airstrips is unclear, Tibet has several functional civilian airports, with Lhasa Gonggar International Airport being the largest and most important. Lhasa Gonggar Airport has a significant capacity to handle 9 million passengers annually. The airport's Terminal 3, which opened in 2021, contributes significantly to this capacity with 21 additional boarding gates and extensive facilities designed to accommodate high passenger volumes. Other notable airports in Tibet include Nyingchi Mainling Airport, Shigatse Peace Airport, Ngari Gunsa Airport, and Qamdo Bangda Airport. These airports form a network facilitating domestic and limited international travel, primarily connecting to major Chinese cities and Kathmandu in Nepal.

Overall connectivity: transportation nexus

Integrating Tibet’s Road, air, and rail infrastructure creates a transformative nexus that significantly impacts tourism, economic activities, and military logistics. This comprehensive transportation network facilitates greater accessibility, enabling a surge in tourism by connecting remote areas with significant cities and international destinations. For instance, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and newly expanded air routes have improved connectivity, boosted the number of tourists and contributed to the local economy.

Furthermore, the development of these infrastructures supports large-scale economic projects and civilian activities by enhancing the flow of goods and services, which is vital for Tibet's economic growth. The railways and highways, such as the Qinghai-Tibet and Sichuan-Tibet Highways, play a critical role in the movement of both civilian and military personnel, underscoring their importance.

Overall, the enhanced transportation infrastructure in Tibet fosters regional economic development and tourism and strengthens the military's logistical capabilities, contributing to the area's stability and significance.

Nexus between Transportation network and PLA presence

Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the strategic distribution and connectivity of major PLA bases in Tibet. Figure 12 depicts the locations of these bases across the region, while Figure 13 highlights the comprehensive network of road, railway, and air infrastructures connecting them. This map underscores how transport infrastructures are designed with dual purposes, serving both civilian needs and military operations.

Settlement infrastructure and road connectivity

Figure 12 shows the distribution of major cities, small and medium towns, and villages within the Tibetan region. Some of these settlements are close to the borders shared with India and Bhutan.

Figure 13 highlights the connectivity of these settlements to major roads. This visualisation specifically showcases the significant roads, indicating a well-established network. It is important to note that this network includes paved and unpaved minor roads, serving multiple purposes. These minor roads provide crucial last-mile connectivity, linking remote posts and villages to the broader transportation system.

The complexity of the terrain

Tibet's terrain is complex, with vast plateaus, towering mountain ranges, and dramatic altitude variations, posing challenges for infrastructure development. The 3D map of Tibet Autonomous Region and other vital prefectures follows:

The maps (1414–18) show how challenging it is to find flat land for development in Tibet due to its rugged terrain. Few flat areas are suitable for construction, making land availability a significant challenge. Despite these obstacles, essential infrastructure projects, especially transportation, have been successfully established in the region. The images illustrate how even the most minor pieces of land are creatively used for various purposes, highlighting the region's resourcefulness in overcoming geographical constraints to develop essential infrastructure. This reflects the difficulties and achievements in adapting to Tibet's unique environment.

Tunnels and culverts in the complex terrain

In our study, we have mapped the locations of over 400 culverts and more than 600 spatial segments of tunnels in the region. The culverts are built primarily to allow water and debris passage over canals, rivers, streams, and ditches. On the other hand, the tunnels are designed specifically for road and railway systems, forming integral components of transportation networks. Tunnels and culverts are essential for ensuring the efficient use of transportation infrastructure under all weather conditions. Additionally, the tunnels reduce travel times and improve access to strategically important areas, offering economic or military advantages.

Culverts play a critical role in maintaining transportation routes' structural integrity and functionality by preventing water accumulation and erosion, thereby mitigating potential damage to the infrastructure. Meanwhile, tunnels facilitate seamless traffic flow through challenging terrains, such as mountains and hills, enhancing connectivity and accessibility. This improved connectivity supports economic activities by providing quicker routes for transporting goods and services. It enhances the mobility of military forces, ensuring rapid deployment and logistical support in critical areas. Integrating these infrastructural elements demonstrates a sophisticated approach to overcoming geographical challenges and optimising the transportation network for multifaceted benefits.

Parting shot

The insights shared in this edition aim to provide foundational spatial information about the transport infrastructure of the Tibet Autonomous Region, showcasing its readiness for economic expansion, resource utilisation, and military fortification compared to neighbouring areas. The focus has been mapping the various types of existing infrastructure and the inherent complexities of Tibet's unique and challenging terrain.

This analysis highlights the significant progress made in constructing roads, railways, and air links in one of the world's most challenging regions. The vast plateaus and towering mountain ranges necessitate specialised construction techniques and meticulous planning. Developing such infrastructure is a technical achievement and a necessity, enhancing connectivity and fulfilling civilian and military needs.

Our research extends beyond this initial study. We are delving deeper into the remote sensing of infrastructure and the engineering methods employed in Tibet's transport systems. Understanding the composition and resilience of the materials used is crucial for assessing these constructions' long-term sustainability and durability in harsh environmental conditions.

Moreover, future editions will comprehensively analyse key transport hubs and their evolution. This will include detailed studies of major highways, railway lines, and airports, examining how their development has impacted regional growth and security dynamics. By mapping these elements, we aim to provide a holistic view of how transport infrastructure supports broader socio-economic and strategic goals.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, and VSM [Retd] for giving constant support and motivation, as well as the two reviewers.

Special thanks to our research interns for making 3D maps.

For regular updates on our geospatial research, stay tuned to https://takshashila.org.in/geospatial-research.

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgement and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

• The study identifies a trend in developing settlements along border areas, particularly near valuable resources. These settlements are designed to be resilient, all-weather structures, often serving military purposes.

• New Chinese border settlements display distinct spatial patterns and architectural characteristics, distinguishing them from other types of natural settlements.

• It appears to be a deliberate strategy to occupy all viable land, especially if it is flat, near water bodies or roads, and sometimes near historical monasteries for their influence on the area.

1. Introduction

Border settlements, a tactic frequently used in territorial disputes, have often been discussed in the context of China’s developments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. However, this strategy is not exclusive to this region and has been observed in other disputed areas in Georgia, the Arctic, and Antarctica. The history, cultural diversity, and modern geopolitical considerations surrounding border settlements’ evolution and strategic significance make for a fascinating and multifaceted narrative.

Border settlements have existed for centuries and emerged along ancient trade routes, pilgrimage paths, and strategic locations. They were established by various groups, including indigenous communities, rulers, merchants, and religious leaders, during different historical periods. These settlements played a vital role in defense and communication, serving as early warning systems against invasions. They also facilitated cross-border trade, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic interactions. As time passed, these settlements became melting pots of diverse cultures, hosting people from different ethnic backgrounds, languages, and traditions. This cultural diversity is reflected in each village’s unique folklore, festivals, and rituals.

1.1 China’s border settlements

Rapid construction activities, especially settlements in recent times, have occurred for various reasons related to its disputed territorial claims with neighboring countries. While the Chinese Communist Party initially presented these settlements as part of its poverty alleviation campaign, they also played an essential role in national security. The settlements are established to strengthen surveillance and security, assert territorial claims, maintain a civilian presence as a deterrent, support military operations, encourage Chinese citizens to work in ethnic minority populations, and promote economic development in remote areas.

The rapid construction of these settlements, including large housing blocks and people’s relocation to these areas, has been most significant in the Tibet Autonomous Region. This has led to a swift expansion of China’s presence in the disputed regions. Furthermore, these settlements have been used to negotiate disputed regions, further reinforcing China’s territorial claims.

1.2 The Land Border’s Law – A booster

The Land Borders Law of the People’s Republic of China, enacted in October 2021, is considered a significant step towards establishing new settlements on the border. This law highlights China’s approach to its border regions, focusing on defence and security. It specifies the division of responsibilities among various bureaucracies, authorises the use of force, emphasises the role of citizens and civilian institutions in border defence, outlines conditions for emergency measures, and pledges state support for socio-economic development in border areas.

1.3 What is unique about this article?

The media often reports on the emergence of new villages near borders, but these settlements lack detailed mapping and spatial context. Our research aims to identify smaller settlements near the border and larger settlements with a dual purpose across the entire area of interest (i.e. 100km from the border of four districts of Arunachal Pradesh). This article focuses on newly established settlements within or near existing towns or areas with available resources. These settlements are placed to gain military advantage or to tap into local resources.

We have used advanced remote sensing tools, such as satellite imagery and remote sensing algorithms, that detect even minor settlements in these regions to map these locations accurately. This method allows for a more precise and detailed settlement mapping to study its spatial pattern.

For this study, we have selected a few examples to understand the subject better and give insight into broader patterns and trends of settlement development in border areas.

2. Mapping and spatial analysis of Chinese settlements located within 100km range from the four districts of India’s Arunachal Pradesh

This analysis maps settlements approximately 100 km from the India-China borderline, utilising advanced remote sensing technology. Unlike traditional studies that only focus on smaller settlements, this research aims to identify larger settlements that exceed the size of 0.25 sq. km, which have been determined using coarse resolution non-optical remote sensing data. The study focuses specifically on settlements around 100 km from the LAC, along the four Northern districts of Arunachal Pradesh, starting from Tawang to Kurung Kumey.

Furthermore, the analysis examines the identified locations using moderate and high-resolution optical remote sensing datasets. This in-depth examination aims to provide an understanding of the settlements in the region, including their size, location, and characteristics.

The research findings indicate two significant clusters of settlements, marked by yellow dotted lines on the map. Our research investigates each location, providing valuable insights into the settlements’ nature, proximity to critical features, and the types of civilian and military developments within them. Additionally, the study examines common traits and potential growth trends in the region.

One of the most significant patterns that emerges from the research is the proximity of major settlements to highways and water bodies. This indicates that two predominant characteristics are shared across these dispersed locations, as evident from the heat map above. Further analysis suggests that this clustering of settlements around road networks and water sources will likely continue, as these factors remain essential for developing and growing settlements.

2.1 Significant developments

Out of the original 35 identified settlements, we picked settlements with strategic importance and dual-purpose structures for discussion in this article.

A new residential development has emerged along the banks of Loro Chou, near the G219 highway at Chayal, approximately 12 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This area features a newly constructed settlement near a small dam on the Loro Chu stream, consisting of over 100 border defence houses, covering an area of about 0.043 sq. km.

Additionally, there has been significant redevelopment in an older settlement near Jamchen, which now includes more than 75 structures, encompassing an area of 0.052 sq. km.

Both these developments, including the new and redeveloped settlements, materialised between 2019 and 2020. During 2020, the area underwent further enhancements, including adding various recreational facilities. These new settlements complement the numerous existing ones scattered across the region.

The area lacks substantial military infrastructure, except for two helipads near the newly built houses. These developments indicate a significant focus on regional residential expansion and infrastructure enhancement.

2.1.2 Settlement 02 – Cona County

Kone County is a historic and sizable town located in the southern part of Tibet. It is surrounded by mountains, situated 25 km from the LAC, next to Highway S202, and shares its border with Bhutan.

Kone County has a rich history and has experienced significant developments since 2018. From 2019 to 2022, there has been a notable shift in settlement patterns, with new residential areas established similar to those in other regions. Between 2020 and 2021, an extra site was also found, further expanding the town’s footprint.

The area has seen substantial redevelopment initiatives, including operational reservoirs established in 2020. The town has a robust military presence, as evidenced by its infrastructure, which includes military vehicles and helipads strategically positioned on the northern, eastern, and western sides.

The large inscriptions with messages cascading down the mountain slopes are particularly interesting. These structures serve a dual purpose: to symbolise the town’s military significance and act as a beacon, encouraging the local populace to adhere to the directives of Chinese leadership. It is also noted at places, these inscriptions are removed or, at times, replaced with new ones. As Kone County grows, it extends along the valley in the northern and southern directions, highlighting its historical importance and contemporary geopolitical dynamics.

2.1.3   Settlement 15 – Raorang

In our series of site explorations, Rorong Settlement was the 15th one. Nestled between mountains, this settlement thrives along the banks of the Char Chow River. Rorong came into being in mere months between May 2022 and January 2023.

The settlement has the advantage of a well-developed road network established at the same time as the settlement. These roads are helpful for the local community and extend 6 km downhill towards the LAC. The settlement itself is located 12 km from this line.

A small unit with 13 blocks roofed in red near the settlement was established in August 2023. Additionally, some administrative buildings are situated on the sideline of the mountain. Some administrative buildings are placed atop the mountain’s sideline.

Notably, the Rorong Settlement is situated in a valley around 3000 m above sea level, in contrast to the nearby mountain peaks of LAC, which range from 4000 to 5000 m. This positioning renders the settlement less visible from the surrounding mountaintops. Ongoing development has been extending downhill towards the Line of Actual Control. This includes the emergence of new, smaller settlements or structures and land clearing for agricultural purposes.

One particular instance of this development is the placement of 10 shelters, likely for agricultural use, about 2.7 km from Rorong. This structure was established between March 17th and 19th, 2023, near Xian Gqu. Consequently, the expansion of roads and other minor activities continue to progress in this valley, moving closer to the LAC.

2.1.4 Settlement 17 – Migyitun

Since 1950, the region of Migyitun and its nearby areas have been a subject of contention. Notably, Chinese control in the valley has significantly increased since 2020. Figures 10-12 depict the current state of developments at three specific locations around Migyitun. Moreover, our earlier publication comprehensively discussed settlement number 17, identified as Zone B.

2.1.5 Settlement 22 – Gyaca

After examining site number 22, we have discovered that it is an age-old settlement alongside the Yarlung Song Po River. The site provides a unique perspective, distinguishing between formal and informal settlements. Legal settlements, which are highly versatile, are found on one side of the riverbank, while informal settlements are predominantly located on the northern bank. Furthermore, the western areas of the site host more formal structures, which indicate the settlement’s diverse nature.

Over the years, the site’s infrastructure has expanded significantly with new bridges and improved facilities. Despite this, Highway S306, which passes through the site, has remained unchanged from 2021 to 2023. Before the pandemic, the site had experienced considerable development, with numerous small sites emerging. These developments, located several kilometres from the border, are believed to serve not only military purposes. Establishing such sites will facilitate a physical presence, leveraging local human resources and materials for significant projects such as dam construction and water management in the upstream areas.

2.1.6 Settlement 33 – Near Longda

Site number 33, positioned along the northern banks of the formidable Yarlung Tsang Po, presents a fascinating case in our study. This location is characterised by its dispersed settlements interspersed with elements of military-like infrastructure. A notable feature is one of our newly identified structures along the riverbank. This area has seen a development progression, beginning 15 years ago, with significant redevelopment occurring more recently along the border.

A key observation across the riverbank is the presence of approximately 25 building structures, each accompanied by antennas - a striking difference from the other side. Over time, these structures have increased, and associated administrative buildings have also been augmented. Additionally, recent images from 2024 reveal the emergence of new metallic structures in this area.

Figure 13 presents a temporary metal structure that was evident in the initial image from November 2019 but had disappeared by the time of the second image in Dec 2023. Map Credit: Author, Foundation layer credit: Google Earth & Planet Labs PBC.

The exact nature of these developments remains ambiguous. While distinct from typical civilian constructions, it is unclear whether they serve a military purpose. They could be related to civilian police operations, other security activities, or testing endeavours.

In a unique observation, we’ve noticed that the structures at this site tend to be clustered together. A large, potentially metallic structure previously situated along the riverbank and atop a mountain is fascinating. This structure was notably removed, and the area where it stood was filled and covered with soil. The specific reasons for this action and the current status of the structure remain unclear.

It’s important to note that this structure was well-integrated with the existing road network, suggesting it might have been used temporarily. This could include serving as a facility for construction projects or other short-term activities and then being dismantled once its use is concluded. However, based on satellite imagery alone, this structure’s exact nature and purpose remain indeterminate.

2.1.7 Settlement 30 – the latest Shannan Longzi Airport

The historical satellite images present the temporal activities of the newly built Shannan Longzi Airport, located less than 50 km from the LAC at an altitude of 3,900 m. This airport features a 4.5 km-long runway and has been under construction since 2021. Satellite imagery analysis reveals that significant land clearing was done to make way for this project. Subsequent images from 2022 and 2023 show the development of an airbase complete with essential support systems. It is unclear at this point whether the airport’s infrastructure will be solely dedicated to military use or serve a dual purpose. Considering the pattern observed from other airbases around the region, we can confidently state that major settlements will emerge around this airbase. Likely, every flat piece of land adjacent to or connected to this place via road or railway will be transformed into a concrete settlement.

2.1.8 Other settlements – along the Yarlung Tsang Po

The figure above shows the diverse settlements along the Yarlung Tsang Po River. These settlements, a combination of old and new, are dispersed along the river, with some being prominent, structured settlements. They share similarities in shape and characteristics with other border defence settlements. The development of these areas has been gradually increasing, driven by the region’s rich potential resources. The area’s abundant solar energy, ample water supply for hydroelectric power, and road access make it exceptionally valuable.

The riverbanks are adorned with flat, fertile lands, instrumental in these areas’ continuous occupation and habitation. Settlements aim to establish a physical presence in strategic locations. They vary in size and sophistication, ranging from simple hut communities to modern villages and even towns, depending on the available land and opportunities the inhabitants exploit.

One of the most striking features of these settlements is that they often serve a dual purpose as both residential and strategic sites, distinct from other regional features. These settlements showcase a unique blend of resource utilisation and military importance, reflecting the dynamic growth and evolution of the area along the Yarlung Tsang Po River.

2.2 An unnamed border settlement

Located about 15km south of Mailing, an unmarked border settlement on the western side of the Milin River, which flows into the Yarlung Tsang Po, is located. Close to the disputed boundary, a small, desolate area covering 0.11 sq. km is situated. This land, previously barren for many years, has recently transformed into a border settlement. For an in-depth analysis of this settlement, please refer to our previous article, where it is designated as Zone A.

2.3 Spatial distribution of Monastery and dual-purpose settlements

From the above map, we can observe the spatial characteristics of local settlements, particularly their proximity to water bodies and roads. We conducted an exercise to explore the spatial relationship between these settlements and the historic Monastery. Our investigation aimed to understand whether these settlements have developed in adjacency to the Monastery, known for its strategic location near water sources, or have evolved independently with distinct purposes, possibly for optimising resource utilisation and serving multiple functions.

Our findings are illustrated on a map highlighting monasteries’ locations traditionally established near water bodies. Interestingly, newer settlements follow this pattern of adjacent water sources. These settlements are not expansions of the areas around the Monastery sites, which are typically associated with towns and small villages. Instead, they are emerging in new locations, often closer to borders in strategically important areas, potentially offering military advantages.

The map demonstrates the strategic intent behind establishing these water-adjacent villages. Through this, one can deduce the emergence and characteristics of these settlements, providing valuable insights into their development and purpose.

3. Parting shot

Our study explored a range of settlements, including those of significant size serving dual purposes and more minor, strategically located settlements. A development trend is observed predominantly along border areas, often near valuable resources. These developments are not merely incidental but deliberately designed to be all-weather, resilient structures that can serve military purposes. These settlements sometimes represent new construction projects involving clearing land and vegetation. In other cases, they signify redevelopment efforts where old structures are replaced with new, formal constructions.

These border settlements have unique spatial patterns and architectural characteristics that differentiate them from other settlements. These features are essential in identifying the border villages and the dual-purpose and military settlements. The latter are often surrounded by boundary walls and closed-circuit surveillance, distinguishing them from nearby civilian settlements that tend to be more dispersed and unstructured. Rivers and other physical features naturally mark these dual-purpose settlements, distinct from typical urban expansions. Based on time series satellite images, most construction work occurs during June and July when weather conditions are mild.

It is crucial to monitor these developments closely. Analysing the settlement patterns suggests a deliberate strategy to occupy all viable land, regardless of size, especially if it is flat, near a water body, or adjacent to roads. This expansion often occurs near historical monasteries, influencing the surrounding area. However, sometimes, the location choices are based on strategic considerations.

Remote sensing analysis, complementing human intelligence, is pivotal in this research. The use of moderate-resolution satellite sensors has been particularly highlighted. Our study has mapped several large and small settlements in open areas and shadowed regions. In our newsletter, we will continue covering the border settlements along the LAC with the other districts of Arunachal Pradesh and parts of Tibet. Our ongoing research is poised to reveal intriguing findings and insights related to this topic in future articles.

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM [Retd], for giving constant support and motivation, as well as the reviewers.

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their judgment and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

• Significant recent developments have occurred in two border settlements, one in Zone A (an unnamed village) and the other in Zone B (Migyitun, Longju, and Luowa).

• Structures with dual purposes are being constructed in Zone A on the boundary line specified by the Survey of India (SOI).

• Since 1950, Zone B, a contested area, has experienced numerous construction projects, with a notable one in 2020, as indicated by the Pentagon. Additionally, several more construction projects have occurred in the last three years.

1. Backstory

In our recent research of border settlements, particularly the 'Dual Purpose Settlements' located within 100 km of Tibet from the Indian frontier, we've uncovered a few notable findings on the Arunachal Pradesh border line provided by the Survey of India. The vector boundary line referred to here is used to demarcate between two countries by all major geospatial service providers in India.

This article delves into a comprehensive analysis of two specific locations, Zone A and Zone B, in the following maps, where the Chinese border dual-purpose settlements are evident around the established boundary lines. Utilizing advanced remote sensing algorithms, we initially mapped these areas. Subsequently, we referred to high-resolution satellite imagery to conduct an in-depth study. Temporal satellite images played an essential role in uncovering the direction and growth of settlement expansion, the types of developments, and the presence and features of military infrastructure. This work aims to track and comprehend the changes and growth patterns over time through satellite imagery, providing a distinct perspective on the dynamics at these crucial border areas.

This study systematically tours a series of recent developments in the zones since 2020. While Zone B has been in the news in the past, Zone A is largely unnoticed.

Zone A—an unnamed border settlement on the Millin River—is the most recent ongoing settlement development on India’s claim line, which started in 2023. 

Meanwhile, Zone B—Migyitun and its surroundings—have been disputed since 1950; the Chinese occupation has expanded its presence in the valley since 2020. Zone B has three important sites: Sites I, II, and III.

2. Mapping the hot zones around the critical line

Zone A is located on the banks of the Milin River, approximately 65 km west of Tuting, Arunachal Pradesh, India, and 15 km south of Mainling, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Meanwhile, Zone B is located on the Tsari River, approximately 50 km northwest of Nacho, India, and 53 km southeast of Nang County, TAR. It is steeped in historical significance and has been a contested territory for many years. Both zones are located on the valley slopes towards India.

2.1 Zone A: An unnamed border settlement on the Millin River

Zone A is situated on the western bank of the Milin River, a tributary of the Yarlung Tsang Po. Right on to the contested boundary line lies a small, barren patch of land spanning 0.11 sq. km. It remained empty with two shelters for decades until recently, when it transformed remarkably into a border settlement. A rapid construction activity has been underway since mid-2023, with nearly 100 structures emerging in a few months. This settlement, nestled amidst forests and rivers and conveniently located near a road, rests on a mountain slope at an altitude of 3142 m. From the satellite image, the ongoing development is advancing rapidly and is in the final stage.

Notably, comparable open pasture lands can be found in other sections of the mountain slopes in the vicinity on either side of the borderline. These areas can potentially be utilised for similar development projects in the future. They are expanding the road network, extending further south along the river, which bolsters this prospect, suggesting the possibility of further development in these regions.

2.2 Zone B: Migyitun and its surroundings

Table 1 provides an overview of three sites located in Zone B. The information provided here is extracted from remote-sensing images.

*Longju is a disputed area with a history that dates back to 1950.

It is pertinent to observe that while the demarcation line extends east to west, Site I is situated north of this boundary. Conversely, Sites II and III are positioned to the south of the aforementioned line. Notably, this boundary, a subject of contention, bifurcates Site I from the other two sites.

2.2.1 Site I of Zone B: Migyutan

Site I Migyutan (Mi-Chi Tun) was a small village near the India-China border in the year 2000, just about 500 meters away. However, in 2013, construction began, and soon after, many buildings started to appear, increasing in number after 2018. Upon analysing satellite images taken over time, it is evident that the small village has transformed into a massive border settlement, with around 200 permanent houses and other supporting infrastructure. These houses appear to serve dual purposes and have infrastructure such as helipads, communication towers, solar panels, and other tall structures with boundary walls that could potentially be of military significance.

2.2.2 Site II of Zone B: Longju

The border settlements are not limited to the Migyutun alone. Roughly 500 meters south of the disputed boundary line, a parcel of land now referred to as Longju (identified as Site II in this analysis) was established on the riverbank through land claims. Although activities on this riverbank were noticeable as early as 2013, construction efforts commenced between July and August 2019, with the first potential military facility appearing to reach completion by February 2021. Now, it contains four blocks of multistory buildings with a storage facility. In addition, recent satellite images reveal a second military complex constructed between July and August 2023 featuring blue tent roofs, potentially designated for storage purposes.

2.2.3 Site III of Zone B: Louwa

Heading southward along the valley in 2020, a group of houses emerged at the convergence of Rivers Tsari and Mipa, approximately 5.1 km from the border delineated by SOI. This settlement swiftly took shape between March and October 2020. The structures seem to serve dual purposes and are now seemingly fully operational, as evidenced by the vehicles parked in the communal area.

The advancements persist beyond that point, stretching another 2.5 km. Infrastructure such as a military road is being constructed alongside a military barrack spanning 0.02 sq. km and featuring three multistorey blocks around 750 m from Louwa village. Additionally, small structures are seen all along the valley. Recent satellite imagery shows the presence extends approximately 8 km southward from the disputed borderline.

3.     Parting shot

In summary, by superimposing satellite imagery from various timescales onto the vector boundary of Arunachal Pradesh, as delineated by the Survey of India, it becomes clear that the locales known as Zones A and B are located in disputed territories. Zone B represents an enlargement of pre-existing settlements; however, Zone A is of new concern, given that it involves the establishment of fresh settlements on a mountain slope near the tribal villages.

A recurring trend noted is that the development of these settlements predominantly takes place during the pre-monsoon and monsoon seasons. Constructing roads adjacent to the river and land clearing in tactical areas indicate potential border settlements. Our continuing research has identified a number of significant and smaller settlements featuring dual-purpose housing in Tibet, especially within a 100 km radius of the Indian border. We are keen to share our insights in upcoming publications. Do keep an eye out for further updates!

The author thanks Lt Gen [Dr] Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, and VSM [Retd] for giving constant support and motivation, as well as the reviewers.

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. We advise readers to exercise their own judgment and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

• China is strategically advancing urbanisation in Tibet to strengthen its control over the region.

• In recent times, several new urban areas have emerged, although the pace of urbanisation remains relatively slow and is not as rapid as that observed in other parts of China.

• The article focuses on Tibet's swift urban growth and examines a few driving factors like population and their wider effects.

• The geospatial data is used to assess the urban extent and visualise the complex terrain.

• China is strengthening its role in the region with enhanced military and economic ties, plus new air routes between Kathmandu and Lhasa, opening doors for tourism and collaboration.

Backstory

Over half the world’s population now resides in urban areas, a figure only expected to rise, with estimates suggesting an urban population of 68% by 2050. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Asia and Africa, where nearly 90% of the urban population growth is projected. The rate of urbanisation is a critical metric in assessing a nation's progress, encapsulating various aspects such as economic development (evidenced by increased activity and employment opportunities), infrastructural expansion (including new roads and enhanced public transport systems), social evolution (marked by improvements in education, healthcare, and life quality), demographic shifts (altering population density and household dynamics), global competitiveness (fostered through international trade and investments), and environmental advancements (highlighted by efficient resource use and innovations in energy).

Approximately 65.2% of Chinese lived in urban areas in 2022, though with significant regional disparities. The eastern coast of China exhibits the most advanced urban development, with over two-thirds of its population living in cities. In stark contrast, western and central China, including Tibet, show slower urban growth. Among Chinese regions, Tibet presents a unique urbanisation narrative. With its comparatively low level of urban development, Tibet offers a fascinating study in contrast to other areas of China.

Nestled between India and the large population centres of China, Tibet has immense strategic and cultural significance. Since China consolidated control over the region in the 1950s, Tibet has remained a focal point of global attention, particularly over the political and human rights of its inhabitants. Beyond Tibet’s geopolitics and rich cultural and religious heritage, the region’s environmental significance is underscored by the terms often used to describe it, such as the 'Roof of the World' and the 'Third Pole'. The Tibetan plateau, a source for major rivers such as the Indus, Mekong, Yangtze, and Yellow, supports billions across a swathe of the Asian continent. The region's distinct ecosystem and challenging geography add to its allure and complexity.

Delving into Tibet's urbanisation through the lens of urban geography and geospatial technology, set against the backdrop of historical, cultural, military, and environmental significance, is not just a regional endeavour but a globally pertinent one. The dynamics of Tibet’s urbanisation, the underlying causes, and the far-reaching implications offer a unique perspective, contributing significantly to the broader narrative of urban development and its possible impact on India.

Overview of China's Administrative Divisions and Regional Classification

To better understand Tibet, it is essential first to grasp China's administrative divisions and urban classifications.

These administrative divisions are categorised into several levels:

• Provinces: China has 22 provinces, each with its local government. They are the highest level of administrative divisions in China.

• Municipalities: There are four municipalities — Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. These large cities have the same status as provinces and are directly controlled by the central government.

• Autonomous Regions: These regions— Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet — have a high concentration of ethnic minorities and enjoy some degree of legislative independence from the central government.

• Special Administrative Regions (SAR): Hong Kong and Macau, the two SARs, have been given a high degree of autonomy. Their legal systems are separate from mainland China.

Each of these administrative divisions has further subdivisions:

• Prefectures: Mostly found in autonomous regions, they serve as intermediate administrative divisions.

• Counties: This level encompasses counties, autonomous counties, and county-level cities, commonly under the jurisdiction of prefectures or municipalities.

• Districts: Administrative areas within municipalities and larger cities.

• Townships: Rural subdivisions of counties, including towns, townships, and ethnic townships.

China also classifies its cities based on urban population size. These are:

• Megacities: 1 to 2 million urban population.

• Large cities: 500,000 to 1 million urban population.

• Medium-sized cities: 200,000 to 500,000 urban population.

• Small-sized cities: Less than 200,000 urban population.

Additionally, China is conventionally divided into three regions:

• Eastern Region: Includes 12 provinces and encompasses cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.

• Central Region: It comprises nine provinces, including Shanxi, Henan, and Jiangxi.

• Western Region: Consists of 10 provinces, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai.

To give a comprehensive aerial perspective of the six major cities, the most recent satellite imagery has been utilised to demonstrate their urban extent.

Urbanisation trend in Tibet

The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), situated on the Tibetan Plateau along the southeast edge of China, spans an area of 1.2 million square kilometres and has a population of 3.64 million, with Lhasa as its capital. This region, known for its rugged mountainous landscape and an average elevation exceeding 4,500 meters, is one of the least appealing areas in China for migration. Despite China’s efforts to promote urbanisation, Tibet's urbanisation rate remains below 37.39%, significantly lower than other regions in China. This is attributed to its harsh climate, craggy terrain, and limited economic prospects. However, China is undertaking various initiatives, including sustainable urban development projects in Tibet. By 2025, it's expected that the Tibetan Plateau, encompassing both Tibet and Xinjiang provinces, will host 16 million residents, with over half reaching moderate urbanisation stability.

It is interesting to note that since the 1970s, the rate of urbanisation in Tibet has undergone significant changes. Between 1970 and 1979, there was noticeable growth in both the economy and population. The population increased from 1.48 million to 1.83 million, with an annual growth rate of 2.14%. This was the region’s fastest population growth rate during that time.

Before 1951, Lhasa was the only semi-urbanised settlement in Tibet, with a population of over 10,000 and a total urban area of less than 10 square kilometres. In the 1950s, the region’s urban population was less than 70,000. However, after the government's efforts in urban development, including road construction, housing, and infrastructure, Tibet saw rapid urbanisation post-1951, indicating a 198 per cent increase till 2022. This was further boosted by China’s reform and opening-up policy in 1978. In recent years, there has been an increase in the speed of urban construction in Tibet, especially after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. In the 21^st century, the urbanisation rate of Tibet reached 31.5% in 2019, a significant increase from its low base. As of the end of 2020, Tibet had six prefecture-level cities, 146 urban towns, and a total urban built-up area of 326 square kilometres.

In terms of migration, TAR’s population has been increasing, with most of this growth attributed to the Tibetan people. As of 2010, Tibetans constituted over 90% of the region’s population. In contrast, the Han comprised about 8.17% of the population, with other ethnic groups accounting for 1.35%. The increase in the number of Tibetan people and the relatively small proportion of migrants in the region has been integral to China's social and economic development plans. Many engineers and technicians from other provinces in Tibet have contributed significantly to the region’s overall socioeconomic development. This migration has been essential in supporting urbanisation in the area.

The land cover map and DEM of Lhasa provide an overview of the complexity of the terrain.

Urbanisation Drivers in Tibet

Urbanisation in Tibet encompasses traditional elements of urban growth. These include economic activity, government-led development and investment, demographic shifts, enhanced living standards and urban facilities. However, in Tibet's context, this urbanisation extends beyond these classic drivers. It encompasses broader goals such as land acquisition, resource extraction, and a strategic shift in the identity of local communities.

The region's relatively flat lands amidst its mountainous topography have been steadily urbanised, with support infrastructure being developed. This urban expansion often involves the appropriation of rural land for building infrastructure, residences, and commercial spaces, leading to the displacement of rural populations and a transformation of the traditional Tibetan lifestyle. The demand for urban land in China, including Tibet, is primarily met by converting rural land, resulting in considerable changes in land use and ownership patterns.

Urban pockets are established with substantial infrastructure to enhance the quality of life. These urban areas have essential amenities and key infrastructure like roads and airports. Urbanising Tibet plays a pivotal role in large-scale initiatives. A key focus of these endeavours is contributing to China’s ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. To this end, renewable energy sources such as hydroelectric and solar power are being harnessed from the inhabitant regions, and supporting mechanisms are established in nearby towns and villages. These energy sources not only benefit the Tibetan regions but also have the potential to help other regions in the country.

Moreover, rivers flowing through Tibet can provide essential freshwater resources to other parts of China, especially those facing water scarcity. China's large-scale damming of rivers on the Tibetan plateau to generate hydropower affects the water supply to a vast population in Asia. Tibet's rich mineral resources, including copper, lithium, gold, and silver, are being mined on a massive scale, contrasting with traditional Tibetan practices that avoid disturbing the land. This has resulted in the transformation of Tibet's landscapes, the displacement of Tibetan nomads, and the degradation of local ecosystems.

 Thus, the distribution of populations across various geographical regions can be beneficial for multiple reasons, including resource allocation and development in remote locations, as well as other strategic advantages.

Possible concerns to India due to urbanisation in Tibet

The issue of urbanisation in Tibet has been a significant concern for India, primarily due to strategic and geopolitical factors. It is often believed that any potential war between India and China would occur along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China's territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh and other areas have heightened tensions. Additionally, India's support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile has been a longstanding issue that has caused friction between India and China. China’s recent change to use “Xizang” instead of “Tibet” in its official diplomatic communications and geographical data sets is seen as a strategic effort to alter historical perceptions. Another significant concern for India is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves infrastructure development in Tibet. These developments could enhance China's regional strategic presence, raising security concerns for India.

Parting shot

As we closely monitor the recent developments near India's border, particularly the increasing Chinese presence in Bhutanese territory and the growing alliance between China, Bhutan, and Nepal, the geopolitical landscape in the region appears to be in flux. The recent visit of Bhutan’s foreign minister to China has raised the potential for diplomatic shifts that might impact India’s strategic interests. Furthermore, China's military and economic influence in the region and the expansion of air connectivity from Kathmandu to Lhasa indicates possible tourism and cooperative developments. In the context of rapid urbanisation in Tibet, our future coverage aims to comprehensively analyse the various factors that have contributed to this phenomenon. Using geospatial data, we will delve deeper into the impact of urbanisation on the region's economy, environment, and social fabric. Overall, our analysis seeks to offer a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of urbanisation in Tibet and shed light on how this process shapes the region's future.

Disclaimer:

Please note that the geospatial data and the naming conventions employed in this document are sourced from open-source geospatial repositories. It's important to be aware that the names and spellings of locations may differ across databases, reflecting changes that have occurred over time.

• PLA continues to expand its presence in the Doklam plateau area, deepening the threat posed to the Siliguri Corridor.

• Occupation astride the Mochu River, extending up to 9 kilometres inside territory disputed with Bhutan.

• Recent Sino-Bhutan talks on border issues are unlikely to impact China’s de-facto occupation of the Doklam Plateau.

Doklam’s history and assertions

The Doklam tri-junction, a vital region in the Himalayas, has become a focal point of geopolitical tension between India and China, marked by historical complexities and territorial disputes. The issue's roots trace back to geopolitical shifts in the 17th and 18th centuries, shaping the Himalayan landscape and British involvement. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, a pivotal treaty delineating boundaries, omitted Bhutan as a signatory. The current Doklam border dispute revolves around conflicting interpretations of the treaty and India’s legal rights. China’s low-level patrolling/ civilian herding dates back to 1966, escalating in 2017 when a standoff ensued over a road construction project. Despite de-escalation efforts post-2017, China continued its construction activity.

To comprehensively understand events in the Doklam plateau up to July 2020, encompassing its history and developments, I suggest exploring The Doklam Imbroglio. This detailed resource offers valuable insights into the issue.

In this article, we have examined the recent military advancements undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Doklam, particularly over the past two years, utilising satellite imagery and Geospatial Intelligence as valuable resources.

Recent developments in the Doklam plateau

The sites examined in the study are the Chinese-occupied Doklam plateau, which lies north of the Jhampheri ridge, bordered by India’s state of Sikkim in the west and the Mochu River in the east. The mountain peaks of Batang La, Merug La, Senche La, and Mt Gymochen surround this area.

Doklam plateau

Site Number 1 (Figure 4) is located at an elevation of 4,232 meters above sea level on a mountain peak oriented towards the Indian side. It hosts a complex network of military facilities and structures at the peak’s highest point of 4,235 meters. The site is easily reachable via well-established roads that connect it to the surrounding areas, and it is located just under 2 kilometres from the Doklam standoff point. The road connecting the standoff point and site 1 holds several helipads. The PLA made military fortifications on this site, which included solar panels, communication trenches, a communication tower, temporary shelters, and a few gun positions. It is to be noted that the shelters were established after 2019, as indicated by the images from 2017 to 2023.

Site No. 2 (Figure 5) is located on the closest mountain slope to the Indian border, with an elevation of 4265 m. It is less than a kilometre from the 2017 standoff site. From the available images, it seems the site has been cleared, and roads have been constructed up to the top of the mountain in 2021. The expansion on this mountaintop has been steady, and an observation post has been set up. 

Site number 3 (Figure 6) is adjacent to a roadway traversing the Doklam plateau from the Doklam standoff point. This location features distinct markings, trenches on the east-facing slope, and camouflaged shelters. Notably, this site represents the forward point where military vehicles, gun positions, and supporting sheds exist.

Site number 4 (Figure 7) comprises a structure with numerous vehicles, including a command post where significant activity occurs on the leeward slope. As such, Sites 3 and 4 have developed significantly in recent years, including trenches, gun positions, helipads and other military infrastructure. The infrastructure on either side of the flatland road has remained unchanged since 2017.

Site 5 (Figure 8) and 6 (Figure 9) are on leeward slopes. Notably, the area has developed significantly since 2019, and the shelters appear camouflaged along the road towards the northeast of Doklam. Site 5 is located at an elevation of 4,235 meters, while Site 6, an extension of Site 5, is at 4,323 meters. Ongoing construction and land reclamation on the mountain slopes suggest continued developments in this area.

On the same ridge, Site 7 (Figure 10) and Site 8 (Figure 11) are at 4337 and 4318 meters, respectively. Site 7 is undergoing similar activity as Site 5, in which land clearance is being carried out on the slope. Meanwhile, site eight at the top of the mountain has robust road connectivity and numerous gun positions, trenches, and pillboxes. These pillboxes at the summit top provide direct views toward Doka La in the southwest, Merug La in the north, and Senche La in the east. The flat land on the mountaintop, closely linked to Site 8, spans approximately 45 acres.

Site 9 (Figure 12) is located at an altitude of 4179 meters and covers an area of approximately 15 acres. It overlooks the Indian Territory. It is only two kilometres from Senche La, less than four kilometres from Batang La and less than five kilometres from the standoff point. In 2021, significant developments occurred at this site, previously limited to trenches and artillery positions on a mountain slope to the left of a road leading from the Standoff point towards the Senche La. Back in 2019, the site had a modest setup, but by 2020 and 2021, the monitoring post underwent a substantial transformation. A relatively flat piece of land at a slightly higher elevation now serves as a potential ammunition dump or a post with a secret underground vault and robust iron doors. This facility, marked with firing loopholes in trenches along the road approaching the standoff point, suggests heightened sensitivity. Notably, developments in this region have been relatively subdued post-2021.

Site 10 (Figure 13), a key location in our study, appears as a focal point of persistent military activity preceding 2017. Situated less than a kilometre from Site 9, this site underwent significant alterations in 2017, evolving into a conclave set of structures just below Senche La, facing south towards Doklam standoff point. The flat terrain, spanning three kilometres and surrounded by mountains, transformed from a slope with artillery and machine gun positions, bunkers, trenches, and firing points on the leeward side in 2017 to a concrete structure in 2019. Site 10 appears to us like a fully functional Forward Area Refuel and Rearm Point (FARRP), closely linked to the ammunition dump at Site 9 and other ongoing activities in Senche La.

Site 11 (Figure 14) is located at an elevation of 4447 meters. Despite being developed in 2017, the site has remained largely unaltered, featuring three helipads, military vehicles, various structures, and a road leading from Senche La into the valley. However, recent activity has been noticed, including extending the road downhill into the valley, increasing trenching, and other operations on the slope near Senche La.

Site 12 (Figure 15) is located on the down slope of the road connecting further from Site 11 towards Niyu, northeast of Torsa Nala. Site 12, developed after 2019, is 3906 meters in a deep valley.

Site 13 (Figure 16) is located north of Senche La, sloping towards the Mochu River. This site has a significant military presence, including military vehicles, communication towers, sheds, permanent structures, and solar panels. The area is tactically sited with a robust infrastructure that blends well with the surrounding vegetation and suggests a remote post.  

What is noteworthy about this location is its lower altitude of 3,338 meters, which is hidden from the direct view from India. Site 13’s core buildings and structures have maintained their form for longer, indicating its operational continuity. Additionally, the site has evolved in terms of expanded activities, which adds to its overall significance.

Site 14 (Figure 17) in our study, situated at 3232 meters on the western side of the Mocho River, stands as a hub of extensive military infrastructures. Starting mainly as a barren land in 2017, the site has transformed remarkably into a strategic location featuring towers, a range, complex shelters, and dual-purpose buildings. This place is a focal point for military activity, hosting trenches and bunkers.

Site 15 (Figure 18) is located at an elevation of 4300m near Yudong County, behind Merug La and Naurang. The site is situated about 9 kilometres away from the Indian border, and its elevated position offers a commanding view of the Indian side from the mountaintop. Similar to Site 14, it is home to essential military infrastructure, including ammunition dumps, helipads, and a potential small military post with parking spaces surrounded by a boundary wall. The site has solar panels for electricity generation and numerous trenches along its mountain slopes. Additionally, it is connected to a well-maintained road leading to Yudong County. The military post and trenches have been on the site since 2017. Still, the development of bunkers gained momentum in the late 2020s, making Site 16 an even more critical infrastructure in our study region.

Descending from Site 15, Site 16 (Figure 19) stands at an elevation of 3453 meters on a mountain peak adjacent to a valley inhabited by a substantial civilian population. The foothills of this peak extend to the Mocho River on the eastern side, connecting to Lao Yadong and a valley that leads to Yadong, stemming from Narong. This location holds significance with over 10 ammunition bunkers connected by trenches, easily accessible from the road. Its development in the early 2020s, following the 2017 standoff, is a crucial point.

China’s Intrusions in Bhutan’s Mochu River

Recent developments along the Mochu River, flowing through Yadong County and entering Bhutan, have sparked concerns due to China’s establishment of villages in the valley. Notably, Pangda village has gained attention as China designates it as a permanent settlement in the region. Construction activity is widespread on the western side of the Mochu River, occurring whenever available land in the valley is identified. Two specific locations showcase the construction of large buildings, villas, and accompanying infrastructure are shown in Figure 20.

Despite the emergence of a village featuring sizable houses, there is uncertainty regarding its purpose. These houses can be used for housing civilians and military purposes. Given its remote location, construction activity persists in the area, extending up to 9 km inside Bhutanese territory.

The attention surrounding developments along the Mochu River stems from concerns about the potential use of an alternate route by PLA troops through the Jhampheri ridge. This route could offer a direct line of sight to India’s Chicken Neck Siliguri Corridor, though the terrain presents significant challenges, with the river flowing north to south. Accessing the Jhampheri ridge would require climbing from 1,700 m to 3,556 m through the challenging Torsa Nalla.

Strategic dialogues: Bhutan’s political negotiations with China and India

Bhutan’s Foreign Minister, Tandi Dorji, made history on October 23, 2023, by becoming the first Bhutanese official to visit China. During the visit, both sides concluded the 25th round of the previously stalled border talks. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasised the importance of establishing diplomatic relations and reaching an agreement on the boundary. This development marks a positive step in strengthening ties between the two nations and resolving border-related issues.

Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck visited India on the 3^rd of November, 2023. He reassured Bhutan’s emphasis on India’s concerns and commitment to the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty and India’s interests will be preserved.

Parting shot

The Doklam tri-junction emerges as a focal point as we navigate through the layers of history, with unresolved issues surrounding Bhutan’s involvement, treaty interpretations, and India’s legal rights in the disputed territory.

Zooming in on recent military advancements, our geospatial analysis reveals China’s extensive footprint in the Doklam region, marked by sites like Site 10, a transformed Forward Area Refuel and Rearm Point (FARRP). This key location and others, such as Site 9, 11, 14, 15, and 16, highlight ongoing developments in the area. China's activities near the Mochu River, such as establishing villages in the valley, raise concerns about their purpose.

Our findings emphasise the need for vigilant monitoring in the Doklam region.

Subscribe to our newsletter https://geospatialbulletin.substack.com for the latest updates on geospatial analysis in this region and locations of strategic interest to India.

• China has made substantial investments in the Western Theatre Command, including constructing new airbases and heliports and improving existing infrastructure.

• Many of these airbases in Tibet and Xinjiang serve dual civilian and military purposes.

• China's rapid construction pace and utilisation of cutting-edge technology indicate its commitment to maintaining a long-term presence in the region.

• All military installations aim to be constructed with self-sufficient infrastructure and amenities.

• This study used high-resolution satellite images to analyse three operational dual-purpose airports and two airbases under construction in Central Tibet. Additional analysis will follow.

Backstory

Since the confrontations between India and China in both 2017 and 2022, there has been a noticeable strengthening of China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) presence in the strategically important places of Tibet and Xinjiang provinces, which are situated in close proximity to Indian territory. This enhancement has primarily focused on bolstering air defence capabilities and power projection.

China has undertaken significant developments in Western theatre command in these regions, including constructing new airbases and heliports and substantially improving existing infrastructure. These upgrades encompass lengthening runways and enhancing defence systems to ensure heightened operational efficiency.

The Western Theatre Command, one of the five Theatre Commands within the People's Liberation Army, includes Tibet and Xinjiang. Headquartered in Chengdu, this command is tasked with safeguarding China's borders with India and Russia, a challenging mission due to the region's imposing mountainous terrain complicating troop movement. The Western Theatre Command has operational responsibility for the Sion-Indian Border.

Based on open-source information, recent findings reveal a notable surge in infrastructure development. Since 2017, 37 airports and heliports within Tibet and Xinjiang have been either newly constructed or extensively upgraded. Notably, at least 22 facilities serve dual civilian and military purposes.

While the scale of this infrastructure expansion may raise concerns, experts believe China's efforts are part of an overarching goal to strengthen its combat capability on land and air at high altitudes. The strategic placement of airbases in critical locations near India is a concern, particularly given their potential to house advanced aircraft and drones.

Notably, it is the pace of construction that should be of concern to India. China's utilisation of cutting-edge technology and infrastructure created for military personnel and civilians in these areas further underscores its long-term presence. Investments in agriculture, sustainable energy sources, and recreational amenities for the local population strongly suggest China's long-term intentions.

Moreover, the development of robust road and rail networks facilitates the efficient mobilisation of people and military resources, thereby promoting economic and military growth in the region. While China asserts that these infrastructure and development initiatives are geared toward sustainable regional progress, their proximity to the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) understandably raises concerns within the Indian establishment.

These activities may ostensibly appear geared towards improving the lives of residents in Tibet and Xinjiang, but they also serve clear military objectives. The sophisticated defence mechanisms and infrastructure at these airbases reflect China's preparedness for air combat operations, potentially reshaping the regional power dynamic.

This chapter focuses on the air infrastructure, specifically the key airbases that are operational or being built near Doklam and Arunachal regions. Among the five airbases covered here, Shigatse Peace Airport, Lhasa Gonggar Airport, and Nyingchi Mainling Airport are operational dual-use airports. At the same time, Damxung Airport and Shigatse Tingiri Airport are currently under construction airbases. Due to their dual nature, air infrastructure, and proximity to the Indian border, these airbases are strategically crucial for India. Hence, we cover them in the first installment of a continuing series.

Shigatse Peace Airport

Shigatse Airport is about 150 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and in a straight line to the Doklam region. The airport is situated at an altitude of 3,800 meters and is close to the Yarlung Shangpo River, a significant waterway that flows through the Tibetan area. The airport has two runways - one measuring 5 kilometres long and the other 3 kilometres long. The widths of the runways are 450 meters and 350 meters, respectively, and they are made of asphalt. The airport serves both civilian and military aviation operations.

Below is a description of the critical air infrastructure at Shigatse Peace Airport, with each item marked with a corresponding number for easy identification: 1. A dedicated military runway, likely used for advanced UAV systems and helicopters; 2. A dual-purpose runway for use by both civil and military aircraft; 3. A newly established SAM (surface-to-air missile) site designed to protect valuable assets and prevent threats from a specific direction; 4. Fresh solar farms have been found to enhance renewable energy harvesting; 5. An underground construction project is ongoing next to a mountain; 6—potential helipads; 7. An old SAM site contains a fully functional SAM system and one abandoned one; 8. Fighter jets, likely of the old Sukhoi series; 9. A hard shelter has been created to protect an asset, which may be an advanced UAV system; 10. Two UAV hangers are likely used for UAV maintenance.

Regarding civilian aircraft activity, Shigatse Airport can handle up to 13 weekly flights, primarily facilitating connections to domestic destinations and providing links to three airports in China. Moreover, the airport enjoys connectivity to the G318 highway.

Significant developments in civil and military infrastructure expansion near the airport are noticeable.

The primary energy sources for the base and its vicinity predominantly comprise water (hydroelectric power) and sunlight (solar energy). According to our calculations1, the installed solar capacity was estimated to be around 350 megawatts in 2019. Remarkably, this capacity has increased nearly tenfold, currently standing at approximately 3,000 megawatts, or three gigawatts, as evidenced by the deployment of solar panels. It is anticipated that this capacity could reach up to 6,000 megawatts upon the completion of the expansion of solar farms.

Our analysis of high-resolution satellite images captured in May 2023 by Planet Labs revealed that the military base can accommodate large aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On the day of imagery, the ground holds nearly a squadron of fighter jets, a larger advanced aircraft, four helicopters, and a fleet of 10 UAVs. We have also observed a significant presence of military vehicles, especially generator vehicles, adjacent to the UAVs.

Among the notable military installations within the base's confines are an under-construction underground facility, two newly constructed hangars designed for UAVs, a robust shelter to safeguard valuable assets, and three distinct surface-to-air missile sites.

For aircraft operations, the smaller runway features blast pens dedicated to UAVs and helicopters, while civilian activities are segregated from the western end of the larger runway. The central segment of the expansive runway is allocated for fighter jets and advanced larger aircraft, whereas the eastern portion's blast pens accommodate modern UAVs. Of particular interest is the placement of surface-to-air missile sites at both extremes of the airbase, underscoring the base's air defensive capabilities.

Lhasa Gonggar Airport

Nestled amidst breathtaking landscapes, Lhasa Gonggar Airport has established itself as the preeminent aviation hub in the Tibet region. With impressive capabilities, it facilitates 534 weekly flights and connects to 29 prominent airports across China. It is around 140 Km from the Bhutan border and 210 KM from India’s Tawang Airforce Station. It is one of the prominent dual-use airbases in the region.

Here is a breakdown of the critical infrastructure at Lhasa Gonggar Airport, with each item assigned a corresponding number for easy identification: 1. A recently opened civilian airport terminal; 2. A military zone containing fighter jets, a hard shelter, a maintenance block and administration buildings; 3. A rapid exit taxiway that allows larger planes to move between runways more easily; 4. A new military runway that is almost complete; 5. Military infrastructure that is currently under construction; 6. The River Yarlung Tsang Po flows very close to the airbase; 7. a sizeable complex structure that can hold fighter jets; 8. A mysterious and massive system is being built at the ridge's edge and underground; 9. Small white patches that are likely to be the bundle of agricultural residuals; 10. A possible military storage facility.

Located at an altitude of 4,000 meters above sea level, Lhasa Gonggar Airport is a testament to modern engineering and logistical prowess. It boasts two meticulously designed runways with Rapid Exit Taxiways (RET), each measuring 4,000 meters long, accommodating various aircraft, from civilian planes to formidable fighter jets and cargo behemoths.

The airport is ingeniously divided into two distinct sections. The western precinct is dedicated to civilian air traffic and recently underwent a transformative upgrade with the inauguration of a state-of-the-art terminal in 2021. In stark contrast, the eastern section is a critical military installation, strategically separated by a formidable mountain ridge that aptly demarcates the two domains.

Several military facilities stand out, particularly the robust complex shelters in the airport's eastern sector. These shelters are strictly for military use and have become dominant among regional airbases. In 2021, 24 of these hard structures were identified at the airbase. Today, this number has increased to an impressive 30, each able to house two fighter jets with dimensions of 17 meters in length and 13 meters in breadth. With a formidable lineup of 30 such hard structures bolstered by comprehensive support systems, the military aircraft presence at this facility is anticipated to surpass that of any other airport in the region.

A new runway and taxiway are being constructed in the northern part of a military base near the Yarlung-Sangpo River. The 4,000-meter-long runway appears exclusively for military use, and several hangars and other military buildings are erected in the same area.

Upon careful examination of the high-quality images, we observed two noteworthy features. Firstly, a large structure is built on the ridge's edge, separating the base's civilian and military sections. This structure could be linked to communication centres at the mountain ridge. Although it is unclear whether this facility has multiple uses, it will likely be exclusively for military purposes. Secondly, we noticed small white dots in the nearby fields, which we believe to be harvested crops bundled together.

Although the current image of September 2023 only showed the presence of four military jets, two helicopters, and several military vehicles, China is widely believed to operate sizable air assets.

Nyingchi Manling

Ningxi Manling is an airbase that serves both civilian and military purposes. It is located in the Tibetan region of China and is situated in close proximity to Indian territory. This airbase is the closest to the Indian border in this region, with a distance of only 13 kilometres from Arunachal Pradesh and 65 kilometres from India's Advanced Landing Ground in Tuting. Nestled at an elevation of 3,000 meters, this strategically important airbase is vital to nine airports across China and accommodating up to 85 flights every week. Boasting a single runway equipped with taxiways and measuring 3,000 meters in length, it offers the capability to handle large aircraft, facilitating the transportation of military supplies and the movement of a significant number of personnel.

Below is a breakdown of the critical infrastructure at Nyingchi Manling Airport, with each item assigned a corresponding number for easy identification: 1. A dual-purpose runway and taxiway utilised by civil aircraft and drones; 2. Apron area for civil aviation;3. Advanced military drones, most likely WZ-7; 4. Operational SAM sites with supporting infrastructure; 5. Possible storage facility; 6. Military barracks.

The airbase's facilities are divided into two distinct sections, one catering to civilian operations, situated near the taxiway on the upper part of the base, and the other dedicated to military functions, positioned closer to the runway in the lower section.

Military infrastructure has undergone significant and rapid development since 2017, especially in this airbase. The infrastructure encompasses military barracks and garages within a controlled area. Notably, there have been 35 garages constructed in recent years. These garages may serve as essential storage facilities capable of accommodating supplies, making them instrumental in supporting ground forces and various operations.

The airbase is strategically linked to the S306 highway, providing crucial connectivity to other strategically significant regions. The proximity of the 35 garage blocks to a surface-to-air missile site is particularly important, enhancing the airbase's defences against threats from multiple directions. While this airbase primarily engages in military activities, it is also conceivable that it serves as a base for supporting units in the southeastern parts of the Tibetan region, where access to air infrastructure and airbases is relatively limited compared to other parts of Tibet due to complex mountainous terrain.

Damxung Airbase

Damxung Airbase, perched at an impressive elevation of 4,300 meters, is situated approximately 270 kilometres away from the Indian border. Notably, it is also near Lhasa airport, just 90 kilometres from the capital of Tibet. Since 2020, there has been rapid and ongoing construction activity at this location, culminating in the completion of two expansive runways. Each of these runways spans an impressive five kilometres in length and extends to a width of 50 meters.

These runways are equipped with swift exit facilities, catering to various military requirements. Shortly, there are prospects for the development of hangars, garages, and barracks near the airbase. The airbase location, positioned 30 kilometres from Namcho Lake and above marshland, currently lacks substantial military structures. However, it holds significant potential for dual-purpose utilisation, serving both civilian travel and bolstering military capabilities in the region.

Here is a breakdown of the critical infrastructure at Damxung Airbase, with each item assigned a corresponding number for easy identification: 1. Two long runways that can accommodate advanced fighter jets; 2—a fuel tank installation; 3. A military garage is potentially under construction; 4. The structure of supporting infrastructure, likely hangars; 5. A residential complex; 6. A rapid exit terminal indicates that the runways are designed for fighters and UAVs; 7. Marshland, located next to the airbase construction, may provide an opportunity to claim more land required for expansion in the future.

Shigatse Tingri Airbase

Shigatse Tingri Airbase is one of several airbases that have been under construction since 2017. Due to its remote location, the airbase will likely serve military aircraft, as there is little need or demand for a civilian airport in such an isolated area.

Located approximately 65 kilometres from Nepal's border and perched at an impressive altitude of 4,300 meters, the airbase currently features a 4.5 kilometres long runway and taxiway. It is conveniently linked to Highway G219, which serves the surrounding region.

The airbase is located below the Bamchu River. The river's course was altered to establish the runway with no nearby towns or villages except for a small modern settlement, Ummiki village. Ummiki village has modern infrastructure, including agricultural lands and solar panels, that contributes to the region's development.

Additionally, supporting infrastructure for the airport is currently being developed, and it may take a few years for the airbase to become a fully established airport.

Below is a breakdown of the essential infrastructure at Shigatse Tingri airbase during different periods: 1. The airbase features a long runway that can accommodate advanced, large military aircraft; 2. An old airstrip is also present at the airbase; 3. The expansion of the airbase has impacted the Bamchu River; 4. The construction of terminal buildings has been carried out rapidly; 5. Supporting infrastructure is currently under construction;6. The area's unique surface morphology may naturally facilitate future underground structures.

Common insights

In our examination of the airbases, several commonalities have emerged:

• Notably, these airbases have been strategically located adjacent to water resources, offering many advantages. These water sources serve various essential purposes, including meeting water consumption needs, facilitating construction activities, generating electricity, and supporting military applications. This choice may be attributed to the scarcity of flat, construction-friendly land with suitable soil conditions, often found near riverbanks. It can also be used as a weapon to disrupt the functioning of airbases.

• The region has witnessed a rapid transformation in land use, with formerly barren lands now giving way to agriculture and urban development. This shift hints at a substantial increase in the local population in recent years.

• These airbases are strategically nestled in valleys surrounded by high-altitude mountains, presenting advantages and disadvantages for air operations.

• Finally, an interesting observation is that all military installations are being constructed with self-sufficient infrastructure and amenities to cater to the needs of military personnel and the associated civilian population.

Parting Shot

China's regional strategic infrastructure development is becoming increasingly evident, with a deliberate focus on areas of strategic significance. Among the five airbases examined, three are operational and have embraced a dual-purpose approach, catering not only to civilian needs, such as tourism and economic development but also serving as robust military assets supporting ground troops in the region (Appendix 1). China's strategy of establishing dual-purpose airports is gaining momentum.  The expansion of housing infrastructure in military cantonments and broader villages indicates a significant increase in population compared to pre-standoff periods. However, the emphasis is not solely on quantity but on deploying cutting-edge military technologies and equipment, including advanced aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, missile systems, and anti-missile defence systems. These developments underscore China's heightened combat readiness in the region, signalling a significant shift in military capabilities.

Our detailed analysis of airbases in Tibet using open-source data and advanced remote sensing will be discussed in future newsletters. Stay tuned for captivating insights!

Appendix 1

Backstory

Recent developments have shed light on China's military readiness as tensions rise between China and India on border issues. For the past few years, China has been increasing the deployment of military radars in Tibet, both permanent and mobile installations, to strengthen the first line of defence. In this article, we have studied the satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery and mapped out the locations of these radar systems on the ground using an open-source tool. We also analysed the radar footprints' spatial and temporal aspects, providing a detailed understanding of China's strategic position in Tibet. These findings are crucial in comprehending the current situation in the region and have potential implications for India’s combat readiness.

Role of the Radar in modern-day Military

In the present era, military systems have increasingly relied on deploying radar installations to achieve critical capabilities in various areas such as surveillance, reconnaissance, target detection, tracking, and situational awareness. These capabilities are essential for adequate defence, intelligence gathering, and strategic decision-making and play an integral role in safeguarding national security interests.

Though there are multiple applications of radar, we have picked some specific ones relevant to the current study as follows:

a.   Missile Defence - The significance of early warning radars cannot be overstated when detecting, tracking, and intercepting inbound missiles. These advanced systems are critical in granting vital seconds to react to missile threats and take proactive measures to prevent potential harm or damage.

b.  Surveillance and Detection: Radar systems can constantly monitor vast territories and airspaces to detect and identify potential threats. These systems can effortlessly detect various objects, such as aircraft, missiles, or ships, even in rough weather conditions or poor visibility, ensuring the area's safety under surveillance.

c.  Electronic warfare: In electronic warfare, radar installations serve the purpose of detecting, identifying, and countering enemy radar signals and communication systems.

d.  Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Management: The significance of radars in the control and management of aircraft cannot be minimised, both in civilian and military contexts. These sophisticated systems play an indispensable role in ensuring air travel safety by enabling the detection and avoidance of potential collisions, thereby minimising the risk of accidents. Whether it's tracking the movement of nearby aircraft or identifying potential hazards such as weather patterns or obstacles, radars are a crucial tool for pilots and air traffic controllers.

In short, a nation-state that possesses highly developed radar technologies to track both its territory and that of its adversaries gains an operation edge in warfare.

In the following section, we will share our approach to identifying military radar sites in Tibet and gaining deeper insights by studying the surveillance period, the radar's extent, and spatial context.

Mapping military radars

In February 2022, Ollie Ballinger, a lecturer at the Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis at University College London, developed the radar interference tracker. This was based on the discovery made by Harel Dan, an Israeli Geospatial Engineer, in 2018. The pattern resulting from radio frequency interference between the space-based and ground-based radar systems was inferred using the radar interference tracker.

For this analysis, Spaceborne Sentinel-11 SAR images are utilised. These images are different from optical high-resolution satellite images. Visual images are passive and show features in similar colours as visible to humans. In contrast, SAR is an active system where the sensor transmits energy with a specific frequency and records the intensity of backscattered radiation in decibels (dB)2 in different polarisations.

The variation in dB values depends on the surface feature, with all terrains having minor variations in backscattered energy. The surface material, soil moisture, and roughness largely control the interpretation. However, erratic spikes can be caused by severe interference of signals on the ground, which could be from another high-frequency radar system operating at the same frequency.

The deployment of military radars can create an interference pattern that is distinguishable in Sentinel-1 images after several processes. This pattern forms distinct, evenly spaced stripes that are not to be confused with other forms of artefacts, such as blips, speckles, or waves that varying conditions can cause. Our team conducted a thorough analysis of Sentinel-1 images from 2016 to the present and discovered the presence of red spikes that indicate the frequency of the emitted pulses. In cases where multiple spikes are visible within the same area, numerous observations were made, possibly when the radars were turned on. Despite this procedure being a proper observation method, it has certain limitations. For instance, it can interfere with ground radars that operate at the same frequency and those turned on during the satellite overpass. It is essential to note that Sentinel-1 images can cover the exact location every six days in most areas, with 1A & 1B pair satellites, and 14 days in regions lacking them.

When observing backscattered microwaves in both Sentinel 1A & 1B, areas with red and blue cross stripes may indicate the presence of a Military radar, with the center point of the cross being the likely location.

Military radar activity in the Tibet region

Due to escalating political and military tensions, China has heavily fortified the region with robust military radar systems to monitor major conflict zones, including the LAC, to show their readiness towards any potential threat from India. Over the years, radar monitoring has consistently intensified, with mobile systems being replaced by permanent monitoring stations equipped with high-powered radars in critical areas. The altitude of the radar varies depending on the area being monitored and coverage requirements. Radar may be placed at a lower height where viewshed regions are to be monitored or when the intention is to protect hidden assets. However, some radar signals are picked up at strange locations far away from human settlements and the contested Indo-China border, nullifying the purpose of monitoring critical infrastructure or enemy intrusion.

Occasionally, radar signals are detected instead of the usual radar spikes, suggesting that a site may not be a typical monitoring station. However, this interference is caused by activating an antimissile radar system during military exercises or troop movements along the road.

There have been repeated sightings of strong signals over some mysterious regions, which may indicate an attempt to protect strategic weapons hidden in those locations. Detecting military radar signals in areas with no apparent physical infrastructure is puzzling.

Let's take a closer look at the traits of military radar signals. We'll examine their spatial features that show variations in intensity and time3. Considering the topic's sensitivity, precise coordinates are not provided, and maps are not drawn to scale.

a.  Pangong Tso Lake

Pangong Tso is a high-altitude lake located on the border between India and China. In 2020, Chinese troops attempted to intrude into the lake's southern bank with "proactive military movements”.

Based on our observations, the Southbank area has been consistently monitored, with the highest interference levels occurring between July and November of 2018. We've identified three specific spots that seem to intersect with Highway G219, two of which are monitored regularly. This highway is a significant infrastructure project established by China near the Indian border.

Upon closer inspection of high-resolution images, we noticed a Surface Air Missile (SAM) site near the southern bank. Given its proximity to the national highway G219, it's likely that the interference is caused by a radar beam emitted from the mobile Chinese antimissile system in the area. The fact that we've consistently observed these interferences thus far suggests that the region is being monitored regularly.

b.  Aksai Chin

During our analysis, we've identified three vital radar interference spots in this region. One is located close to Aksai Chin Kul Lake and cuts across the Aksai Chin River. Another is between Gozha Co and Orba Co lakes, near Yesh Hill Chu Valley and Kongka la highway. The third one is near Heishi Beihu Lake in the open valley. We've found multiple spikes since 2017, indicating severe regional radar interference. Different instances of interference indicate multiple ground-based radar systems operating at different times and locations. The radars appear to have been positioned to protect against unauthorised access and safeguard assets constructed or deployed in that vicinity, given that the evident interference patterns are noticeable.

c.  Nagchu

Nagchu is a significant town in Tibet. It has a mixed infrastructure, civil and military facilities and is surrounded by mountains. The townhouses military installations include helicopter bases, radar stations, and other structures. It appears to be one of the few places with a permanent high-frequency radar established to monitor the area continuously. There was another interference detected above Nagchu, situated between the lakes. It was a rare occurrence and could be caused by a mobile radar system.

d. Lhasa

As the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Lhasa holds great cultural, religious, historical, and geopolitical significance. The city is situated at an altitude of around 3700m and is surrounded by tall mountains. The town has a large civilian population, dense physical infrastructure, and a few military installations may exist.

Two major areas in the region experience radar interference. One is in the Lhasa He valley, while the other is located below it over the Yarlung Tsang Po River in Gong Gar County just before entering India. The radar interference can reach as high as -4.5 dB, with significant spikes observed in 2018 and 2021. It is suspected that the radar systems are being used to safeguard the urban and water infrastructure in the area.

e. Shigatse

Shigatse is the second largest city in Tibet and is strategically located. It lies in the direct line of sight to India's Chicken Neck, which connects the Rest of India with north-eastern India. The city is also located on the mighty Yarlung Tsang Po. During our research in this region, we have observed two areas with radar interferences: one over the city of Shigatse and another over Gyantse County. The radar interferences observed over Shigatse covered a very long area, including its peace airport and city. Notably, the radar interference is quite strong over Shigatse, reaching above +1dB value, which may be unusual due to some other strong interferences. However, we have observed regular solid spikes over the region, indicating military radar in both areas. Shigatse's Peace Airport has a dual purpose for civilian and military use and is equipped with various military radar devices.

f. Yadong County

The Yadong County is a significant location in Tibet, situated near the borders of India, Nepal, and Bhutan. It shares boundaries with India's Sikkim state on the west and Bhutan on the south, making it a strategically sensitive region due to its proximity to these countries. Apart from being a vital trade route, the area is also ecologically sensitive.

Through our research, we have pinpointed two zones. One is intended to prevent intrusions from the Indian state of Sikkim, while the other is located on the opposite side of the border with Bhutan. The Sikkim zone was active twice during the winters of 2017 and 2022, with a higher frequency of up to -7 dB. Meanwhile, the area near Dochen Tso Lake, closer to the Bhutan border, has been active recently and operational since 2022.

The critical radar interference locations are compiled in the map below:

Parting Shot

Chinese radars have maintained a consistent presence across regions marked by border disputes and sites of strategic military importance within their territory, utilising high-frequency operations. The radar interference range varies from 28 to 110 km, with most covering 70 to 85 km and some small inferences observed up to 28 to 40 km. Radar interference near Yadong County, close to India's border, uses high-frequency modulation techniques and reveals a narrower gap between pulses. This ongoing operational pattern serves as a testament to China's state of readiness while shedding light on its active strategies as discerned from the intensity and timing of activity.

Although the analysis is limited to a one to two-week time frame due to the satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system, it remains a crucial tool for operation assessment. Its open-source intelligence offers valuable insights into fingerprinting radars, adding to the arsenal of classical Radar Finger Printing Techniques. Our examination has led us to identify a radar with the characteristics of China's Type-381, operating in the G Band frequency.

While our analysis highlights clusters of interference patterns in select areas, it's worth noting that numerous smaller radar footprints exist but are not expounded upon here. It is worth noting that a substantial radar interference was detected near Heishi Bei Lake (roughly 300 kilometres from Aksai Chin in a direct line of sight), near the foothills of a mountain far from any civilian or military establishments. This incident raised suspicions of a concealed structure on the mountain slopes that could serve as an underground facility.

The efficacy of this technique extends beyond China's radars, having successfully mapped radars like the USA's Patriot, Japan's FCS-3, Sweden's STRIL, and Russia's S400. To fortify the credibility of our findings, we've diligently sifted through false positives, cross-referencing them with spatial entities and other contextual factors. Additionally, we've delved into scenarios where non-military radars might exhibit traits akin to military radars under certain conditions, corroborated by insights from weather radars and supplementary sources to prevent misleading results.

As our exploration into this domain continues, we anticipate sharing more comprehensive and in-depth analyses shortly.

The author thanks Mr. Atharwa Sarnobat for his enthusiasm on this topic during the brainstorming sessions.

In March 2021, the 14th five-year plan for China was passed by the National People's Congress in the Chinese Parliament. The plan established quantitative targets in various areas such as economy, trade, defence, science and technology, politics, social issues, culture, the environment, and other policy priorities. Unlike previous plans, this one includes a short section on "long-range objectives for 2035". The third section of the plan focuses on building a modern energy system, which involves constructing clean energy bases across China's administrative regions. One proposed project is to build a hub of renewable energy production in Nyingchi, consisting of hydropower, offshore wind power, and solar power plants. Out of five major “Modern energy System Construction projects”, the hydropower plant in the lower region of Yarlung Tsang Po (also known as the River Brahmaputra in India) is the most ambitious. It is anticipated to produce 60,000 MW, making it a giant hydropower plant. This is three times the current capacity of the world's largest power generation plant, Three Georges Dam, located on the Yangtze River, which has a capacity of 22,500 MW. According to Chinese media sources, the Dam will be built on Yarlung Tsang Po at the Great Bend, taking a "U" turn at Medog County before entering India's Arunachal Pradesh. Reports suggest that India is concerned about China constructing such a massive dam so close to its border (just 22 kilometres away), as it could reduce the natural flow of water downstream and potentially be used as a weapon against India by creating artificial floods. Experts are concerned that the construction of the giant Dam may cause significant harm to the environment and disrupt the livelihoods of individuals residing in the downstream area of the river in northeast India and Bangladesh.

The potential challenges involved in building Dam in Medog

Apart from its strategic significance, the Chinese government has recognised the immense potential for hydropower generation in the Yarlung Tsang Po region of Medog County, the last county before the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The proposed region is one of the world's deepest canyons, immediately after the "U" Bend, where the elevation drops by over 2000 metres. This location is between the Eastern Himalayas' two tallest mountains, Namache Barwa and Gyalaha Peri.

This is not the first time the idea of a hydropower plant in this area has been put forth. Before 2020, there were rumours about a hydropower plant at Namache Barwa that would necessitate the construction of tunnels to divert water from one side of the great bend to the other. It is worth noting that Namche Barwa holds sacred significance to the local communities in the region, including the Adi, Pemaköpa, and Tibetans. However, in the context of the 14th Five-Year Plan, it remains to be seen whether the previously rumoured engineering approach of tunnelling through the mountain will be pursued or if an entirely new engineering feat awaits the world.

China is embarking on a new engineering project that is different from its past dam-building efforts. The location in Medog presents significant challenges due to the rugged terrain and the need for a dam that spans 13 miles in width and three miles in depth within a deep canyon. Additionally, the water flows through the canyon varies naturally due to factors such as snowmelt and monsoon runoff, which must be considered. The project will showcase China's impressive engineering capabilities.

Our inference through satellite images indicates that China is preparing Yarlung Tsang Po to construct the historic Dam. The developments are happening systematically. Settlements and agricultural farms have swiftly been established along the riverbanks, potentially aiding in dam construction and potential growth. An analysis of land use and land cover (LU/LC) change using a 10-metre Sentinel satellite image has revealed a significant shift from open land to settlements or agricultural lands in just three years (2018–2021).

The project's implementation may need help with the region's complicated topography and the effects of climate change. However, the 14th five-year plan emphasises the importance of “implementation”. On the 26th anniversary of the founding of the China Hydropower Engineering Society, Yan Zhiyong, the chairman of China Power Construction Corporation, sees this as a significant opportunity for the hydropower industry. Given the precedent of past dams failing to fulfil their intended purpose of achieving comprehensive flood control, manoeuvring through this intricate hydrological landscape without encountering potential disasters becomes quite challenging.

Status of existing operational dams in China

Before assessing the Medog dam project, we must examine other major hydroelectric initiatives in China.

The Three Gorges Dam

The Three Gorges Dam is built over the Yangtze River, the longest river in Asia and the third longest in the world. The Yangtze River basin covers one-fifth of China’s land territory and accommodates one-third of the people in China. The Dam was primarily built for flood control, irrigation, and electricity generation. However, it has failed to control floods as it was forced to release water due to the unprecedented water flow. It caused severe environmental impacts, such as flooding of animals and plants, threatening more than 400 plant species; the fish population is in peril; the scientific community believes the massive storage of water can create earthquakes; and, more than all, it has displaced more than a million people in the upstream and downstream areas due to changes made in the river morphology.

Our collaborative research using gravity sensors on satellites has shown that an unnatural water accumulation has altered the Earth's gravity. This change is visible in the gravity anomaly map, which shows higher gravity values compared to measurements based on elevation. The gravity gradient indicates relatively higher values in the stored water. The immense pressure from the water storage is suspected to have caused this anomaly. This is a cause for concern as it may lead to catastrophic natural disasters such as earthquakes and landslides. Despite 17 years since the Dam's completion, efforts to restore culture, environment, and ecology are ongoing.

The Mekong River Basin

The Mekong River spans through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam and is home to diverse flora and fauna, including the endangered Mekong giant catfish and Irrawaddy dolphins. However, China has built 11 large dams in the upper river region, causing rising temperatures, changes in rainfall intensity, disruptions in river flow, floods, and droughts. This has destroyed homes, infrastructure, crops, and fisheries, resulting in food shortages and diminished livelihoods for vulnerable communities.

Countries in the lower basins accuse China of not regularly sharing water flow data. Currently, China only shares this information twice a year. This lack of information would make preparing for floods and droughts easier for these countries. Additionally, China is accused of using the water storage capacity in the upper basin as a weapon against the lower region by operating dams erratically. A report from Stimson reveals that China has released less water during the monsoon season while an unprecedented level of water is being released during the summer. This has caused significant disruptions to the way of life for people living in the region and the ecology of species in the plains.

Potential Impacts of Constructing Dam on Yarlung Tsang Po on India and Bangladesh

The Yarlung Tsang Po River originates from the Angsi glacier near Mount Kailash in Tibet and extends for about 3000 km before entering India as the Brahmaputra in Arunachal Pradesh. It collects water from tributaries and traverses through muddy jungle terrain during its journey. Upon reaching Assam, it combines with the Logit and Dibang rivers before entering Bangladesh as the Jamuna. Ultimately, it joins the Teesta and Ganges rivers and empties into the Bay of Bengal. Earlier, the upper regions of the river basin had a minimal human population, whereas the lower parts had millions of people. The basin encompasses an area of 570,000 square kilometres and is inhabited by 130 million people. The river plays a vital role in sustaining the livelihoods of many people in the northeastern states of India and a significant portion of Bangladesh.

We have identified three significant concerns for lower riparian countries, such as China, when an upper riparian country constructs several large dams within its territory.

• Climate Change and Disaster

• Water Shortage and diversion

• Impact on Natural Resources

Climate Change and Disaster

The scientific predictions for climate change in the region are concerning. As the Earth warms by 1.5 and 2.0 degrees Celsius, we can expect a higher rate of glacier melting and extreme precipitation. This could lead to unprecedented rates of water flow and floods. The north-eastern states of India and Bangladesh are already experiencing severe flood events and may face more challenges due to climate change. While climate change is perceived as a global issue, the area's topography determines specific disasters such as landslides, earthquakes, and floods. The Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is highly susceptible to landslides, especially in the river basin. Additionally, the state is prone to frequent earthquakes due to orogenic tectonic activity, where the Eurasian and Indian subcontinent plates grind against each other. Constructing a massive dam in the fragile geology of the lower river reaches, which can stress the ecosystem, could lead to catastrophic events.

Impact on Natural Resources

The construction of large dams can significantly impact river systems, including water extraction for agriculture and power generation, as well as the displacement of human and non-human habitats. The proposed Medog hydroelectric project is located in a sparsely populated area with only 14,000 people, according to a 2017 news report. However, the physical development in the region would likely increase this number. Millions of people living in the Indian part of the region are at risk due to the impact on natural resources. The primary concern is the silt flowing from the upper riparian region, which is rich in minerals and vital for agriculture and riverbank stability. The construction of a massive dam in Medog could restrict the flow of silt, which would significantly impact the biodiversity of Arunachal Pradesh, one of India's two major biodiversity hotspots. In contrast, the Tibetan plateau receives less rainfall and tends to be colder, resulting in lower biodiversity, so China has little to lose from the dam's construction.

Water Shortage and Diversion

There is growing concern that areas downstream may face water shortages due to water diversion and limited storage capacity. Even a tiny alteration in water release schedules from these dams can significantly impact the surrounding communities and ecosystems that depend on consistent access to water and are accustomed to specific patterns. China's 14th five-year plan seeks to tap renewable energy potential in underutilised regions, which may require diverting the river that flows towards India at the "U" bend. Furthermore, China's actions concerning transboundary cooperation in the Mekong Basin have led people to anticipate a similar or worse situation in the Yarlung Tsang Po.

Transboundary River Management Challenges

Despite numerous obstacles related to transboundary rivers, such as disputes over sovereignty and ownership, unequal distribution of water resources, environmental impacts, climate change concerns, limited information sharing and management, and geopolitical factors, the absence of a legal framework stands out as a significant barrier. Conflicts and difficulties in resolving disputes can arise without such a framework, hindering cooperation and efficient management.

India and China have not entered into a specific legal agreement regarding the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River, despite having previously held discussions on numerous topics, including the Brahmaputra. There are no current intentions for a comprehensive water-sharing agreement regarding this river.

Typically, transboundary disputes between lower and upper riparian countries are resolved through bilateral negotiations, international mediation, international arbitration, engagement with regional organisations, establishing treaties and agreements, and, in extreme cases, recourse to international courts. However, regarding the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River, the complex geopolitics between China and India, combined with ongoing border disputes and military tensions in the region, severely limit the options for resolving the dispute.

From China’s Perspective

China wants to achieve the ambitious target of achieving net carbon neutrality by 2060. To support this significant endeavour, the country is actively exploring utilising hydroelectric energy reserves in Tibet, focusing on the Yarlung Tsang Po River. With an immense capacity to generate up to 76 million KW of energy, the Yarlung Tsang Po River is considered a key source. Other viable rivers, such as the Nu, Lancing, and Jinsha, are also under scrutiny.

The Yarlung Tsang Po River can provide 30 million KW of energy. This exceptional potential is attributed to its strategic location amidst towering mountains, which enables an impressive flow rate and, thus, generation capacity that surpasses even the mighty Three Gorges Dam by threefold. China recognises the significance of dams and other renewable energy sources in ensuring energy self-sufficiency in the region and emphasises its commitment to taking stringent measures to safeguard the well-being of the local population, protect the environment, and preserve the area's cultural heritage.

Parting Shot

Based on our satellite imagery analysis, China is steadily progressing towards constructing massive dams in Medog, as seen through the rapid development of quality mountain roads, border villages, and smaller dams along the river. From a strategic perspective, monitoring these periodic developments closely is imperative. Despite China's utilisation of the latest technology and extreme precautions to safeguard the environment during the construction of the Medog dam, there is no guarantee that it will not lead to disastrous consequences, given the region's susceptibility and unpredictable nature.

Such developments will predominantly affect the Indian side, as the proposed dam site is only a few kilometres from India's Arunachal Pradesh. The rich ecosystem and cultural heritage of the people in north-eastern India and Bangladesh would inevitably suffer, as there are no stringent international regulations or effective treaties governing transboundary rivers. The dam's construction in Medog can be likened to playing with fire in the sensitive Himalayan ecosystem.

It is uncertain whether the Medog Dam could be used as a weapon against India, like in the recent conflict in Ukraine. However, any actions that disrupt the region's natural flow, patterns, and ecosystem could indirectly cause harm and potentially be exploited during dispute negotiations.

Unfortunately, India has limited resources to protect itself from this issue. However, building dams downstream can help prevent artificial flooding attempts. Monitoring the region during and after the dam is constructed is essential. India can also use remote sensing datasets, including high-resolution satellite images, radar data, and other IoT sensors, to monitor water levels, surface changes, and topography beyond its borders. This will help predict and give people early warnings. Additionally, it's essential to regularly apply diplomatic pressure on China and raise concerns on appropriate international platforms, backed up with evidence of potential impacts.

Overall, the ongoing and future developments in Medog demand vigilant attention and proactive measures to safeguard the transboundary region's interests and inhabitants. Furthermore, periodic Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments can promote transparency and cooperation between upper and lower riparian nations.

The future edition will feature our in-depth analysis of this topic, exploring Hydrology, Ecology, Terrain, and security perspectives.

Disclaimer: Please be aware that the information and opinions provided in this newsletter are intended for informational purposes only. The views expressed herein are subject to variation based on factors such as individual interpretation, research methodologies, and the availability of reliable data sources. We advise readers to exercise their own judgement and consider multiple sources of information before drawing any conclusions or making decisions based on the content presented in this newsletter.

Recent satellite images show that there has been significant military development in the Coco Islands groups. The Coco Islands are popular due to their strategic location, which is directly in line with the Malacca Strait, a vital point for global oil supply routes from the Gulf to the South East and India's key defence establishments to the West. Also, the islands are only 54km from the Indian Military base in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Chinese Military is believed to be monitoring the Indian Naval base Visakhapatnam, DRDO's Integrated Test Range facility in Balasore District of Odisha, and more importantly, activities in Malacca Strait through a signal intelligence facility on the island. Having a signal post nearby and a direct line of sight is essential for signal intelligence and eavesdropping on conversations from the other side. Satellite images show a noticeable military presence in different parts of Coco Island groups, including - Slipper Island, Table Island, Great Coco Island, Jerry Island, and Little Coco Island. It's important to note that Little Coco Island is located on the Little Coco Reef, while the other four islands are situated on the Great Coco Reef.

The speculations around the island group are apparent, given the quantum of developmental activities happening in recent years. The construction and operation of such a sophisticated military base far from Yangon City in Myanmar, which Myanmar itself neither needs nor has the financial means to afford, strongly indicates that it may have been clandestinely established and is being operated by China. The Coco Islands remain a fascinating and enigmatic corner of our world, inviting people to explore and uncover their secrets.

Recent speculation

This is not the first time the coco islands have been in the limelight. The place gained prominence and became a concern for the strategic community in India in the early 90s when it was believed that a Chinese signal intelligence facility was established with a 45-50 m antenna tower, radar station and other electronic facilities. Since then, the development activities in this area have been increasing and are getting attention only when high-resolution satellite images are released. A report by Chatham House based on high-resolution Maxar satellite images of January 2023 divulges new construction activity on the Great Coco Island. The report indicates that "Myanmar could conduct naval surveillance operations from Great Coco Island. As stated previously, it is unlikely that the Myanmar Navy could conduct surveillance operations independently. The constructions, such as an extended runway, new hangers, a large pier, and suspicious constructions on this isolated archipelago near a strategic Indian navy outpost, are currently shrouded in mystery".

Military development in the Coco Islands group

A decade's satellite imagery shows a deliberate and continuous construction of military infrastructure on the islands to support all military branches, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We conducted a thorough analysis of the islands using remote sensing techniques, leading to various observations that reveal their unique characteristics and features.

A mysterious “radar station”

On top of Great Coco Island, a radar station has been strategically placed at a height of 102 meters above sea level for military purposes. In December 2013, satellite images showed that trees had been cleared and construction was underway. The image of April 2022 indicates that the station has been strengthened and converted into a fully functioning signal intelligence post with a robust military radar infrastructure. With this radar system, the military can monitor and collect information on air and maritime activities within Myanmar's borders, thereby improving their border security and defence capabilities. However, the Chinese may also use this to monitor activities in India's Andaman Nicobar and far away - the western coast of India and Malacca Straight using High-Frequency radar. There are suspicions of cooperation between Myanmar and China in installing this radar, a source of worry for India.

Towards a bigger airbase

Our analysis of satellite imagery of Great Coco Island on Google Earth has revealed significant expansions to the runway and infrastructure. The northern end of the runway was extended between October 2014 and October 2016, resulting in a longer runway of 2.5km instead of 1.5km. Furthermore, the width of the runway was increased from 30m to 50m around 2020 and 2021. An operational hangar of approximately 46m x 45m has been in use since last year, and land has been cleared near the runway, suggesting that additional hangars may be constructed in the future. On the western side of the airstrip, we observed the emergence of several buildings that could support the infrastructure of a military base between 2017 and 2018. Some buildings are guarded with tall walls, indicating they are likely part of a military establishment and not civilian housing. With these expansions, the airbase will be able to house a wide range of modern aircraft, including many Chinese military planes.

The Enigmatic part of the Unseen Coco Island

 Little Coco Island, located just 15km southwest of Great Coco Island, appeared to be a crucial military hub. Despite being the second largest island in the Coco Islands group, with a length of approximately 5km and a maximum width of 1.3km, it is covered in dense vegetation and lacks any civilian community. The thick coral reefs and dense vegetation surrounding the island make it unsuitable for civilian habitation.

Significantly, two well-maintained helipads with a radius of 7m were discovered next to each other at the highest point of the island and were established in 2017, becoming operational in 2018. Furthermore, two shelters accommodating 100-150 people were found roughly 350m from the helipads. Although the shelter appears old, it might have been operational for up to two decades. In addition, a third helipad was found in the northern plain region of the island, which has been inactive for over a decade. The helipads and shelter are connected well with the road network. The existence of these facilities in such a remote location on the island has sparked speculation regarding potential military activities in the area.

Declining vegetation

The island groups are primarily covered in evergreen forests, which house various species. However, our research indicates that these islands' vegetation has decreased. We utilised time series and open-source Landsat satellite imagery to observe that although there are seasonal changes in vegetation density, the overall health and density of the vegetation cover have been declining. The time series was performed over NDVI (Normalised Difference Vegetation Index). Higher values indicate healthy vegetation, while lower values indicate poor or no vegetation. Despite increasing rainfall over the last thirty years, raising ambient temperature may not be a concern as the place exhibits similar climatic conditions throughout the year and experiences good rainfall except for three months (January, February, and March) in a year. It is essential to note the stark contrast in vegetation cover between Little Coco Island and Great Coco Island. Regrettably, the central region of Little Coco Island has undergone a substantial deterioration in both the quantity and quality of its vegetation, which was once flourishing. The decline is evident in the False Colour Composite (FCC) of Infrared, Red, and Green used in digital image processing to visualise the quality and quantity of vegetation cover. Dark red indicates highly dense vegetation and light red indicates sparse vegetative surface. The reduction in vegetation cover appears to be linked to potential military infrastructure over the years rather than climate change.

Parting Shot

The recent developments in the Great and Little Coco Islands suggest an increased likelihood of extensive military activity. These developments include changes to land cover, deforestation, and the construction of larger airbases, helipads, naval piers, and advanced signal intelligence facilities. Myanmar's relationship with China makes the island group a potential military outpost for China. This would enable China to closely monitor India's nearby military installations and movements in Malacca Strait and the Bay of Bengal.

Our comprehensive examination of the Great and Little Coco Islands has uncovered compelling evidence of an underground facility that may be assisting Chinese submarines. This finding holds significant strategic operational and tactical implications for the Indo-Pacific region. Keep an eye out for our subsequent newsletter, which will provide further details on this crucial topic.

Disclaimer: Please note that the research analysis and interpretation of remote sensing data may vary concerning the algorithm used, level of data processing, analyst skills, and quality of input datasets. The inferences compiled here are limited to the open-source dataset and tools available to the research team.

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